This paper examines China's emerging animal anti-cruelty law and the extent to which it meets established animal welfare norms or not. Features that render the draft laws distinctly Chinese include the restrictive interpretation of cruelty as deliberate abuse, stringent pet control stipulations, and compromises on the consumption of dogs and cats. Meanwhile, the draft laws also reflect the Western experience. Animals are categorised according to their use; the ‘unnecessary suffering’ concept is the central philosophical tenet; and the enactment of the law will certainly result from strategic, pragmatic compromise. We conclude that 200 years of animal protection policy-making, the involvement of policy elites in drafting the Chinese laws, and the globalisation of trade, have made it difficult for China to do anything other than develop an animal protection regime broadly consistent with what exists in the West, although some unique Chinese features can also be identified in the proposed laws.

Among the diverse approaches to comparison in socio-legal studies, those that employ qualitative research, richness of detail and attention to context are the focus of this special issue. The Introduction draws on comparative law and social science literature to argue that comparison amongst studies of laws in contexts can follow different trajectories: the comparison may start from an assumption of similarity – in form, purposes or context – in order to identify significant differences; or it may identify significant similarity across social and cultural divides. What unites many of the projects of comparison undertaken by qualitative empirical researchers is that the points of relevant comparison are identified within the complexity of the empirical studies at hand; and they are allowed to emerge, or change, as the researcher comes to understand the facts and issues more deeply.

This paper distinguishes three ideal-type contexts in which comparisons are used: comparison as a contribution to disciplinary enquiry, as part of deliberately trying to learn lessons and as an essential element of a new form of governmentality concerned with ranking places in terms of social indicators. After offering examples of the way comparisons are employed (and criticised) in each of these exercises, the paper ends by discussing the overlap and feedback between them.

Focusing on the history of US anthropology between World War II and the high point of the Vietnam War protests in the late 1960s, this paper aims to historicise the assumed epistemological divide between anthropological and legal thinking. It is shown how anthropology as a discipline in the US has restructured some of its basic assumptions and changed its institutional structure in the context of legal interventions in larger struggles, specifically the court-based battles against racial segregation and the legal proceedings related to indigenous land rights before the Indian Claims Commission. Special consideration is given to an analysis of how objectivity is conceptualised in the literature on anthropological expert witnessing: from mechanical objectivity before 1970 to critical objectivity after 1970. The paper concludes with a caveat against exaggerating existing epistemological differences between anthropology and law, and suggests a more pragmatic approach to interdisciplinary communication.

The Revolution of 25 April 1974 had a strong impact on justice in Portugal. Initially, it can be said that there was evidence of a process of democratisation involving the judicial structures, together with effective improvements to conditions allowing for independent and autonomous professional performance. However, in analysing the course of judicial reforms, it can be seen that changes took place more on a legislative level than in terms of the performance of the courts, proving that the evolution of the judicial system still demands a change of the legal culture. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to reflect on the evolution of the legal architecture in Portugal, seeking to determine whether the transition to a democratic judicial system is complete or whether, on the contrary, we are still faced with the process of justice in transition, delaying any changes in the current legal culture.

Death investigation and coronial practices have undergone significant social, political and legal scrutiny in recent years. A wave of coronial reform has occurred across jurisdictions, including in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada and New Zealand, with a concomitant focus on the adequacy of death investigation law and policy. Taking key coronial developments in the UK and Australia as its starting point, this paper explores a legal jurisdiction undergoing immense legal and policy reform to illustrate why coronial law and practice is of increasing scholarly interest. It begins by tracing the contentious landscape of UK coronial law reform, which has also resonated internationally, thereafter examining key controversies that refocused attention on the value of the jurisdiction, before discussing contemporary coronial issues including, publicity, human rights and death prevention.

