JAPAN'S INCREASING AFFLUENCE AND ITS INFLUENCE IN world affairs have led many to inquire about the functioning of Japanese politics and how one should deal with the Japanese in government or business negotiations. With the steady rise of such interest in Japan, the study of Japanese politics has started to flourish at home and abroad. It was impossible to predict one or two decades ago that one would find so many students, many of whom have a good command of the Japanese language, enrolled in a graduate course on Japanese politics in major US universities. Writings on Japanese politics have started to attract many more general readers, not just a small group of specialists in Japanese politics whose number would not reach, by any method of calculation, one thousand in the whole world. In this article I shall summarize and discuss some major debates on the nature and functioning of Japanese politics with some recent illustrations. The following three subjects have been chosen: decision-making and policy implementation, power structure and the nature of democracy.

While the growing body of research on non-violent political movements centres on the idea that choosing non-violence tends to produce more favourable outcomes for dissidents, the question of why some non-violent campaigns still fail has not been sufficiently empirically investigated. Building on the extant research on the effects of group dynamics and certain external actors, we examine the role of the natural resource wealth of target states on the outcomes of non-violent campaigns. We hypothesize that the probability that a non-violent movement will fail increases as the target state's natural resource wealth increases. This natural resource wealth could serve to neutralize the potential for support from both domestic and external actors, thereby increasing the risk of failure. The results of our statistical analyses support our hypothesis and suggest that non-violent campaigns are more likely to fail in states with higher natural resource wealth, particularly that which stems from oil.

Legislatures are key institutions that stabilize authoritarian rule. However, less is said about the individuals who populate these institutions or the pathways that take them to power. This is an oversight, since how autocrats recruit reflects upon their institutional capacities and adaptation to changing circumstances. Specifically, recruitment is challenging when regimes lack robust ruling parties to cultivate partisan loyalists and during periods of multiparty elections when candidates must provide a higher degree of self-financing. This article examines these dynamics across the lifespan of Cameroon's authoritarian regime and introduces an original biographical data set of over 900 legislators between 1973 and 2019. The data show there is an increased proportion of businesspeople in the legislature, but also a possible emerging preference for former civil servants. The article argues that civil service recruitment pipelines substitute for the monitoring functions a party might serve, while simultaneously preparing candidates for the unique financing needs of elections.

This article analyses the distribution of staff resources between party offices. While earlier studies have compared central and parliamentary offices, this study also includes ministerial offices. To capture fully the differences in staffing, I examine both the quantity (staff size) and quality (education, experience, tasks) of their staffs. The empirical section is based on a cross-sectional analysis of original survey data collected among political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands (N = 1,009). While the Belgian cabinet system includes extensive ministerial offices, ministerial staff is limited in the Dutch non-cabinet system. The results show how this institutional difference shapes parties' internal distribution of resources. While the party in parliament does not have a clear staffing advantage over the party in central office in Belgium, they are both eclipsed by the large, highly qualified party in the executive. In the Netherlands, the impact of ministerial offices is negligible and the staff of the party in parliament is both larger and more qualified than the staff of the party in central office.

The power-sharing literature lacks a review that synthesizes its findings, despite spanning over 50 years since Arend Lijphart published his seminal 1969 article ‘Consociational Democracy’. This review article contributes to the literature by introducing and analysing an original dataset, the Power Sharing Articles Dataset, which extracts data on 23 variables from 373 academic articles published between 1969 and 2018. The power-sharing literature, our analysis shows, has witnessed a boom in publications in the last two decades, more than the average publication rate in the social sciences. This review offers a synthesis of how power sharing is theorized, operationalized and studied. We demonstrate that power sharing has generally positive effects, regardless of institutional set-up, post-conflict transitional character and world region. Furthermore, we highlight structural factors that are mostly associated with the success of power sharing. Finally, the review develops a research agenda to guide future scholarly work on power sharing.

This article aims to discuss to what extent populist parties with opposite ideological backgrounds have differed in their policies towards inherited external financial liberalization (EFL). Building upon a comparative case study centred on Argentina under Kirchnerism (2003–15) and Hungary under Viktor Orbán (since 2010), I conclude that both experiences led to a partial EFL reversal. However, reflecting their opposite ideological underpinnings, each subtype of populism opted to restrict a different dimension of EFL. Argentina's left-wing populism re-regulated cross-border capital flows, harming financial operators, foreign investors and primary exporters through capital controls and export surrenders. These interventionist capital account regulations were needed to shield expansionary macroeconomic policies that attended the interests of subordinate socioeconomic strata, fuelling the tension with financial markets and domestic economic elites. Conversely, Hungary's right-wing populism focused on the ownership structure of the banking sector, aiming to redistribute assets from foreign to domestic private banks and improve the credit conditions for native capitalists. In this case, even when resorting to macroeconomic heterodoxy, the maintenance of fiscal balance and price stability retained support from both foreign investors and domestic business groups, mitigating tensions derived from financial nationalism.

