The optimists amongst us assume that human hands — our hands — shape legal education, that legal education shapes the law, and that law shapes the world. The pessimists contend that the process works in reverse, that the forces of political economy ultimately have their way with law as a system of social ordering, as a cultural phenomenon and an intellectual enterprise, and as the subject or object of study in law schools. I am a pessimist by nature, so I will begin on a pessimistic note. However, I am trying to overcome my nature, so I will end on what, for me, is an optimistic one.

Until recently, Australia was firmly committed to the idea of higher education as a public good. The swing from social liberalism to neoliberalism has seen a rejection of this basic principle in favor of values associated with the market. Knowledge, education and credentialism have become highly desirable in the information age, but treating them as tradable commodities has profound repercussions for what is taught and how it is taught. Most significantly, we have moved to a mass education system where the focus is on applied and vocational knowledge. Within this new paradigm, law, business, information technology, hospitality and tourism courses have proliferated.

The Bologna Declaration (1999) started a process of reforming European higher education. The major aim of the declaration was to construct a single European Higher Education Area by 2010,

There has not been dramatic reform to legal education for many years. Although changes to the way we train students to be lawyers certainly have been made in the past decades, there has not been occasion to fundamentally re-think the process for educating lawyers.

The celebration of 180 years of legal education in Brazil, held in August 2007, was marked by strong criticism of the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (Brazilian Bar Association) and the higher education expansion policy which was undertaken in the late 1990s, establishing more than a thousand law schools in the country. The escolas de enganação (schools of illusion), created mainly during the last decade, would have increased the numbers in the professional college, which currently has around 600,000 lawyers, to approximately two and a half million, if it were not for the professional filter of the Bar Exam. In other words, the proliferation of mass legal courses in Brazil would have enabled the emergence of educational merchants, specializing in the sale of an illusion of social elevation and professional success, which, thanks to the control of entry into the professional corporation, did not happen.

The number of Mexican institutions of higher education (hereinafter also referred to as “Institutions” or “IHE”) offering Bachelor's Degrees in Law has increased rapidly. For example, in the 1997–1998 academic year, there were 364 Institutions offering the basic law degree; by the 2006–2007 academic year, the number had increased to 930. It is as if, over the last ten years, each week a new IHE began offering a Bachelor's Degree in Law. During that same period, law school enrollment in Mexico increased from 170,210 to approximately 240,000. By 2003, the Bachelor's Degree in Law was the degree program with the highest enrollment in the country – 11 out of 100 students at the college level chose it.

In the last fifteen years, the legal fight against bribery and corruption has evolved from the solitary effort of the United States with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq., to a global legal endeavor. During the same period of time, corporations have become increasingly engaged in transnational deals that require them to understand their obligations under a web of anti-corruption regulations. The stakes for businesses are high: fines can range in the tens of millions of dollars and individuals found guilty of corruption may be imprisoned for life.

These are exciting times for European private law. After many years of research the publication of the Draft Common Frame of Reference in the form of the interim outline edition of 2008 and, in particular, of the Outline Edition in 2009, is set to change the landscape of legal education in private law. Although many universities are likely to continue a traditional curriculum based on national law, possibly with comparative influences, for some universities this will be an occasion to move from a comparative to more truly European curriculum. The change to a European-based curriculum is controversial in legal education as the need to train nationally qualified lawyers remains. However, there are some experiences with the setting up of a European-based curriculum that might demonstrate a possibility of how to do this.

Recent criticism of American legal education has focused on its being theory-driven rather than practice driven, which either produces or reinforces a divide or gap between theory and practice. Yet two features of American legal education expressly draw upon experiential learning, one directly by sending students into experiential learning situations (legal clinics) and the other indirectly by bringing instructors who are engaged full-time in active practice into the classroom (i.e. adjunct faculty). If skills development is a feature of American legal education, to what degree can, or should, this be transplanted to other systems of legal education? Are American experiential techniques of legal education meaningful elsewhere?

I have come to believe, over the last two decades of my consulting work outside of the United States, that the origins, growth and acceptance of clinical legal education throughout the world is the greatest single innovation in law school pedagogy – and certainly in student learning – since the “science” of the Socratic, case method was brought to Harvard by Christopher Columbus Langdell. I remember distinctly when I came to this conclusion. It was around the time of a conference held at beautiful Arrowhead Lake, in California, hosted by UCLA Law School and the University of London at the university's conference facility in the mountains of San Bernardino County, startlingly close to Los Angeles. The event was the Sixth International Clinical Conference, held in October of 2005, and it was the first truly international event in that series. Yes, it was an “international” clinical conference, and prior events had provided participants with something of an international flavor, and the event was sponsored by British and American law schools. This, however, was something new, something different.

Half a century ago, the main purpose of university legal education in India was not the teaching of law as a branch of learning and as a science but simply to impart to students a knowledge of the black letter law, that is, certain principles and provisions of law to enable them to enter the legal practice exclusively for local needs. Gradually this perception changed and the process of reform in law and legal education was initiated. The real break came in 1990s when the new challenges posed by scientific and technological revolution and greater interaction between nations, trade in goods and services, information technology and free capital flow across international boundaries made the world a global village. Consequently, the concept of “local practice” widened to that of “transnational practice” in the context of globalisation and opening up of most of the economies of the world.

This article examines the evolution of legal education as it has moved through international, transnational, and now global paradigms. It explores these paradigms by reference to practice, pedagogy, and research. Internationalization saw the world as an archipelago of jurisdictions, with a small number of lawyers involved in mediating disputes between jurisdictions or determining which jurisdiction applied; transnationalization saw the world as a patchwork, with greater need for familiarity across jurisdictions and hence a growth in exchanges and collaborations; globalization is now seeing the world as a web in more ways than one, with lawyers needing to be comfortable in multiple jurisdictions.

