This introductory Article sets out the background and summarises the content of the Symposium on ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as a Relational Actor’. Observing that the CJEU has been a key player in shaping European legal integration, the Symposium takes as its starting point that courts – and the CJEU is no exception in this regard – are unable to drive developments in isolation. For the Court to carry out its role as guarantor of the Treaties and guardian of the rule of law in the Union, it needs not to isolate itself but to interact with other European Union (EU) and national institutions. Relations, the Symposium argues, are not only unavoidable but also legitimate and even vital for the adequate execution of the judicial function. This introduction briefly explores six of the Court’s most important relationships: those with the other EU institutions; the courts of the Member States; the Member States themselves; the parties appearing before it; other international courts; and the general public. It then summarises the contributions and highlights how they complement each other in examining the CJEU as a relational actor.

Reflexive sociology can contribute to a more holistic understanding of the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU/Court) as a relational actor. This article draws on the Bourdieusian concept of (legal) field as an analytical framework to trace the power relations between the Court and its interlocutors. The analysis develops around four distinct conceptualisations of the Court as a legal field, ranging from its institutional architecture to the three mainstream judicial routes for a case to reach its docket (preliminary reference procedure, action for annulment and infringement procedure). These showcase the varied interactions among the different actors that either shape the Court as an institution or engage with it in the course of its adjudicative function. According to field theory, these interactions take the form of power struggles between the actors comprising a legal field in order to take control of the determination of the law. The actors of a legal field enjoy different positions that formulate their objective relations, and which are contingent on their disposition and capital. Each of the conceptualisations of the Court as a legal field in this article points to distinct power struggles and relations among a similar set of actors. Consequently, using field theory can be a very useful tool to contextualise the role of the Court and to systematically study its judgments, modus operandi and position in the European legal field under a reflexive lens that accentuates the significance of social space and power relations, and pushes for socio-legal and empirical insights.

Pluralism is a defining feature of European human rights law and of the European constitution. Contestability and conditional deference determine how participating states eventually calibrate their relation to international and supranational authority. This structure gives rise to differences of opinion that reverberate throughout a public sphere that is composed of a growing number of scholars. They increasingly rely on digital media to exchange their ideas. A major role has come to be played by blogs such as the Verfassungsblog. Since its inception, its focus has rested on defending the values of constitutionalism vis-à-vis ‘backsliding’ Member States. The constitutional culture that results from this is somewhat reminiscent of Germany during the period of the Weimar Republic (1919–1933). While the rise of authoritarianism is a major issue, public law scholarship appears to become increasingly partisan. As European constitutional law emerges against the backdrop of an expanding public sphere, scholarly interventions are drawn into the vortex of politics. Unsurprisingly, scholarship begins to face up to its politicisation by reflecting on its proper task.

This Article addresses the question of how to explain and justify the allocation of politically sensitive legal questions to civil courts in the European Union. It proposes a pluralist theoretical view on interactions of private law adjudication with legislative initiatives in the process of building a European political community. This is elaborated on the basis of a reconstruction of the interaction between judicial and legislative processes in three high-profile cases (concerning non-discrimination, housing and climate change) in light of three theoretical perspectives: social justice, constitutionalism and public sphere theory. The first two perspectives shed light on the legal-political dimension of private legal questions in the European Union and manners in which to handle the plurality of sources and institutions in this field. They do, however, not fully clarify the distinction and relation between Habermasian discourses of justification and discourses of application of law in European Private Law adjudication. The Article suggests that public sphere theory, with a basis in Fraser’s work on transnationalisation, can complement the theoretical understanding of the role of judges in European Private Law. It is submitted that the interaction between national and European levels of adjudication helps maintain transnational deliberative spheres in which the legal-political stakes behind private law can be discussed. This opens up space for the inclusion of different voices in democratic deliberations on questions of social justice. Private law adjudication may thus be considered to contribute to the initiation of discourses of justification which serve the re-imagination of a European political community.