This paper deals with social anthropologists serving as expert witnesses in asylum proceedings in the UK. It argues that it is not a fundamental epistemological divide, but rather massive power differentials that characterise the relationship between social anthropologists and legal practitioners in this context. Within a narrow framework provided by the law, which focuses on ‘true facts’ and ‘objective evidence’, social anthropologists have to position themselves, and they often must do so somewhere along a spectrum from positivist to post-positivist positions (regarding, for example, such concepts as ‘culture’ and ‘identity’). This, as well as their subordinate position in the context of the proceedings, sits uneasily with the professional, moral and ethical standards of their discipline. Engagement as an expert, therefore, comes with certain costs for social anthropologists that range from having to bend one's own epistemological perspective to the risk of being ‘demolished’ as an expert (and beyond) in sometimes implicitly politicised asylum decisions.

This paper argues for a new approach to understanding statelessness. It explores the limits of international laws on statelessness and the relationships between statelessness, diaspora and nationalism. It discusses how the condition of statelessness has affected Kurds, and how statelessness has been constructed and experienced at an individual and collective level in the diaspora. It argues for an expanded definition of the international laws of ‘stateless’ person: adding to the accepted de jure and highly contested de facto definitions, by also suggesting a third, new, category of ‘socially stateless’ people. The paper examines the concept of diaspora itself from the perspective of Kurdish interviewees and explores how, for stateless groups like Kurds, ‘living in diaspora’ can mean more than one place, including their land of origin. It will suggest the concept of ‘double’ or ‘multiple’ diasporas, where stateless people do not feel that they belong either to their country of origin or to the country in which they now live. The paper discusses the idea that when an ethnic community is stateless, then even those individuals who have an official nationality, citizenship or passport may often describe themselves as stateless. The relationship between statelessness, diaspora and nationalism is highlighted; and the impact of this on diaspora involvement in homeland politics, conflict and peace is explored. The paper also argues that the lack of protection which international law(s) offer around statelessness paradoxically create new forms of nationalism.

Lord Neuberger describes open justice as a procedural principle requiring that ‘what goes on in court and what a court decides is open to scrutiny’ (Neuberger, 2011). The prime rationale given for this principle is that it is a safety check on procedural fairness. Such a conception of open justice applies on only a superficial level in inquests into use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state. This paper examines the practice of, and rationales behind, opening up use-of-force deaths at the hands of the state to scrutiny through inquests. They suggest a primarily intrinsic rather than instrumental link between openness and inquests’ purposes, which requires a reframing of traditional conceptions of open justice in this context. It is further argued that recognition theory can provide the normative link between openness and justice in these circumstances – a link that is implicit in the term ‘open justice’ but rarely explored in inquests.

This paper examines the idea of a common European legal culture by exploring its foundational component, ‘collective legal consciousness’, in three EU states: the UK, Poland and Bulgaria. Using a comparative research design and a variety of methods of data collection, it suggests that, underneath the thin layer of EU consensus, there are some fundamental differences in perceptions of law. The evidence shows that legal ideas are infused with perceptions of the political system. This finding suggests that the creation of a shared European legal culture depends on the prior formation of a common transnational polity right across the EU, together with a sense of political identity and of trust in the legitimacy of the European political authorities. The paper also demonstrates the multilayered character of collective legal consciousness, allowing different images of law to co-exist, underpinned by the perception of the source with which each image is associated.

This paper examines the potential use and limits of Zweigert and Kötz's classical functional approach in comparative law for an empirical socio-legal research project. The project involves a comparison of the formal labour laws and informal norms and institutions which regulate restaurant work in the cities of Melbourne, Australia, and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The paper argues that the functional approach is a necessary but incomplete method for overcoming the many issues of comparability between the two research sites; the method requires both extension of its analytical steps and explicit explanation of its limitations.

This paper contributes to the debate on the role of anthropological expertise in the legal sphere by broadening the analytical field of vision. Rather than focusing on the anthropologist, his or her positionality, the epistemic status of anthropological knowledge or the ensuing ethical questions – as the other contributions to this themed section do – we turn the question around. Based on empirical data from a survey conducted among European judges on judiciary practice and sociocultural diversity, our focus here is on the question of how judges perceive, assess and accommodate sociocultural diversity in their daily decision-making. We furthermore investigate the conditions under which external expertise is called upon in specific legal settings and situations. We develop a conceptual argument for rethinking the role of anthropological knowledge and research in legal practice and argue for the need to pursue new forms of collaborative ethnography with judges that go beyond participant observation of their courtroom interactions. Working together with the judges who give decisions on cases, we claim, can provide scope for both critical reflection and applied problem-solving.

