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Reforms in German Stock Corporation Law – The 67th German Jurists Forum

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

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Abstract

The paper gives an account of the proceedings and resolutions of the 67th German Jurists Forum in Erfurt in September 2008 and analyses their significance within the broader context of German company law and other current reform proposals.

The first part of the paper is devoted to the fundamental policy question that was the main topic of the 67th German Jurists Forum: are specific legal provisions for listed and non-listed companies advisable? After sketching the historical background and the status quo of German law, the paper briefly outlines the reform concept presented by Professor Bayer in his expert report and then summarises the gist of the debates and resolutions on this issue.

The second part of the paper focuses on the vast range of other topical issues discussed during the debates, most notably the intense discussion on the reform of the legal regime governing shareholder suits in order to tackle the persisting problem of ‘marauding shareholders’ [‘räuberische Aktionäre’]. Other prominent issues included the calculation of compensation payments to shareholders, the proposal to give German stock corporations the freedom to choose between a one-tier and a two-tier system of management, and various proposals to provide more flexibility for non-listed companies.

The paper concludes that although the German Jurists Forum in general took a rather conservative stance, it also made powerful and well-reasoned reform recommendations with respect to the important issues of compensation payments and the legal regime regarding shareholder suits.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2008

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