Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-lj6df Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-08T06:30:47.809Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Detecting Audience Costs in International Disputes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Shuhei Kurizaki  and
Taehee Whang
Get access

Abstract

Selection effects in crisis bargaining make it difficult to directly measure audience costs because state leaders have an incentive to avoid incurring audience costs. We overcome this inferential problem of selection bias by using a structural statistical model. This approach allows us to estimate the size of audience costs, both incurred and not incurred, in international crises. We show that although audience costs exist for state leaders of various regime types, democratic leaders face larger audience costs than nondemocratic leaders do. Audience costs can be so large that war might be preferable to concessions, especially for leaders of highly democratic states. Audience costs also increase a state's bargaining leverage in crises because the target state is more likely to acquiesce if the challenge carries larger audience costs. We also find evidence that audience costs generate selection effects.

Type
Research Article
Information
International Organization , Volume 69 , Issue 4 , Fall 2015 , pp. 949 - 980
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ashworth, Scott, and Ramsay, Kristopher W.. 2010. When Are Audience Costs Socially Optimal? Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.Google Scholar
Barabas, Jason, and Jerit, Jennifer. 2010. Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid? American Political Science Review 104 (2):226–42.Google Scholar
Baumol, William J. 1958. The Cardinal Utility Which Is Ordinal. Economic Journal 68 (272):665–72.Google Scholar
Bennett, D. Scott, and Stam, Allan C. III. 2003. The Behavioral Origins of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Braithwaite, Alex, and Lemke, Douglas. 2011. Unpacking Escalation. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28 (2):111–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brecher, Michael, and Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1997. A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes. International Organization 56 (4):861–87.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Lalman, David. 1992. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Busch, Marc L. 2000. Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes Under GATT. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (4):425–46.Google Scholar
Desch, Michael C. 2002. Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters. International Security 27 (2):5–47.Google Scholar
Dorussen, Han, and Mo, Jongryn. 2001. Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (4):395–426.Google Scholar
Downes, Alexander B., and Sechser, Todd S.. 2012. The Illusion of Democratic Credibility. International Organization 66 (3):457–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1992. Threats to Use Force: The Role of Costly Signals in International Crises. PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994a. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88 (3):577–92.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1994b. Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 (2):236–69.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization 49 (3):379–414.Google Scholar
Fearon, James D. 2002. Selection Effects and Deterrence. International Interactions 28 (1):5–29.Google Scholar
Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1999. Actors and Preferences. In Strategic Choice and International Relations, edited by Lake, David A. and Powell, Robert, 39–77. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik. 2000. Preferences and the Democratic Peace. International Studies Quarterly 44 (2):191–212.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Li, Quan. 2003. War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization. International Studies Quarterly 47 (4):561–86.Google Scholar
Gartzke, Erik, and Lupu, Yonatan. 2012. Still Looking for Audience Costs. Security Studies 21 (3):391–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gelpi, Christopher F., and Griesdorf, Michael. 2001. Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94. American Political Science Review 95 (3):633–47.Google Scholar
Ghosn, Faten, Palmer, Glenn, and Bremer, Stuart. 2004. The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description. Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2):133–54. <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/10168>. Accessed 15 February 2013.Google Scholar
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, Salehyan, Idean, and Schultz, Kenneth. 2008. Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (4):479–506.Google Scholar
Goemans, Hein Erich. 2000. War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gowa, Joanne. 1999. Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Heckman, James J. 2000. Causal Parameters and Policy Analysis in Economics: A Twentieth Century Retrospective. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (1):45–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holsti, Ole R. 1996. Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Huth, Paul K., and Allee, Todd L.. 2002. The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kurizaki, Shuhei. 2007. Efficient Secrecy: Public Versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy. American Political Science Review 101 (3):543–58.Google Scholar
Leeds, Brett Ashley. 1999. Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation. American Journal of Political Science 43 (4):979–1002.Google Scholar