The former rebel party Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP) in Sierra Leone has struggled with a discredited wartime reputation and electoral defeats throughout the post-war period. In spite of this, the party has remained loyal to its wartime revolutionary ideas, symbols and political rhetoric. Why is this the case? In this article, I argue that the answer lies in the premises of party politics in war-torn states and new democracies on the African continent. In a political landscape where brokerage is power, retaining wartime identities can sometimes serve as a valuable source of (potential) patronage. With few other options for access to resources and opportunities, the core of the party membership has clung to its past as a means to both rally electoral support among the marginalized ex-combatant community and to get access to the long-awaited funds that were promised to them in the peace negotiations.

España Va Bien. ‘Things Are Going Well In Spain.’ With This Simple yet somewhat unoriginal slogan, the incumbent conservative Partido Popular (PP) swept to victory by absolute majority in the 12 March 2000 general election in Spain. The PP's astounding victory may be attributed to several factors. First, its own well-organized campaign was based upon a strong leadership, something the two main leftist parties lacked. As the experience of the former centrist party, Unión Centro Democrático (UCD) shows, party leadership does matter. Secondly, leadership charisma, so important in the 1993 election when the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) managed to be re-elected despite worryingly high unemployment figures and a wave of political scandals, seemed to matter little or nothing in the March 2000 election. Effective management skills and strong leadership seem to have replaced populist charisma as a way to attract the average Spanish voter.

The Date 2 July 2000 Represented A True Watershed In Mexican politics. For the first time in post-revolutionary Mexico an opposition candidate won the presidential elections. Since 1988, opposition parties on the left and right have slowly eroded the stranglehold on electoral politics of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (the PRI), which has been in power since 1929. Vicente Fox Quesada's victory heralds the end of an era; or does it? A dominant theme in analyses of Mexican politics over the past twenty years has been the tension between continuity and change. In this article I argue that Fox's victory is an important, indeed essential, component of Mexico's slow democratization process; but it does not represent democracy in itself. There are three areas where the longer-term outcome of these elections will be measured: first there is the willingness of Fox to carry out further necessary reforms, particularly in the areas of judicial and fiscal reform. To date he has signalled that these will be important policies of his administration but we must wait for the results. Secondly, even where he is willing to deepen democratic reforms, one must ask to what extent will he be able to do so, both in terms of generating enough support within his own party and in overcoming resistance from the PRI, which still controls significant resources and retains a majority in the senate. And thirdly, it must be noted that Fox displayed some worrying tendencies towards populism in his presidential campaign which serve as a sobering reminder that his own democratic practices may be questionable.

It seems to be part of the conventional wisdom of British political science that English religious institutions and values do not demand much attention from the discipline's practitioners. It appears to be tacitly assumed that the process of secularization, and the relative absence of serious religious cleavages, have left such phenomena with minimal political significance. Nevertheless, Churches, and above all the Church of England, have traditionally occupied a position in English society that must leave some question marks against such assumptions. Mass politics, in an age of widespread indifference to institutional religion, no doubt has left Churches with considerably diminished scope for the exercize of political influence. On the other hand, these bodies still dispose of resources that, potentially at least, make them pressure groups of some weight. The politicization of moral issues, of particular interest to the Churches, may add credence to such a view.

The historical development of western civilization has produced several patterns of political opposition deeply rooted and relatively well established in the political systems. This opposition is usually identified with the control of the governed over the government : it is maintained that opposition is at the same time a sufficient and a necessary condition for the existence of such control. Opposition, as the term is commonly used, has the following characteristics : (a) it is political; (b) it is institutionalized in the form of a party or parties; and (c) it is often said that it is also ‘responsible’, i.e., it does not extend to obstruction of the government's actions. In order to define more precisely the relationship between opposition and control, we must ask two questions of a more specific nature: (i) is opposition a sufficient condition for effective control? And (ii) is it a condition sine qua non for any kind of political control? In spite of some ideological assertions, it seems clear that the answers to both questions are negative. Since the problem of opposition in the two- and multiparty systems is discussed elsewhere, we shall focus here on those mechanisms of control which present an alternative to opposition as institutionalized in the party system.

FOR FORTY YEARS THE COLD WAR, WITH ITS PRESUMED threat to Western Europe, has been used to justify the level of military budgets in NATO countries. The United States, Britain and France, in particular, have sustained high levels of military spending throughout this period. Each has sought to maintain capability across a full range of military options, including nuclear forces and the ability to intervene in Third World conflicts. Each has maintained a large, and quite stable, industrial and technological infrastructure in support of these military goals.

With the ending of the cold war, the basis for that stability has been undermined. Defence spending is set to fall. With it will fall overall spending on defence equipment. But the rate of decline, and its distribution across the different sectors of the defence industry, remain to be determined. Upon the outcome turns the future of investment in defence technologies, with further consequences, complex in nature, for national and industrial technological capabilities. To complicate analysis further, these changes arise at a time of considerable concern on both sides of the Atlantic about industrial competitiveness. This concern had already led to upheaval in industrial structures and strategies within both the defence and the civil high technology industries.

