In low-income countries, grassroots collective action for the management of a common environmental resource is a well-known substitute for government provision of public goods. In our research we test experimentally what its effect is on social capital. To this purpose we structure a ‘sandwich’ experiment in which participants play a common pool resource game (CPRG) between two trust games in a Nairobi slum where social capital is scarce but informal rules regulating the commons are abundant. Our findings show that the change in trustworthiness between the two trust game rounds generated by the CPRG experience is crucially affected by the subjective satisfaction about the CPRG, rather than by standard objective measures related to CPRG players' behaviour. These results highlight that subjective satisfaction in a collective action has relevant predictive power on social capital creation, providing information which can be crucial to designing successful self-organized environmental resource regimes.

For local public goods, supply or demand shocks may create periods during which it is welfare enhancing for households to undertake spatial arbitrage by relocating residentially. We point out that the magnitude and direction of the average benefit estimate obtained during such a transition period is likely to vary systematically depending upon the magnitude of the shock, the level of transaction costs and the extent to which other affected goods are substitutes or complements. We test a subset of our model's predictions using cross-sectional data on household demand for improved municipal services in post-socialist Romania. Our preliminary empirical analysis suggests that there have been substantial gains in welfare resulting from spatial adjustment following the opening up of housing markets. Furthermore, our results indicate that benefit estimates for improved water services during the transition may be substantially higher than long-run estimates. This limited evidence supports our concern that economists may recommend non-optimal levels of long-run investment, regulation, or user fees if they are unaware of the implications of future readjustment to supply or demand shocks.

Levin et al. give us a sweeping vision of the notion of resilience and the response of management. In these comments I wish to discuss the daunting task of quantification of the resilience-based management issues raised by Levin et al. I also wish to suggest directions of future research.

Though there are economically based arguments for public intervention in negotiations between private agents, such intervention will often take place as a consequence of political interests. In this paper we discuss how varying political interests of an intervening body affect its intervention mechanism. We derive a unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium for a two-step, three-player game in which the optimal intervention mechanism (subsidies) and the optimal size of the traded good are decided.

The paper has been motivated by the negotiations between a Russian processing plant, causing transboundary, polluting emissions, and Nordic companies offering technology which will reduce the emissions significantly. Nordic governments have intervened in the negotiations and offered subsidies, which is subtracted from the seller's price if trade takes place. Combining the theoretical results and empirical facts we conclude that the Norwegian government seems to have had stronger political interests in this case than did the Finnish government.

Our environment is complex, but it is understandable through rational investigation, and it is not to be feared. So wrote Titus Lucretius Carus of the nature of things some thirty human lifetimes ago—not so long, really. About species evolution Lucretius thought much, guessed well, and worried little. About microparasitic evolution he knew nothing. Would he have feared it? Should we fear it now?

We examine relations between strategic environmental policy, international R&D cartels and research joint ventures (RJVs), using a third-country model with Cournot duopoly. We indicate that forming an R&D/RJV cartel reduces governments' incentives to extract rent from consumers in the third country. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that social welfare under R&D cartels with full information sharing, i.e., RJV cartels, cannot surpass that under R&D/RJV competition, whereas forming an R&D/RJV cartel works well for environmental investment. Among the policy implications, we show that governments can maximize global welfare by collectively determining whether to allow R&D/RJV cartels.

The presence of nonzero conjectural variations in pollution abatement and output make emission taxes less effective with respect to reducing emissions. This has implications for the characterization of the optimal emission tax, particularly in an international context where there are large asymmetries in pollution intensities. A higher degree of collusion in output between polluting firms results in higher emissions taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In contrast, a higher degree of collusion in abatement between polluting firms results in lower emissions taxes in the non-cooperative equilibrium. These results rely on the presence of nonzero conjectural variations and large asymmetries in pollution intensities across countries. The analysis is relevant to the design of international environmental policy, including cases where countries face increasing global competition and damages from rising global emissions.

We estimate the impact of subsequent droughts on the revenues of farmers in Ethiopia factoring in their adaptive capacity. We find that after the first drought, there is no significant difference in the revenue of the farmers who experienced a drought, as compared to those who did not. However, there is a loss in revenue after the second drought, specifically for those farmers that are endowed with less assets. This finding underscores that a rise in the frequency of extreme events and shocks can potentially have significant local distributional implications, with wealth as a major distinguishing factor.