Levendusky, Matthew S., and Horowitz, Michael C.. 2012. When Backing Down Is the Right Decision. Journal of Politics 74 (2):323–38.Google Scholar
Leventoğlu, Bahar, and Tarar, Ahmer. 2005. Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and International Bargaining. American Political Science Review 99 (3):419–33.Google Scholar
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A.. 2003. Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information. Political Analysis 11 (4):345–67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A.. 2005. Estimating State Preferences in International Crises: Promise and Limitations in Fully Structural Models. Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Los Angeles and Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.Google Scholar
Marschak, Jacob. 1953. Economic Measurements for Policy and Prediction. In Studies in Econometric Method, edited by Hood, William C. and Koopmans, Tjalling C., 1–27. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Martin, Lisa L. 1993. Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions. World Politics 45 (3):406–32.Google Scholar
Mearsheimer, John J. 1989. Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics. International Security 13 (4):54–89.Google Scholar
Mercer, Jonathan. 2012. Audience Costs Are Toys. Security Studies 21 (3):398–404.Google Scholar
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Campbell, Sally Howard. 1991. Domestic Structure, Decision Constraints, and War. Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (2):187–211.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morrow, James D. 1989. Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science 33 (4):941–72.Google Scholar
Morton, Rebecca B. 1999. Methods and Models: A Guide to the Empirical Analysis of Formal Models in Political Science. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Nevo, Aviv, and Whinston, Michael D.. 2010. Taking the Dogma Out of Econometrics: Structural Modeling and Credible Inference. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (2):69–82.Google Scholar
Partell, Peter J., and Palmer, Glenn. 1999. Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes. International Studies Quarterly 43 (2):389–405.Google Scholar
Powell, Robert. 2002. Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. Annual Review of Political Science 5:1–30.Google Scholar
Prins, Brandon C. 2003. Institutional Instability and the Credibility of Audience Costs: Political Participation and Interstate Crisis Bargaining, 1816–1992. Journal of Peace Research 40 (1):67–84.Google Scholar
Reiter, Dan, and Stam, Allan C.. 2002. Democracies at War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 1999. Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War. International Organization 53 (2):233–66.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. Looking for Audience Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (1):32–60.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A. 2012. Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now. Security Studies 21 (3):396–75.Google Scholar
Schultz, Kenneth A., Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Zucco, Cesar. 2012. Coercive Diplomacy Data Base [Data file and code book]. Available at http://amypond.sscnet.ucla.edu/cddb/index. Accessed 13 February 2013.Google Scholar
Schweller, Randall L. 1996. Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: “What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies 5 (3):90–121.Google Scholar
Sechser, Todd S. 2011. Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28 (4):377–401.Google Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict. American Political Science Review 93 (2):279–98.Google Scholar
Signorino, Curtis S. 2002. Strategy and Selection in International Relations. International Interactions 28 (1):93–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Slantchev, Branislav L. 2006. Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs. International Studies Quarterly 50 (2):445–77.Google Scholar
Slantchev, Branislav L. 2012. Audience Cost Theory and Its Audiences. Security Studies 21 (3):376–82.Google Scholar
Smith, Alastair. 1998. International Crises and Domestic Politics. American Political Science Review 92 (3):623–38.Google Scholar
Smith, Alastair 1999. Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation. American Journal of Political Science (4):1254–83.Google Scholar
Snyder, Jack, and Borghard, Erica D.. 2011. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. American Political Science Review 105 (3):437–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tomz, Michael. 2007. Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach. International Organization 61 (4):821–40.Google Scholar
Trachtenberg, Marc. 2012. Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis. Security Studies 21 (1):3–42.Google Scholar
Trager, Robert F., and Vavreck, Lynn. 2011. The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining: Presidential Rhetoric and the Role of Party. American Journal of Political Science 55 (3):526–45.Google Scholar
Wand, Jonathan. 2006. Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The Role of Uncertainty and Signaling. Political Analysis 14 (1):101–20.Google Scholar
Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. International Organization 62 (1):35–64.Google Scholar
Whang, Taehee. 2010. Empirical Implications of Signaling Models: Estimation of Belief Updating in International Crisis Bargaining. Political Analysis 18 (3):381–402.Google Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Kurizaki Supplementary Material

Zip

Download Kurizaki Supplementary Material(File)
File 616.2 KB