This special issue of Global Constitutionalism discusses how global constitutionalism influences Asia-Pacific jurisdictions and how they respond. This introductory article presents the theme and structure of this issue, explains the Asia-Pacific’s unique contribution to global constitutionalism and offers a synthetic argument. It conceptualizes global constitutionalism as the global diffusion of common constitutional ideas, institutions and doctrines rooted in comparative constitutional law and public international law. On that base, it argues that constitutional design, adjudication and discourse in many Asia-Pacific jurisdictions are influenced by global constitutionalism. The influence results in not only convergence but also resistance to global constitutionalism in the regions. The regional experience presents critical challenges for global constitutionalism, and hence its effective operation significantly depends on its situation within the region’s axiological, institutional and social contexts.

The contestation of global governance institutions can strengthen or weaken, as well as transform, them. This article analyses the productive potential of contestation and justification of global governance institutions by examining the multiple authorities that are invoked as auxiliaries in the process. It studies the (re-)construction of these authorities by dissecting authority into three components: power, legitimacy and connection to public interests. Empirically, the article focuses on the issue area of business and human rights, examining the highly contested process of drafting a binding instrument in the United Nations Treaty Process. The analysis shows that the success of the Treaty Process not only hinges on its direct reaction to contestation, but also on its ability to (re-)construct the multiple related authorities. Ultimately, the article argues that the contestation of global governance institutions involves (re-)constructing multiple authorities. This demonstrates how contestation can also affect global governance institutions, actors and norms beyond the specific field of deliberation.

This article analyses the rise of populism and its discursive challenge to global constitutionalism (GC). It shows that populist contestation is more ambivalent than often suggested: its challenge depends on the populist variety and can both undermine or support liberal principles of GC. Building on the ideational approach to populism and a framework of transnational politicisation, a proposed typology identifies both communitarian types of populism and cosmopolitan types of populism. Illustrative case studies of the Alternative for Germany, the Polish Law and Justice Party, the Democracy in Europe Movement and Peru’s Alberto Fujimori substantiate these empirically. While all cases contest a perceived lack of popular sovereignty in a largely non-majoritarian global constitutional order, varieties of populism present contrasting responses: communitarian types push for global de-constitutionalisation in line with illiberal nationalist majoritarianism, while cosmopolitan types support global constitutionalisation according to liberal and democratic principles. Further, neo-socialist populists campaign against neoliberal principles in GC, but remain divided about supporting political principles beyond the state. These findings suggest an emerging politicisation of the process of global constitutionalisation at the societal level according to principles of democratic legitimacy; and global constitutional differentiation depending on outcomes of these normatively ambivalent and empirically contingent political contests.

This article explores the extent to which (if at all) the concept of a constitution is undergoing change in the conditions of globalization that characterize the early decades of the twenty-first century, to an extent that might be described as transformation. The question is prompted both by familiar manifestations of the interdependence of domestic constitutional and international law and practice, and by the interpretation placed on them by some of the literature on global constitutionalism. Some – although by no means all – of the literature and the experience on which it draws relate to the extent of transnational influence on the way in which constitutions now are made or changed: constitution transformation in the narrow, or more particular, sense. The article seeks to answer this question with reference to global constitutional experience, including – critically – experience in Asia, as one of the largest and most diverse regions of the world, too often omitted from studies of this kind. To this end, the article considers whether the concept of a constitution can be regarded as having been globally shared in any event; examines the phenomena associated with globalization that might suggest a paradigm change; and considers the arguments that mitigate against change, at least on a global scale. In exploring these factors, it necessarily considers the extent to which states in different regions of the world diverge in their experiences of the internationalization of constitutional law. The article concludes that, on balance, it is not plausible to argue that the generic concept of a constitution has changed, with global effect. It does, however, acknowledge that current conditions of globalization present a series of challenges for national constitutions. Responding to them might itself be regarded as an exercise in global constitutionalism.

Although all constitutional issues are political in essence, ‘political constitutionalism’ as a school is specifically critical of court-centred understandings. Such a school of political constitutionalism has emerged in Chinese constitutional debates since 2008. Its rapid development has both enriched and challenged Chinese constitutional studies, but it has also left certain impacts on the political reality of China. Is this school comparable to the Western political constitutionalism tradition and how is ‘the political’ defined? By discerning three political registers from the school’s main arguments as the ‘constitutional moment’, ‘polity’ and ‘governance’, this article aims to critically examine the aims and functions of political constitutionalism in China and to argue that while constitutional reflexivity requires contestability, the political registers of this wide-ranging school in fact deny it.