Online sexist and racist hate speech has been condemned by many and condoned by most. In this paper we explicate in private legal terms the harms caused by sexist and racist hate speech. By centring the experiences of women of colour through coded testimonies we seek to rethink harm in tort in order to make visible private harms, which have remained largely invisible in European private law discourse. We highlight two aspects of harm that private law structurally fails to make visible: health harms and relational harms in the context of persistent and structural gender and racial injustice. In this paper, we argue that these systemic injustices must inform how we think of tortuous harms that arise from sexist and racist hate speech in bilateral relationships. In this article we centre the knowledge of women of colour targeted by SR hate speech within legal knowledge production and to the ways that the legal community thinks about tort law and its purpose. Conceptualising the tortuous harms of sexist and racist hate speech is crucial for access to private law pathways for redress and damages.

This paper aims to question the dominance of human rights as the primary normative framework for European social media regulation, and academic research in this field. Analysing EU legislation and recent ECJ cases, it shows that issues like discriminatory content moderation, profiling, and promotion of stereotypes cannot adequately be addressed within a human rights framework. The centrality of individual rights in the EU legal regime not only fails to address collective issues, like platforms’ influence on culture and social norms, but cannot even offer effective, equal protection to individuals. In policy debates, the depoliticised and individualistic language of human rights can legitimise corporate activities and downplay important questions about the political economy of this privatised, highly-concentrated, advertiser-funded industry. The paper also considers interpretations of human rights as structural conditions or collective values, and argues that they cannot fully overcome the limitations discussed here. Given the entrenched role of fundamental rights in EU law, critics of social media cannot avoid relying on them. However, academics should also seek to develop more explicitly political critiques, based on alternative normative visions.

This Article draws on research into precedent and the European Court of Justice to argue that it is distinctive in almost never retreating from a standpoint it has taken, or overturning an earlier judgement, by contrast with other Supreme Courts where this is a more common occurrence. The Article then considers the implications of this finding for research into the relationship between the Court and other actors, such as Member States, litigants and institutions. It suggests that in considering how the Court may be influenced and constrained this research takes insufficient account of its apparently limited capacity to change doctrinal direction. Evidence of doctrinal path dependence needs to be a more central part of discussions of the Court as a relational actor.

This article seeks to unpack the potential and limits of markets as instruments of economic planning in sustainability capitalism. Recent policies for sustainability transitions in the United States (USA) and the European Union (EU) (eg, Infrastructure Law, EU Green Deal) have signaled aspirations for a more prominent role of the state in coordinating the economy, while still relying primarily on market mechanisms for such coordination. Yet, could the market itself be conceptualised and structured as a political instrumentality for the achievement of social objectives? An important part of the puzzle of sustainability transitions is the transportation sector, and specifically the transition to Electric Vehicles, or New Energy Vehicles (NEVs). I explore the comparative legal constructions of markets for NEVs in China – the current global leader in NEVs – the USA, and the EU. Drawing from this case study, I first argue that law makes planning possible within markets, as the functional power of market processes can be strategically deployed for the achievement of politically set objectives. Acknowledging the deliberate and artificial character of markets raises the question of what we want markets for, broadening the scope of the political possibilities enclosed in them. I, then, proceed to challenge the enduring argument of the epistemic deficit of central planners, which morphs into prescriptions of decentralisation. I show that arguments against legal centralism and planning cannot stand on just epistemological grounds and are inevitably political. Finally, I attempt to outline the limits of planning within markets – and thus, to a certain extent, the limits of the constitutive function of law – for broader projects of social transformation.

This Article brings new perspectives on the well-known Viking and Laval cases, decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in December 2007, by studying the processes and modalities of the construction of this case law as a major defeat for social Europe. It demonstrates that the political and legal implications of these two rulings were socially constructed by a variety of European actors (especially trade unionists and academics specialising in labour law) rather than legally inscribed in the rulings. In doing so, the author defends a constructivist approach in the analysis of European case law, both contextual and processual. The Article is divided into two parts. The first retraces the pre-ruling construction of the Viking and Laval cases, and shows that trade union and academic actors as well as parliamentarians worked to construct the judgements on these cases as decisive landmarks for social Europe. The second part considers the process of interpretation of the rulings after they were delivered by the CJEU. It evidences the central role played by trade union and academic actors in promoting a critical reading of the rulings, arguing that the Court subordinated social rights to economic liberties. The Article concludes by showing that this interpretation has tended to become subject to consensus, to the extent that it is now European common sense.