On one hand, NGOs are seen as experts because of their proximity to the problems they address. They provide knowledge relevant to the solution of these problems and can bring this into the political process. They are able to increase the efficiency of global governance by participating in the policy-formation processes of international organizations. In this paper I will explain the role and functions of NGOs as described in the debate about their legitimacy and theorize – while applying Ernst Haas's theory of organizational learning – on the mechanisms likely to lead to their increasing integration into international institutions as well as the implications of this integration.

Robert Elgie's contribution to comparative politics is considerable. His work covers a range of subfields, including the study of political institutions, French politics, political leadership, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism. He became the leading scholar of semi-presidentialism and indeed defined much of the research agenda in this subfield.

Scholars have convincingly argued that theoretical frameworks that combine international influences and domestic factors are needed to understand political regime developments. We argue that exogenous shifts in the balance of power between great powers (‘power politics’) spark demonstration effects. These, in turn, are filtered into the domestic political system of smaller states via changes in political polarization – but with the effects being conditional on the domestic vulnerability of democracy. To assess this framework we turn to interwar Europe, where the international order changed from undergirding democracy to facilitating autocratic rule. An analysis of three countries (Poland, Austria and Denmark), backed by a more general glance at the remaining interwar cases, shows that the interaction between demonstration effects, pressure from great powers and the domestic resilience of democracy offers substantial leverage in accounting for patterns of democratic regression.

In These Pages We Will Discuss The Thesis That in order to understand the present problems of Italy, one must look back on an era of international politics dominated by the bipolar and conflictual relationship between East and West. This came to an end finally after the failed Moscow coup in mid-1991.

From 1946, without interruption, in a Europe divided by the iron curtain, Italy was the frontier country where the cold war was most bitterly fought, because the Italian Communist Party (PCI) was the strongest communist party in the world outside the Soviet empire. From many viewpoints, the Italian Communists were ordinary politicians peacefully involved in cooperatives and in the trade unions. Their management of some important regions and municipalities was judged very favourably by many scholars. In public declarations they stated their preference for a peaceful way to socialism, conversion to liberty, independence from Soviet influence, and acceptance of a democratic system. In fact they shared Moscow's orientations in every international problem where East and West were opposed. Now we understand why: they were heavily financed, directly and indirectly, by the Soviets. But after Yeltsin had thrown out many skeletons from the Kremlin closets, we had the proof that the staunch anti-communists were right. The big lie about Bolshevism concerned Italy also, where the PCI had been helped from Stalin to Gorbachev. This is why still in 1985 the Italian Communists declared the USA to be the only imperialist state in the world.

THE ELECTIONS IN ROMANIA IN NOVEMBER 1996 WERE A TURNINGpoint in the political life of the country. They resulted in the victory of the Democratic Convention (DCR) and its presidential candidate, Emil Constantinescu, over the party dominated by reformedcommunists (the Party of Social Democracy of Romania, PSDR) and its candidate, the former president, Ion Iliescu.

Professor Ghiţa Ionescu would have rejoiced in this long-awaited victory for the DCR. During his visit to Romania in 1993 he met many leading figures of the Democratic Convention, including Mr Constantinescu himself who, as Rector of the University of Bucharest, conferred upon him the doctorate honoris causa. He was also pleased to discover that one of his major books, Communism in Romania, had already been translated into Romanian (in 1992). Professor Ionescu was warmly welcomed and was particularly impressed by the enthusiasm of the young people, some of them academics, who were very actively engaged in the political struggle against the Iliescu regime.

Even before the end of the first world war, during the inter-war years and right up to the outbreak of the second world war, a vein of political thought ran through Europe, which condemned national sovereignties and set up against them the idea of a European federation.

In reality, the federalist trend of thought in the inter-war years remained marginal to the main political currents, and partook more of the nature of prophecy than of politics. In the 1920s and 1930s politics in Europe were both tense and varied, culminating in the emergence of many political-ideological tyrannies. But in spite of the violent divergences over political problems in those years, politics itself, of the right and of the left, of moderates and radicals, of conservatives and revolutionaries, was based on the profound experience which the peoples had lived through during the first world war, namely of the solidity of the nation state. This experience led to the conviction that only on this rock could anything be built.

‘The Governance of Britain’ agenda represents Gordon Brown's attempt to respond to long-standing criticisms regarding the way in which Labour governments have since 1997 approached the topic of constitutional reform and democratic renewal. The central argument of this article is that the Labour Party remains afflicted by constitutional anomie and these recent documents, combined with the behaviour of politicians, have done little in response. This article is of methodological importance because it assesses the cumulative impact of recent reforms through the application of Lijphart's framework and reflects on the utility of this tool. It is of conceptual importance because the results of the systematic analysis add further weight to the accusation of constitutional anomie while also allowing the development of a new conceptual tool – bi-constitutionality – which offers a way of understanding long-standing debates. The article is of normative importance because it avoids the descriptive-prescriptive approach to constitutional literature that has dominated British political studies, and it is relevant for comparative politics because it replicates and takes forward a methodology that has been applied around the world. In doing so it provides a critical case of executive politics and statecraft vis-à-vis constitutional reform.