Through the analytical framework of ‘transnational constitutional engagement’, this article examines the dynamically developing practices of the South Korean Constitutional Court as it engages with international and foreign elements, both within and beyond constitutional adjudication processes. Diverse underlying factors and orientations in varied contexts, and the complex interactions between them, are responsible for shaping the modes of a local constitutional actor’s engagement with the transnational. In the vertical aspect, the court adopts international human rights law as a substantive standard of constitutional review through a version of cosmopolitan constitutional interpretation, while it has nevertheless exhibited ambiguity and incoherency in concrete applications. The horizontal aspects of transnational engagement include the court’s practice of referencing foreign law and cases in constitutional adjudication. The vibrancy and the evolving patterns of its citation practice reflect the court’s growing self-perception vis-à-vis the world – although limitations remain, such as geographical asymmetries among referenced jurisdictions. The court has also been enthusiastic in interacting with various transnational counterparts beyond adjudication processes, demonstrating eminent leadership in regional network-building among constitutional courts in Asia. With both cosmopolitan aspirations and nationalist ambitions playing a role in their shaping, the modes of transnational constitutional engagement are not to be generalized, but require contextualization, and the relevant practices should be subject to constant evaluations for their contribution in producing sound and effective concretizations of the values of global constitutionalism.

International courts regularly cite each other, partly as a means of building legitimacy. This study aims to show that judicial dialogue among the regional human rights courts and the Human Rights Committee has an additional effect: it contributes to the construction of a rights-based global constitutionalism. Judicial dialogue among the human rights courts is purposeful because the courts see themselves as embedded in, and contributing to, a global human rights legal system. Cross-citation among the human rights courts advances the construction of rights-based global constitutionalism in that it provides a basic degree of coordination among the regional courts. The jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), as an authoritative interpreter of core international human rights norms, plays the role of a central focal point for the decentralized coordination of jurisprudence. Using original data, this study demonstrates the extent of citations among the regional human rights courts and from them to the HRC. The network of regional courts and the HRC is building an emergent institutional structure for global rights-based constitutionalism.

This article examines the path of global constitutionalism and its encounter with cultural diversity in Africa. It situates the phenomenon of global constitutionalism in the late nineteenth century and traces some of its tectonic transformations since the inauguration of the liberal international order. Besides referring to the processes of and calls for the constitutionalization of the international legal regime and the emergence of global constitutional law, global constitutionalism played a constitutive role for constitutionalism in Africa. As constitutionalism in Africa is configured within a biosphere of global constitutionalism and cultural diversity, their dynamic interplay leads to the emergence of jurisgenerative constitutionalism, which is procedurally and normatively open to accommodate a plural conception of rights, justice and values. As a result, what is constitutionally permissible and what is not cannot simply be determined by an attachment to either global constitutionalism or cultural diversity. Rather, it is the interaction of global constitutionalism and cultural diversity in time and place that dictates what the constitutional practice or outcome should look like. By taking the women’s rights jurisprudence related to customary and Islamic laws and the phenomenon of Shariacracy as themes of analysis, and Nigeria as a case study, this article explores how the emergence of jurisgenerative constitutionalism mediates global constitutionalism and cultural diversity in Africa. By bringing in the African experience, the article sheds some light on the range of theoretical and practical possibilities available to the emerging field of global constitutionalism.

‘Accountability’ is the international legal term du jour. The concept is omnipresent in contemporary discussions about the UN Security Council in particular. From the lack of due process guarantees for individuals implicated in its counter-terrorism sanctions regime, to the (in)compatibility of Council authorized uses of force with international human rights and humanitarian law, no aspect of the Council’s recent practice has been immune from an accountability critique. Driven by the context in which it has emerged, the turn to accountability is seemingly prompted by a felt desire among international lawyers to constrain the arbitrary use of the Council’s considerable powers. However, beyond this felt desire, the concept lacks a robust theoretical foregrounding, both on its own terms and in relation to existential developments in international law. In an attempt to remedy this, this article situates the turn to accountability as a product of the broader turn to ‘constitutionalist’ thinking in international law. Specifically, it suggests that mainstream approaches resonate with a particular ‘liberal-legalist style’ of global constitutionalism. From both an etymological and epistemological perspective, however, I argue that this prevailing style offers an incomplete sense of accountability. The article introduces the dichotomy of ‘liberal-legal’ and more overtly ‘political’ styles of global constitutionalism as a heuristic device in order to offer a broader conception of accountability in the Security Council context. Political constitutionalism, I believe, offers important insights that will allow us to perceive and critique the Security Council in new ways.

In contrast with the decline of liberal constitutionalism around the world, liberal constitutionalism seems to be resilient in Taiwan. Weaving together several threads of history, law and politics, this article first argues that foreign legal education and identity concerns explain why judicial review and constitutional development more broadly in Taiwan have not only flourished but mirrored both German and American constitutional jurisprudence. Second, it maintains that the case of Taiwan poses another challenge to the concept of global constitutionalism since the number of referenced jurisdictions is quite limited.

