Whether or not the prohibition of torture allows exemptions is controversial not only in Germany but worldwide. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had to answer this question in the case of Gäfgen versus Germany (App. 22978/05). The Grand Chamber of the Strasbourg court delivered its judgment on 1 June 2010. It held that the prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) does not grant any exemptions, even if the life of another is at risk. The present case commentary agrees with this result of the judgment. The next question is even more interesting from the legal point of view: What are the legal consequences of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, especially with regard to criminal court cases against the offender and the victim of torture? The ECHR emphasizes the necessity of the effectiveness of the protection of the fundamental rights under the Convention. As a result, it argues for a thorough investigation and deterrent punishment of the offenders on the one hand and for an extensive exclusion of evidence obtained as a consequence of torture from the proceedings against the victim of torture on the other.

In a village of Europe, the name of which I have no desire to call to mind, there lived not long since one of those book reviewers that keep a soft-tongue in the lance-rack for his friends' books, an old buckler with partisan coat-of-arms as a mark of his feudal loyalty to his academic ancestors, a lean hack to accompany him in the dark alleys of scholarly fears, and a greyhound for coursing his civil-servant oriented career's ambitions. An olla of rather more beef than mutton, a salad on most nights, scraps on Saturdays, lentils on Fridays, and a pigeon or so extra on Sundays, made away with three-quarters of his income. His first years in academia were of such quality as to drive him to the verge of quitting this miserable life more than once. The rest of his income went to a doublet of fine cloth and velvet breeches to attend academic congresses, and shoes to match for holidays, that were always research-oriented, and on weekdays he made a brave figure in his best homespun.

On 22 June 2010, the Landgericht Frankfurt (Oder) (Regional Court) ruled on whether a hotel was entitled to deny a member of a nationalist party entrance to its establishment because of the individual's political beliefs or whether such discriminatory conduct constituted an illegal violation of the personality right of that person which would constitute a tort under § 823 of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code, “BGB”). In making its decision, the Court balanced a property owner's freedom of autonomy, specifically the owner's right to ban a customer from his or her establishment, against the customer's personal rights. Furthermore, the Court considered whether a hotel owner's decision to ban a customer based on his or her political beliefs violated the Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (General Equal Treatment Law, “AGG”). Considering the fundamental question of balancing competing interests, of the personal right of the customer and the right of the property owner, and the national public debate concerning the right of members of nationalistic parties to be treated equally, the case goes beyond the interests of the parties involved and is of general importance.

The current global financial crisis has necessitated a questioning of some of the fundamental theories and assumptions, particularly the free-market theory, on which regulation of business enterprises, including multinational corporations (MNCs), have been based. Specifically, in the area of corporate social responsibility (CSR), this paper explores two crucial issues. The first is the implication for our understanding of the obligations of corporations to CSR in light of the scale of impacts on ordinary citizens, and their role in bailing out failed banks which owed them no direct legal obligations. The second is the continued reliance on a voluntary framework for CSR. Just as the financial crisis resulted from the largely unregulated nature of global financial institutions, this paper demonstrates, through various country examples in the resources sector, that the unregulated nature of CSR obligations on MNCs has had dire effects, comparable to that of the financial crisis, on populations. If corporations have, through personal greed and irresponsibility, evidently failed to effectively regulate themselves even in their core areas of business necessary for their own survival, how much less do we expect of effective self-regulation in the area of CSR?

This article is a review-essay of Frank Degenhardt's Zwischen Machtstaat und Völkerbund. Erich Kaufmann (1880–1972), published in 2008. While this review discusses Degenhardt's achievements, it pays much attention to the different academic contexts this research implies: On the one hand this review-essay contextualizes Degenhartds' own research endeavors, and discusses how Zwischen Machtstaat und Völkerbund is part and parcel of the growing historical analysis in international law both in Germany and elsewhere. On the other hand, it pays attention to Erich Kaufmann's historical context both on a personal and professional level. Furthermore, this review-essay examines Degenhardt's book dedicated to Kaufmann's contributions to international law in light of Kaufmanns' Jewish German identity that was a lifelong Leitmotiv reflected both in his theoretical and practical work.

From 6–8 June 2007, the summit meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) leading industrialized nations was held in Heiligendamm, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, under Germany's presidency. In advance of the summit, the federal state (Land) Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and the federal authorities agreed that the task of providing adequate security for the Summit would overstretch Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania's capacities unless assistance were provided by the Federal Government and other federal states.

