¹ Of a total of fourteen specialized agencies China is a member of twelve. The exceptions are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), from which China withdrew in 1952, and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Table I below lists the UN bodies which Peking could in theory be invited to join. (In addition, there is a “Chinese” seat in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee [ENDC].)

² The Assembly in 1950 adopted a resolution recommending “that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly … should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies.” (General Assembly Resolution 396 ]V], December 14, 1950.)

³ Tables II and III give the record of the General Assembly voting on this issue and the changes therein.

⁴ Table IV below lists the countries recognizing both Chinas.

⁵ “Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” UN Monthly Chronicle, 10 1965 (Vol. 2, No. 9), p. 115Google Scholar.

The Secretary-General repeated the call for universality in the introduction to his 1965 annual report:

It is impossible, moreover, to view some of these outstanding problems—whether it is the position of the United Nations in regard to the crisis in South East Asia or the lack of progress in disarmament—without relating them to the fact the United Nations has not yet attained die goal of universality of membership. In the long run die Organization cannot be expected to function to full effect if one fourth of the human race is not allowed to participate in its deliberations. I know that diere are serious political difficulties involved in correcting this situation; but I hope that the long-term advantages may be more clearly seen and die necessary adjustments made.

(“Introduction to the Annual Report of die Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” UN Monthly Chronicle, 10 1966 [Vol. 3, No. 9, section I ], p. 121Google Scholar.)

⁶ “Address of Pope Paul VI to the United Nations,” UN Monthly Chronicle, 11 1965 (Vol. 2, No. 10), p. 67Google Scholar.

⁷ Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy was reported to have told an audience that in view of the current “convulsions” in China, Washington felt this was the wrong time to revise its position “lest it be an encouragement to the hard-liners in Peking.” (The New York Times, November 29, 1966.)

⁸ News conference reported in The New York Times, September 17, 1966.

⁹ Statement on China policy delivered March 16, 1966, before a closed session of the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. (The New York Times, April 17, 1966.)

¹⁰ Opinion-forming American groups on both sides of this issue are usefully summarized in “The China Problem,” Intercom, 01–02 1965 (Vol. 7, No. 1), pp. 44–59Google Scholar.

¹¹ “The American Public's View of U.S. Policy,” published as the appendix to Steele, A. T., The American People and China (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966)Google Scholar, a volume in the series of the Council on Foreign Relations' project on “The United States and China in World Affairs.”

¹² Drew Middleton in The New York. Times, June 26, 1966. A Gallup poll released in November 1964 found that 57 percent believed Communist China should not be admitted, 20 percent believed it should, and 23 percent expressed no opinion. A special survey by Louis Harris released in the same month found 56 percent opposed to admission, 25 percent in favor, and 19 percent not sure. A National Analysts, Inc., poll in April 1966 showed 57 percent opposed, 25 percent in favor, and 18 percent neutral. However, in 1964, 77 percent believed that the United States should remain in the United Nations if Communist China were admitted, 7 percent would want the United States to pull out, and 16 percent were not sure. For detailed figures also see Hero, Alfred O. Jr, “The American Public and the UN,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12 1966 (Vol. 10, No. 4), pp. 436–475CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Speech to National Press Club, April 19, 1966, reported in the Washington Post, April 20, 1966. Freedom House, a dedicated anti-Communist organization, publicly adopted a similar line in a statement released June 13, 1966. (Freedom House News Letter, July 1966.)

¹⁴ New York Times, April 7, 1966.

¹⁵ Ibid., March 14, 1966.

¹⁶ Kenworthy, E. W. in The New York Times, 03 11, 1966Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Lieutenant General James M. Gavin (Retired), Chairman of the Board of Arthur D. Little, Inc., in speech at Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts, reported in ibid., April 15, 1966.

¹⁸ The vote was taken on November 29, 1966. There were 34 in favor, 62 against, with 25 abstentions.

¹⁹ General Assembly Resolution 1668 (XVI), 12 14, 1961Google Scholar. The vote then was 61 (58.6 percent) in favor of the United States position and 34 (32.7 percent) against.

²⁰ I owe this suggestion to my colleague Lucian W. Pye.

²¹ See, for example, Halperin, Morton H., Is China Turning In?, Occasional Paper No. 12 (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 12 1965)Google Scholar, with comments by Lincoln P. Bloomfield, William H. Gleysteen, Milton Kate, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Dwight H. Perkins, and Marshall Shulman.

²² See Halperin, Morton H. and Perkins, Dwight H., Communist China and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research Center, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1965), p. 149Google Scholar.

²³ Ibid., p. 150, citing the People's Daily of June 18, 1958.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ A recent survey indicates that in 1965 Peking pledged only $50 million in aid compared with $330 million the previous year. (Topping, Seymour, The New York Times, 02 16, 1966Google Scholar.)

²⁶ Quoted by Topping, Seymour, “Southeast Asia Isn't Scared by Chinese Dragon,” The New York Times Magazine, 01 16, 1966, p. 13Google Scholar.

²⁷ Pravda, November 28, 1966.

²⁸ See, for instance, Zagoria, Donald S., “China's Strategy—A Critique,” Commentary, 11 1965 (Vol. 40, No. 5), pp. 61–66Google Scholar. Recently translated secret Chinese source material indicates the view that although the United States shows no present sign of “sincerity,” “the far-reaching view of the relationship between the two countries is optimistic and some day this problem will arrive at a satisfactory solution.” (Cheng, J. Chester [ed.], The Politics of the Chinese Red Army—A Translation of the Bulletin of Activities of the People's Liberation Army [Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966], p. 486Google Scholar.) But for the Americans to pin their hopes on “peaceful evolution” is a pipe dream, according to an editorial in Jen-min Jih-pao, reprinted in The New York Times, April 7, 1966.

²⁹ Exchange of cablegrams between the Secretary-General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (UN Document S/3358). The Chinese regime has referred to United States policy as the “one-and-a-half China” policy since it virtually admits Chinese suzerainty over Taiwan. See Cheng, , The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, p. 487Google Scholar.

³⁰ Press conference, September 29, 1965 (New China News Agency).

³¹ Quoted in “The China Problem,” Intercom, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 25Google Scholar.

³² Foreign Ministry statement, December 1, 1965, reported in The New York Times, December 2, 1965.

³³ ibid., January 26, 1965.

³⁴ See The Economist, 08 20, 1966 (Vol. 220, No. 6417), pp. 709–710Google Scholar, quoted approvingly by President Lyndon B. Johnson in his speech of August 30, 1966, reported in The New Yor\ Times, August 31, 1966.

³⁵ See the address “The United States and Communist China” by Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy made before the Associated Students of Pomona College at Pomona, California, on February 12, 1966, in Department of State Bulletin, 02 28, 1966 (Vol. 59, No. 1392), p. 316Google Scholar.

³⁶ Cheng, , The Politics of the Chinese Red Army, p. 480Google Scholar.

³⁷ “Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. 3, No. 9, section I, p. 121Google Scholar.

³⁸ Address to the General Assembly's 1413th plenary meeting, September 23, 1966, reported in The New York Times, September 24, 1966.

³⁹ The New York Times, April 30, 1966.

⁴⁰ Some of these points were rehearsed in Bloomfield, Lincoln P., “The UN at Twenty and After,” Headline Series, 10 1965 (No. 173)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Sorensen, Theodore C., Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 755Google Scholar.