Beyond setting the stage, the Introduction makes three claims about the conceptual triangle of the rule of law, judicial authority and legitimacy. The first is that all three are essentially contested and interpretive concepts in the sense of Walter B. Gallie and Ronald Dworkin. In their expositions, the contested and interpretative nature of such concepts is nothing to be ‘solved’, rather the formulation of different conceptions and contestation about them are central functions of such concepts. The interpretive and essentially contested nature points us to the relevant ‘actors’ and to conflicts and trade-offs between contested competencies. Thus the second point is that arguments about the rule of law and judicial legitimacy are often a means of questioning or securing the authority of a particular actor or institution in relation to other actors and institutions. The final point is that transposing concepts from the domestic to the supranational is a constructive endeavour because it entails creating new conceptions and substituting old ones as well as legitimising new authorities and delegitimising old ones. Thus, this special issue also cautions against discourses that ultimately are more about legitimation than about legitimacy and more about new ways of ruling than the rule of law.

The European Union is bound to respect the national identities of member states. States might, on occasion, define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal national developments. We see the relationship between the constitutional recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional values as a zero-sum game; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss for constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, both at the national and supranational levels. To try to identify the line where this shift happens, we rely on the limits of toleration and recognition of exclusive norms and identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raises structurally similar theoretical questions, insights and experiences as the dilemma defined above, namely the challenge of illiberal states undermining fundamental EU values.

This article argues that the governance project of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) oscillates between rule-based formalism and anti-formalist scepticism about rule-based governance. In this dichotomy, anti-formalist arguments support CCP leaders’ efforts to maintain and increase the Party’s influence over the judiciary and other state organs, which is a key justification for the Party’s power. Formalist language, in contrast, supports Party leaders’ attempts to constrain lower-level cadres’ uses of power within the Party. Formalist language is particularly prominent in the writings of Party ideologues on the interpretation of the Party’s internal regulations, including the CCP Constitution. At the same time, Party ideology also provides for various anti-formalist arguments about rule-based governance within and outside the Party. Paradoxical as it may be, the Party leadership seeks to exert rule-transcending political leadership through formal rules. While the focus of this article is on China, it argues that other illiberal regimes may also be studied in terms of similar, potentially incoherent approaches to rule-based governance.

What role do courts play in advancing or upholding the political ideal that we call ‘the rule of law’? Does the rule of law require that courts should have authority over all other branches of government, including the legislature? And does it impose constraints on the sort of reasoning and decision-making that courts engage in? This article explores an array of possible answers to these questions, and considers the possibility that the ascendancy of courts in a constitution may represent a form of judicial supremacy that looks remarkably like the uncontrolled rule of men, which the rule of law is supposed to prevent. To preclude that possibility, it is particularly important for courts to recognize that their authority is limited in scope and that they should not be guided by any overall political program other than the program of seeing that constitutional constraints on government are upheld.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has a new mechanism to receive individual complaints and issue views, which makes the question of how the Committee should interpret the broad articles of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights more pressing than ever. Most commentators on the legitimacy of the CESCR’s interpretation have argued that interpreters should make better use of Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in order to improve the legitimacy of their findings. In this article, we argue conversely that the individual communication mechanism should be evaluated and reformed in terms of legitimate authority. In the context of the Committee’s process of interpretation, we contend that proportionality is better suited than the various interpretive options of the VCLT to offer a consistent procedure that is able to generate legitimacy by attenuating the tension between personal and collective autonomy.

This article examines the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines’ provisions on social and economic rights and welfare. It considers how the 1987 Constitution fits within the post-liberal paradigm of ‘transformative’ constitutional texts that emerged during democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s. It then analyses how the Supreme Court of the Philippines responded to the constitutional call for egalitarian socio-economic reform in the first fifteen years after the People Power revolution. The article highlights how the 1987 Constitution envisions far-reaching, progressive socio-economic change, and incorporates both social and economic rights as well as open-ended policy goals in this regard. The article argues that this hybrid approach to distributive justice creates a distinctive set of interpretive challenges for the judiciary. It then argues that the Philippine Supreme Court’s approach to these provisions in the years following the transition to democracy was perfunctory and somewhat inchoate. The court affirmed its jurisdiction over these provisions, but did not develop meaningful standards or principles in relation to them. The article points out that transformative constitutional texts place difficult demands on the judiciary in relation to social and economic rights. They prompt the judiciary into unfamiliar domains. At the same time, institutional legitimacy – including legitimacy on questions of distributive justice – requires judges to sustain the sense of a cogent boundary between constitutional law and politics. The article argues that these challenges were heightened in the Philippines by the textual ambiguity of the 1987 Constitution as well as the relative dearth of jurisprudential resources at the time. It concludes by considering the implications of the Philippines experience for the design of transformative constitutions.

This commentary on Jeremy Waldron’s essay, ‘The Rule of Law and the Role of Courts’, applies a holistic perspective on the rule of law and judging situated within a broader complex of surrounding social, cultural, economic and political factors and institutions.