The author presents in this paper the new German foreign investment regime entered into force in the spring of 2009. He sets out the basic principles of the regime as well as its enforcement in practice. According to the new German foreign investment regime, the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) may examine and prohibit purchases of German companies by foreign investors if they pose a severe threat to public policy or security. Certain transactions, however, fall within the “safe harbour” or are otherwise exempted so that the BMWi has no right of interference. The author presents several exemptions from the scope of application of the regime, which can be either identified from the wording of the law by reverse argument or derived from the spirit and purpose of the new foreign investment regime. Furthermore, by presenting the concept of so called “critical infrastructures”, the paper gives valuable guidance to practitioners on what the German administration might consider relevant for public policy or security. The last part of the paper summarizes the filing and the review process. The parties may, in order to receive clearance for their transaction, notify their transactions to the BMWi and receive a certificate of non-objection. While, this notification is wholly voluntary, parties who do not apply for clearance bear the risk that their transactions are blocked or unwound if the BMWi decides to investigate the transaction within three months from signing ex officio.

The German Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) has to frequently adjudicate cases related to terrorism. The “War on Terror” has reached the German judiciary shortly after its proclamation as a reaction to the 9/11-attacks. Ever since, German criminal law is grappling with the question of how to harmonize security interests on the one hand with individual rights and liberties on the other. The expansion of the criminal law is a real threat for the previously liberty-oriented criminal law. The court decision discussed in this case addresses a specific aspect of terrorism: the financing of terrorist activities. As there is no special law prohibiting such kind of behavior, the judges had to apply section 263 of the German Criminal Code, which deals with fraud, and combine this with sections 129 a and b of the German Criminal Code, which makes being merely a member of a criminal organization into a criminal offence. A highly sensitive field of law that is put under scrutiny by anti-terrorism measures is procedural law. As secret investigation measures through electronic surveillance become more prevalent and sophisticated, the admissibility of the evidence, which was gained mainly by intelligence, becomes more and more questionable. The court decision discussed in this paper proves the willingness of the Federal Judges in Germany to reduce individual liberty rights in order to enhance the effectiveness of criminal prosecution.

On 19 January 2010 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was asked to rule on the application and scope of the general principle of non-discrimination under Community law. In Kücükdeveci the Court had the opportunity to clarify a number of questions concerning the principle of non-discrimination and the application of Directive 2000/78 that had remained unanswered after the famous Mangold judgment and subsequent case law. The case was particularly apt to clarify the scope of Mangold, as it concerned a similar factual situation, albeit after the implementation period of Directive 2000/78 had expired. Consequently, many issues addressed in that judgment arose anew. The Court had to deal with the relationship between Directive 2000/78 and the general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, the possibility of justifying differential treatment on the basis of national social and employment policies, the extent of the doctrine of indirect effect, and the direct horizontal effect of directives.

This birthday gives rise to many considerations. Some reflect upon achievements – the German constitution, named “Basic Law”, has proven to work although many did not believe in it when it was framed. Others emphasize desiderata. Sabine Berghahn commented at the 50th birthday that it has developed “far too slowly and [some] has even gone completely wrong.” Jutta Limbach, former President of the Federal Constitutional Court, observed that constitutional history was “anything but regal, but very difficult and full of obstacles.” Former Chancellor Willy Brandt famously called the constitution “a snail on thin ice.” So what is missing when we analyze the Basic Law, and what should be finally added - as spirit, in interpretation, in clarifying words? I will try to point to achievements and show what might still be lacking. This is what studies in constitutionalism always do. To do justice to the occasion, I will also think about who we should invite to celebrate this birthday. More precisely, if we are to celebrate the 60th birthday of Article 3 of the Basic Law, which is the equality guarantee, and which has been amended since its birthday, I will encourage you to think about who should come to this party.

Professor Joseph Weiler will soon stand trial for criminal libel in France for refusing to remove a book review from a website associated with an academic journal for which he serves as editor. His case has disturbing implications for all those who write, edit, and publish critical scholarly work. In this article, I explore those implications for Canadian scholars at home and as members of a global scholarly community. I assess the likelihood of success of a similar complaint under Canadian defamation law, and I consider the impact of libel chill and libel tourism. I conclude that although the defendant in such a case would have a good chance of prevailing under Canadian law through the defense of fair comment, a threat to academic freedom remains that requires action on the part of individuals and institutions committed to its preservation and enhancement.

Victor Kattan's “From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949” is an archival excavation of the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab-Israeli) conflict and its origins. This review will examine the contours of Kattan's book followed by a brief examination of objectivity in academic scholarship often enunciated through the concept of ‘balance’ as it relates to those scholars (like Kattan) working on the conflict. Finally, this review will explore some of the weakness of the arguments that Kattan advances.

Having gone through an international process on status settlement, in the aftermath of the proclamation of independence, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a Constitution and a range of essential laws. One of the very basic laws adopted in the aftermath of independence is the Law on the Constitutional Court. The Ahtisaari Commission had given a singular importance to the latter, having seen the Kosovan Constitutional Court as one of the most important guarantors of democracy in constitutional terms. In an Ahtisaarian view, the Kosovan Constitutional Court is, inter alia, thought of as a guarantor of the ethnic communities' constitutional rights. As a result, the law concerned along with the Constitution of Kosovo determined the organization and functioning of the Kosovo Constitutional Court.