Legal education is changing. What is changing is our understanding of “education”, of how we learn and how we should teach. Also changing is our understanding of how to define what is “legal” about “legal education”. Most will nowadays agree that legal education should be more than a vocational training for the practice of the profession in a particular jurisdiction. In analyzing the development of legal education in recent years, we can distinguish two trajectories. Firstly, there is the ongoing attempt of specifically the North American legal academy to make legal studies a transdisciplinary endeavour, a development closely connected to the major “paradigm shifts” in legal theory in the 20th century. Secondly, it seems that jurisdictional boundaries have lost significance in an internationalized, globalized and post-regulatory environment. This calls into question the very notion of “law” itself, at least as traditionally understood as a system of posited norms within a given jurisdiction. How should both developments be reconciled?

As is well known, comparative law enters the curriculum normally only after some substantive law has been learned. The traditional approach first takes the law student's national legal system, with the comparison or foreign law element only coming later as a form of supplement to the standard curriculum. This paper offers some thoughts concerning the teaching and learning of law in a world in which pluralistic and/or transnational elements are commonplace. These plural features stem from the declining authority of the nation state as well as from the strengthening of various forms of sub-national law being in tension with the central system of the state. These developments also include growth of supranational or transnational legal regimes (e.g. EU). The growth of the significance of human rights, especially the considerable growth of the system of the European Convention on Human Rights, has caused national and international legal spheres to overlap. This paper is based on a belief according to which future legal education ought to respond more seriously to the globalisation of law. However, the argument here is preliminary and it offers merely a sketch of essential features with scarce details i.e. this paper is of a somewhat rough design. The theme itself, i.e. transnational law and its effects, is most certainly somewhat fashionable these days.

The Association of Transnational Law Schools [ATLAS] is a consortium of seven law schools from four continents that launched an annual academic summer program, called the Agora, for doctoral students this past July 2008. As the name of the consortium would suggest, the program focused on transnational law. The Agora is one of several multi-school initiatives aimed at furthering the study of the globalizing legal environment. The Agora both reflects and furthers a trend in legal scholarship, and as a consequence legal education, toward a focus on a set of interrelated concerns, which include globalization, international governance, transnational law, comparative legal studies, legal transplantation and the apparent conceptual challenges that these pose. In important respects these new conceptual challenges have a long pedigree in questions about the scope of legal pedagogy and theory. The pedagogical controversy is rooted in questions about the purpose of legal education, namely, whether it is trade training and should focus on practical legal skills, or whether it should be conceived of as broader than this. Intimately connected to this pedagogical controversy is a legal-theoretical controversy about the scope of legal theory (and thus the nature of law and its investigation). Does the word “law” designate the organizational instruments of state power, or should we think of “law” as referring to a more diverse set of social-organizational systems that may have greater or less affinity and connection with state law?

During the Fall of 2007, as part of a much broader York-Nigerian Universities linkage project that he had been working on for some time, Professor Okafor taught an internationalized version of a pre-existing existing course entitled “Human Rights in Africa.” At the same time, Professor Dakas of the Faculty of Law, University of Jos, Nigeria (assisted by Mr. J.D. Gamaliel) taught a similarly modified version of an existing course at their own institution. Professor Dakas, a former Hauser Global Scholar at New York University and most recently the attorney-general of the Plateau State of Nigeria) was the lead faculty at that partner law school in Nigeria.

Starting with the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the establishment of the European Economic Community by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 with only 6 member states, Europe has since become a political and economic union of 27 Member States that has wide law-making competences and thus considerably affects daily life in Europe. With the overall aim of creating a common market for economic activities, borders are largely disappearing and people are free to travel to other Member States and stay, study or work.

While considerable thought and effort has been put into exploring and fixing the ethical rights and professional responsibilities of private lawyers, little energy has been directed towards defining and defending the role and duties of government lawyers. As a result, the traditional understanding seems to be that government lawyers are to consider themselves as being under the same regimen and restrictions as their private counterparts. After criticizing this default approach, the article offers a fresh evaluation of what is different about the role of government lawyers and develops a more appropriate model for thinking about their professional responsibilities and ethical privileges. The central thrust of the article is the effort to appreciate legal ethics and professional responsibility as part of a larger democratic understanding of law and justice.

The traditional narrative of the legal profession has run its course. Lawyers are looking for ethically sensitive ways to practice law that “assume greater responsibility for the welfare of parties other than clients” and that increasingly amount “to a plus for this society and for the world of our children.” Lawyers are also seeking ways to practice law that allow them to get home at night and on weekends, see their families, work full or part-time, practice in diverse and “alternative” settings, and generally pursue a meaningful career in the law rather than necessarily a total life in the law. Similarly, law students are hoping not to be asked to make a “pact with the Devil” as the cost of becoming a lawyer, and are instead looking to find areas in the law that fit with their personal, political, and economic preferences. An increasing number of legal academics are teaching, researching, and writing about progressive changes to the way we view the role and purpose of lawyering. Law faculties are actively reforming their programs and creating centres and initiatives designed to make space for innovative ethics offerings and public interest programs. Law societies and other regulatory bodies are slowly chipping away at some of the time-honoured shields of ethically suspect client behaviour, while at the same time facing demands for increased accountability. The bench and the bar are taking an active interest in addressing a perceived growing lack of professionalism within the practice. The public is increasingly skeptical of the distinction that continues to be drawn between legal ethics and “ordinary standards of moral conduct.” Finally, clients are not only expecting lawyers to actively canvass methods of alternative dispute resolution—the alternative to the adversarial and costly litigation process—but they are also demanding evidence of general sustainable professional practices from their legal counsel.