Using the lens of immigration and asylum, this Article develops a new understanding of legal personhood on the basis of equal human dignity, as the interface between legal personhood, equality and human rights, in order to address the dual-faceted and opposing reality of immigrants and asylum claimants in relation to their equality as humans in the order of nature and their inequality within the social/political order of Europe, where they are subjected to a constant process of depersonification and reification. This reformulated approach to legal personhood not only seeks to remove the debasement and dehumanisation that has come to characterise European Union (EU) immigration and asylum law but also intends to address the limitations of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as a valid platform for translating the EU’s own self-proclaimed commitment to human rights into justiciable normative claims.

This Article sheds new light on one of the longest-running debates in the European Union (EU) citizenship literature: the concept of ‘reverse discrimination’ and the question of whether it is justified. Reverse discrimination has divided EU lawyers into roughly two distinct groups. One group believes that it constitutes an unjustified violation of the principle of equality; a second that it is inevitable in a Union governed by the constitutional principle of divided powers. This Article questions this by offering a typology of reverse discrimination. While most scholars assume that reverse discrimination is a singular phenomenon that demands a singular response, this Article shows that it is a variegated phenomenon that demands a variegated response. It distinguishes three types of reverse discrimination and explains that the proper response depends on the type we are considering. Type I is caused by the application of the principle of mutual recognition; Type II by an interaction between domestic federalism and internal discrimination; and Type III by the CJEU’s confusion over the aim of the right to free movement and residence. Through this typology, the Article shows that reverse discrimination is never a corollary of the principle of divided powers, nor is it always incompatible with the principle of equality. Finally, the Article shows that to the extent that reverse discrimination violates the principle of equality, the solution is not to equalise rights upwards but downwards to the lower (national or regional) level of government. This shows that the principle of equality and the principle of divided powers need not collide.

When the Charter of Fundamental Rights was published in 2000, it was the first time that an international human rights instrument had recognised the freedom to conduct a business. To understand how conducting a business came to occupy the status of a fundamental right, I undertake an examination of the drafting process of Article 16 in Section 2. Early drafts protected the freedom to pursue an occupation, before the freedom to conduct a business eventually became a freestanding entitlement. This was thanks to the influence of Convention members associated with the European People’s Party who were instrumental in ensuring Article 16 was added to the draft Charter. In Section 3, I critically assess the claim contained in the Explanations to the Charter that Article 16 was simply a codification of pre-existing entitlements deriving from the case law of the Court of Justice. In Section 4, I examine the impact of Article 16 Many of the limitations that constrain the scope of Article 16 have been weakened, or have not proved to be the limitations that were originally envisaged. The Court of Justice’s defence of select areas, such as consumer protection, has shielded the deregulatory potential of Article 16 from view. Yet Article 16 has had a real and damaging impact on workers’ rights across the Union. Protecting the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 means that a remarkably broad range of actions taken in the course of running a business are now accepted as the exercise of a fundamental right.

In a crisis, ordinary rules must often give way to a more expedient approach. Such emergency competences tend to favour executive decision-making over legislative procedures. In a European Union (EU) shaken by successive crises, this situation risks leading to permanent competence creep. While considerable attention has been devoted to the impact of crisis on legal and political decision-making within the Union, the position of the Court of Justice (CJEU) – and its impact on the distribution of powers within the EU – has been less researched. This Article fills the gap by exploring how the Court reviews the exercise of power in times of crisis by executive actors at the Union and Member State levels. Using migration law as a case study, it qualitatively and quantitatively examines how the CJEU has responded to crisis both in its scrutiny of measures of containment, and through its adjudication of migration cases in general before and after the acute phase of the 2015 refugee crisis. The Article shows that the crisis has led the CJEU to take a more lenient approach towards the executive powers at both the Union and the Member State level. It argues that this effectively amounts to a withdrawal from the judicial control function and enables an expansion of executive power that is likely to have effects lasting beyond any given emergency.