Since the ECJ handed down the Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm (Mangold) decision in 2005, scholars have provided sometimes quite far reaching and sharp critiques of the decision and of what they took to be its consequences for European Union law. The decision concerned several questions, but the core issue was the applicability of (then) Community (now European Union) age-based anti-discrimination law in the case of a fixed-term employment contract. The contract at issue was based on a law that allowed fixed-term contracts without demanding objective reasons justifying the limitation of the period of employment beyond the age of 52. The law is enmeshed in the political problem of including people older than 52 in the workforce without depriving them of secure working conditions. The legal issue was complicated by the fact that the transposition time of the relevant directive 2000/78/EC including the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age had not yet expired because of a permissible extension of that time by Germany. The ECJ declared the relevant norm to be contrary to Community law and thus not applicable in the case at hand. It applied the directive in question despite the still pending time limit for transposition, arguing with the requirement under Community law that Member States refrain from taking any measures liable to seriously compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by the directive. It buttressed its argument with the duty to report about the progress made during the extended transposition time. This provision was held to imply that the Member State was not allowed to adopt measures incompatible with progressive implementation. Furthermore, the ECJ interpreted the prohibition of age discrimination as an expression of a fundamental principle of Community law: the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation. Applying a proportionality test, the court found this foundational principle to have been violated. The ECJ also underlined the broad discretion the Member States retained in the field of social and employment policies. Because the provision's only criterion for allowing fixed-term contracts without an objective reason was age, without any other consideration linked to the structure of the labor market in question or of the personal situation of the person concerned, the Court found that even in light of this broad discretion, the respective norm was not appropriate and necessary to vocationally integrating unemployed older workers, which formed the purpose of the norm.

The 50th Assistententagung, the annual meeting of public law assistants, convened this year in Greifswald. Greifswald is not only home to academic institutions, but also has a long legal history and is the host city of both the State Constitutional Court and the Highest Court of Administrative Law in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The meeting's aim was to facilitate an exchange between postdoctoral and doctoral candidates on questions relating to public law. Until 1959, the assistants in public law, who are usually conducting doctoral or post-doctoral studies, had been admitted to the annual meeting of public law professors. Assistants could benefit from professors' wealth of experience, including how to structure lectures and how to answer difficult questions, through participation in the Public Law Professors' Meeting. With the exclusion of non-professors from the annual Staatsrechtslehrertagung in the 1950s, assistants no longer had a forum to learn how to perform as academics. This exclusion resulted in the beginning of the annual meeting of German-speaking public law assistants in 1961 in Hamburg, to which not only postdoctoral candidates, but also doctoral candidates were welcomed. The meeting served as both a training course and an opportunity for academic exchange. And it was therefore in accordance with tradition that Jörg Scharrer, who hosted the first panel, had to ask the dean of the law faculty at Greifswald University, Prof. Dr. Axel Beater, to leave the building before opening the first session.

At a first glance the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has given a clear negative answer to the question submitted to it by the General Assembly. According to the ICJ's advisory opinion from 22 July 2010, Kosovo's declaration of independence did not constitute a violation of international law. Yet, reading the reasons the ICJ offered in support of its holding, one soon discovers that many relevant questions have been left open.

Law is a discipline which allows us to combine a high level of doctrinal craftsmanship with an equally high level of theoretical reflection and (re-)construction of legal-political developments. For the academic scholar, law is practice, theory and doctrine, each requiring a distinct set of goals, a distinct set of methods and a distinct level of abstraction. For some time, the international legal discipline has been described as lacking in theoretical development. This consideration may have motivated the conveners of a Kelsen-Schmitt-Arendt conference series when they decided that it was time for a re-engagement with the theories of Kelsen, Schmitt, and Arendt. The first workshop on constitutionalism will be the object of this commentary.

Kelsen, Schmitt and Arendt have experienced unexpected and innovative reception in recent years: Schmitt has contributed to questions such as the problematic role of human rights, the institutionalization of politics as conflict, as well as new applications of the state of exception. Kelsen's international writings as well as his democratic theory have borne a fruitful re-reading, and Arendt, who has been widely read, and written about in the social sciences for several years, has finally reached the law faculties.

The primary interest of this comment lies in the question of how international legal scientific work can make use of legal and political theory. A whole range of politico-legal developments in the European and international arenas are currently creating new forms of institutions, obligations, and types of engagement between legal orders. The velocity and the diversity of these developments are challenging traditional frameworks, paradigms, and analytical tools of the discipline. This task of conceptualization asks for and lends itself to theorization. Which approaches to theory are available for legal scholars, and what kind of insights do they offer? The conference offered the chance to witness different examples of how theory can be accessed. What role is there for theory in international law and what is its potential?

The United States and other nations have taken numerous military, police and intelligence measures in order to counter terrorists’ threats in response to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Virginia as well as the attempted attack on a target in Washington, D. C.