This paper examines the role of coroners in investigating and reporting on cases of death after police contact (DAPC) in England and Wales. It considers how Article 2 (the right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has affected coronial processes and practices. It argues that the effects of Article 2 represent an evolutionary shift in accountability processes surrounding cases of DAPC in England and Wales, but that this shift has in turn been mediated by aspects of institutional structure in the coronial system. It discusses how this shift demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the coronial system, state and society and how this has continued to evolve as a result of external demands.

This paper aims to conduct a descriptive analysis of a total of 2,172 semi-structured interviews with sentenced inmates in Mexico City during 2002–2008 in order to explain how public legal defence works, how this service is evaluated by the inmates who took part in the interviews, and how the traditional division between public and private services constitutes an important distinction in the way in which criminals interact with, and are processed by, the legal system. Our findings suggest that, in the case of Mexico City: (i) to be tried by a public defender not only implies that the person accused holds a bigger chance of getting a softer sentence than those defended by private lawyers; but also, (ii) that the population will have a better perception of the justice process.

This paper follows collegiality, demonstrating how, as a central value of medically trained coroners, it can shape the content of death investigations and certificates. Drawing on ethnographic evidence from a 16-month-long study of the Office of the Chief Coroner (OCC) of Ontario, Canada, I argue that collegiality is an instrument of trust that both affords investigators tremendous access to information, and severely limits the flow of that information into the public domain that the OCC serves. The paper focuses on in-care death investigations, which are those where the OCC's medically qualified coroners find themselves investigating the quality of care delivered by professional colleagues. I show how professional expertise, experience and collegial values often combine to see instances of poor or even incompetent care dealt with privately (rather than publicly) or referred up the medical (rather than public safety) hierarchy. The burden of my argument is that collegial deference to the autonomy and skills of other physicians tends to see coroners expurgate the death certificates they produce. These expurgations obscure competence issues from public view and reduce the accuracy of the certificates. I close with a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of medically qualified death investigators, as well as potential adjustments to improve the accuracy of in-care death investigations and certifications.

Socio-legal studies in Belgium represent a diverse patchwork of many topics studied from many angles. This paper first presents a brief historical account of socio-legal studies and their organisation, in the north and south of the country. It has no ambition to give a full overview of socio-legal studies in Belgium, let alone be exhaustive. It merely focuses on the content and features of two topics that have constituted major strands of research over the last thirty years: courts and dispute processing, and public opinion about law and justice. It ends with some reflections on the nature of Belgian socio-legal research, as well as some recommendations on future orientations.

This paper looks at expectations people have of informal justice mechanisms through a rich empirical dataset of 2,775 recent ombudsman users in Germany and the UK. In a cross-cultural comparison, the ombudsman as a model of justice is explored. Not much is known about people's expectations of the ombudsman model; this paper starts to fill the gap. Four roles became apparent in cross-cultural narratives in the dataset: people who interact with ombudsmen expect them to be interpreters, advocates, allies and instruments. The identified roles are largely common to both countries, but in some aspects they show national specificities. These national specificities are seen mainly in the use of language; in Germany, it is more legalistic in comparison to the UK. I argue that this might be related to what has been described as the general legal culture of each country and the institutional set-up.

This paper explores the role of anthropological expertise in shaping the outcome of legal proceedings under conditions of cultural diversity. Taking the state-driven land-restitution process in post-apartheid South Africa as its point of reference, the text reflects upon the work of anthropological experts in a number of cases and shows how their theoretical and political stances shaped the trajectories of their legal engagements. Pointing towards frictions that emerge in acts of translation between the seemingly objectivist rhetoric evoked in court and more relativist and subjectivist stances within the academy, the paper revisits and problematises debates around strategic essentialism. Sketching instead the contours of a ‘recursive anthropology’ that expresses itself in terms of a post-positivist universalism, the paper turns on the author's use of his own expertise in support of a White land claim, probing – and critically reflecting upon – the practical potential of a form of expertise grounded in such a recursive anthropology.