By the turn of the 1990s, tax competition among national governments had emerged as a powerful law-making practice. The possibility of tax competition essentially depends on the design of transnational law, such as European law. This Article examines the change of economic, political, and legal ideas that have shaped responses by the European Communities and the European Union (EU) to income tax competition. It asserts that under the post-war settlement of embedded liberalism and moderate market integration, tax competition was not perceived as a fully developed phenomenon. Under increased cross-border economic mobility in the 1990s, tax competition became a critical concern but received a liberal and permissive reaction from the EU. In the 2010s, governing tax competition in the EU became a more vital topic. Still, in the contemporary EU, turning political ideas into legal rules capable of addressing tax competition remains hampered by the EU law requirement of unanimous decision-making. The European choice of whether and how to address tax competition involves profoundly contrasting ideas on the means by which to govern the socio-economic reality. The decision between spontaneous and regulated income tax integration is therefore a salient political question, but the unanimity rule undermines political contestation over tax competition and over the European model of fiscal federalism. The Article comes to a close by reflecting on whether the EU legal order offers means to overcome the deadlock of unanimity and whether it could accommodate a more properly political contestation over the Europeanisation of income taxation.

This Article sheds new light on the long-running debate in EU legal studies about how intense the EU judicial review of complex and uncertain assessments requiring specialist knowledge could and should be. It argues that it is necessary to move beyond formulas and concepts hammered out in the judicial statements of reasons and consider how the institutional context affects legal epistemology. How likely is it that the judges form an independent opinion about the probative value of the presented evidence and the soundness of the administration’s specialist reasoning? How likely is it that their opinion is reliable? Answering these questions helps appraise the boundaries in which judicial review or proliferating administrative review by partly specialised boards of appeal foster the rule of law understood as the pursuit of non-arbitrariness. The Article examines recent case law of the EU Courts and the Board of Appeal of the European Chemical Agency concerning public health and environmental issues, in which complex and uncertain specialist assessments were prevalent. It contends that, due to institutional limitations of EU adjudicatory bodies, a further expansion of the rule of law in EU decision-making requiring specialist knowledge should be pursued through extra-judicial means fostering transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is often viewed as a revered champion of opposition to autocratic reforms in the Member States. In the context of the rule of law crisis in Poland, however, its resolute support for judicial independence contrasts notably with the limited improvements for judges on the ground. As the present investigation suggests, this discrepancy can be explained by a mode of incremental adjustments at national level that has allowed Polish lawmakers to repeatedly neutralise the effects of the Court’s interventions. Resulting from this strategy are several instances of mutually responsive interaction between the Court of Justice and autocratic national lawmakers that have shaped developments in the rule of law crisis, both at national and supranational level. At national level, lawmakers have incrementally adjusted reforms to comply – at least superficially – with supranational judicial interventions, whereas the Court refined its interpretation of supranational safeguards of judicial independence in response to incremental adjustments in Polish law. Yet, more recently, this interaction of inadvertent mutual inspiration may have come to a halt. Rather than changing national law to superficially respond to supranational judicial interventions, Polish authorities may increasingly deny the Court’s authority to adjudicate in matters of judicial independence in the Member States altogether.

Transparency is widely acknowledged as a core value in the governance of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. However, scholarship on AI technologies and their regulation often casts this need for transparency in terms of requirements for the explanation of algorithmic outputs and/or decisions produced with the involvement of opaque black-box AI systems. Our article argues that this discourse has re-interpreted and reshaped transparency in fundamental ways away from its original meaning. The target of transparency – in most cases, the provider of AI software – determines and shapes what is made visible to the outside world, and there is no external check on the validity and accuracy of such mediated accounts and explanations, opening transparency up for manipulation. Through a theoretically informed and critical analysis of the transparency provisions in the European Union’s AI Act proposal, the article shows that the substitution of transparency with mediated explanations faces important technical constraints, creates opportunities and incentives for both providers and public-sector users of AI systems to adopt opaque practices, and reinforces secrecy requirements that gag accountability in practice. An approach to transparency as disclosure thus becomes necessary, even if not sufficient in and of itself, to ensure the accountable development and use of AI technologies in the European Union. Transparency needs to be reclaimed as a core concept, accountability tailored and reinforced and the necessity for secrecy re-examined and cordoned off.