The accommodation of religious personal law systems is an issue that has arisen in many countries with significant Muslim minorities. The types of accommodations can range from direct incorporation into the state legal system to mere recognition of religious tribunals as private organs. Different forms of accommodation raise different types of legal, social, and political issues. Focusing on the case of Singapore, I examine one form of accommodation which entails the direct incorporation of this law regulating marriage, divorce, and inheritance for Muslims into the state system. Administered by the Administration of the Muslim Law Act, 1966, the Muslim law binds Muslims unless they abjure Islam. The resulting pluralistic legal system is deemed necessary to realize the aspirations of and give respect to the Muslim minority community, the majority of whom are constitutionally acknowledged as indigenous to the country. This Article examines the ramifications of this arrangement on the rights and well-being of members of this community in the context of change. It argues that, while giving autonomy to the community to determine its personal law and advancing group accommodation, the arrangement denies individuals the right to their choice of law, a problem exacerbated by traditionalism and the lack of democratic process in this domain. Consequently, the Muslim law pales in comparison to the civil law for non-Muslims. The rise of religious resurgence since the 1970s has but compounded the problem. How the system can accommodate the Muslim personal law without compromising the rights of individual Muslims is also discussed.

While the “essence” of EU fundamental rights has received much attention following the CJEU’s Schrems decision, the concept of “essence” remains much less examined in international human rights law. Nonetheless, a concept of “essence” for human rights can also be found in international law. This Article discusses different aspects of the “essence” concept in international human rights law, namely non-derogability, non-restrictability, and minimum core, in three steps. First, the Article looks at civil political rights and socioeconomic rights separately and identifies two different approaches to the concept of essence for each of the two categories: While for civil and political rights the concept of essence is mainly linked to the notions of non-derogability and non-restrictability, for socioeconomic rights, the concept refers mainly to the states’ obligation to guarantee an essential level of protection independent of their resource limitations. Second, the Article continues by reading the two approaches together and identifies certain elements of an overarching “essence” concept. Finally, the Article discusses the relationship between the CJEU’s “essence” jurisprudence and the related concepts in international law and concludes with two theses: First, international law deserves more attention when reflecting on the EU’s concept of essence. It equally employs concepts of “essence” and also informs the development and interpretation of EU law. Second, when engaging with the question of whether the EU law should draw lessons from its international counterpart on the notion of “essence,” one must contemplate drawbacks for EU law that the concept has presented for international law.

“Populism” appears everywhere: a frequently proffered assessment—or perhaps diagnosis—of constitutional systems around the world. Both its supporters and opponents emphasise its newness. But its phisiognomy, causes, and impact on legal orders and institutions are a matter of deep controversy. In a few words, its contours and core components adapt to different constitutional settings. Populist forces back a variety of agendas, which often overlap in a more rhetorically than concrete way.

The authors of this issue divide themselves among opponents to populism and moderately optimistic observers. In this respect, populism has probably become a catalyst both for its supporters and detractors. Populism identifies through ideas that rally increasing number of discontents. But also opponents identify as populists the perceived threats to liberal democracy as they understand them.

Defining populism has not simply proven to be a Sysyphean task; it has also showed that it is all but easy to pin down what a liberal democracy is made of. Contemporary debates about the fate of democracy need to abandon metaphysics for a more realistic, down-to-earth approach that is sensitive of the specificities of each constitutional setting.

The book that has most stimulated my life in the law over the past year is Michael Ignatieff’s The Ordinary Virtues: Moral Order in a Divided World.1 I write “stimulated” rather than “inspired” because some of its claims are disorientating, others are disputable, and the most important are disconcerting. Despite, or rather due to, that provocation I find the book more engaging. The Ordinary Virtues is a self-described moral progress report amid globalization and as such is a work of sociology, anthropology, and philosophy. However, Ignatieff’s report implicates many important topical issues of international and constitutional law. It should, I believe, inform the thinking of legal scholars on global ethics and public policy today.

The Japanese Constitution has never experienced any amendment since its enactment in 1947. This article claims that the reason is not the Japanese people’s support of it from the heart. The hypothesis presented in this article is that many other political, structural and cultural reasons have gradually deprived the Constitution’s normative force among people, and have made constitutional amendment unnecessary in Japanese politics.

The populist challenge to constitutional democracy—and constitutionalism as its modus operandi—is significant and raises deep questions regarding the nature of modern democracy. A crucial question pertains to the challenge that our existing (but eroding) democratic systems faces. The way we perceive this challenge is essential for our descriptive and prescriptive contributions. The first, perhaps most widely embraced view, is to perceive populism as a ‘disease’, ‘deviation’, or ‘pathology’ of existing democracy. A second view understands contemporary ‘neo-populisms’ rather as one particular instance of a rather profound, complex, and long-term set of transformations of democracy. Where we stand on this matter is of great importance, as the feasibility and potential success of our responses and solutions depend on our description of the problem. Many of the contributions to this special issue clearly go beyond the current state-of-the-art, in which populism and constitutionalism are often seen as mutually exclusive categories. The special issue provides ample reflection on intrinsic problems in constitutional democracy itself, and, taken as a whole, stimulates a self-reflexive and historically informed scrutiny of the modern projects of liberal democracy and constitutionalism, so as to provide due acknowledgement of the political and conflictive origins of the project, as well as of its current deficits.