As a literary genre and practice, philosophical and political epistolography seems to have been alive and well in the fourth-century Roman empire. We have fragments of twenty letters of the late third- and early fourth-century c.e. Platonist (Neoplatonist to us) philosopher Iamblichus of Chalcis (which are preserved in the early fifth-century Ioannes Stobaeus’ Anthologium [ = Flor.]) to former students and other contemporaries, some of whom appear to have been imperial officeholders (see Appendix); the Epistle to Himerius of Sopater the Younger (which is partially preserved in Stobaeus, 4.5.51–60, in sequential extracts; this Sopater is the homonymous son of the philosopher who had been Iamblichus’ student) to his brother Himerius on the latter's assumption of an unknown governorship (ἡγεμονία) in the East, probably sometime in the 340s or 350s (and so under the Emperor Constantius II); the Emperor Julian's Epistle to Themistius, which was likely written and published c.December 361/early 362; and the Epistle to Julian of the Aristotelian philosopher Themistius on proper rule (preserved in two Arabic manuscripts from the eleventh and fourteenth/fifteenth centuries), which seems to have been a response, in part, to Julian's Epistle to Themistius and perhaps was written to the emperor when both men likely resided in Constantinople at the same time. These philosophical and political letters are but a few examples from this period. All four authors mentioned above, who are representative of intellectual life in the East during the fourth century, produced epistles which reflect Greek political theory in a Roman imperial context.

This paper proposes a number of improvements to the text of Basil of Caesarea's Homiliae in hexaemeron 4 and 5. The biblical text poses particular problems for the fourth and the fifth homilies. Therefore, the text form of Genesis from these two homilies is discussed first, and then further individual instances from the fourth and the fifth homilies are examined. The passages are presented in the format of a commentary under the assumption that the reader has the GCS edition at hand.

While commonly referring to us as ‘human’, ‘particular’ (μερικαί), or ‘rational’ (λογικαί) souls, in one striking passage, Proclus (In Ti. 3.259.21–7) instead describes us as

Eudemian Ethics II 6 is meant to introduce Aristotle's discussion of voluntary action in II 7–9. The majority of II 6, however, consists of a somewhat obscure discussion of the ways in which humans, alone among animals, are origins of action (ἀρχαὶ πράξεων). It is not at all clear how that topic is meant to relate to the topic of voluntary action until the following passage, towards the end of the chapter, in which Aristotle relates being the cause (αἴτιος) and origin of action to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and to the voluntary (1223a9–16):

In the final book of his poem Lucretius spends some time discussing earthquakes and their causes (6.535–607). In accordance with the standard Epicurean practice, Lucretius considers four alternative physical mechanisms that may be responsible for the phenomenon. The first three explanations involve three different kinds of subterranean matter—rock (6.543–51), water (6.552–6) and air (6.557–76)—causing the commotion of the earth's deeper regions, which is then transmitted to the surface. The fourth type of earthquake is different, as it is produced by the seismic agent affecting the surface directly and potentially causing its deformation rather than just trembling. This happens when a gust of subterranean wind (6.583–4)

exagitata foras erumpitur et simul altam
diffindens terram magnum concinnat hiatum.

Cicero's praise of Caesar in the Pro Marcello of September 46 b.c.e. has been much discussed for its sincerity or otherwise. Here I would like to point out some unobserved literary colour which may make some contribution to the argument, namely Cicero's subtle evocation of Hercules in describing the achievements of the victorious Caesar. Such an analogy is not unlikely in the context of Roman military image-making: Sulla in 78 b.c.e. and Crassus and Pompey in 70 b.c.e. had earlier encouraged connections with Hercules in analogous victorious contexts, and similar comparisons are later made between the foreign conquests of Augustus and those of Hercules in both Virgil (Aen. 6.801) and Horace (Carm. 3.14.1–4).

In January of the year a.d. 69, Marcus Salvius Otho, disappointed in his attempt to be named Galba's heir and successor, fomented revolt among the praetorian guard. Trading on the praetorians’ own discontent at not receiving the donative, he began to win over the soldiers’ favour. Tacitus relates that, when the attitude of the soldiers seemed ripe (haud dubiae iam in castris omnium mentes, Hist. 1.36.1), Otho himself came forth and began to implore them directly (nec deerat Otho protendens manus adorare uolgum, iacere oscula, et omnia seruiliter pro dominatione, Hist. 1.36.3); and after he accepted the oath of loyalty from the entire classicorum legio (Hist. 1.36.3), he felt ready to hold a speech encouraging the men to complete the deed by ousting Galba.

The most authoritative testimony for the text of Apuleius’ defence-speech known as Apologia or Pro Se De Magia is a Cassinese MS indicated with the siglum F (Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Plut. 68.2), written under the abbotship of Desiderius (1058–1087) in a mature Beneventan script, which also preserves the text of the Metamorphoses and the Florida. The text that F preserves is unsurprisingly not flawless, and in this note I argue for the presence of a corruption affecting aut in Apol. 47.1. For the sake of clarity, I provide the passage from Apol. 46.6 to 47.2 below.

Lines 27.14–17 of the text published by Justin Stover as Apuleius, De Platone 3 are printed by him as follows:

In this brief note, I wish to highlight Proclus’ unappreciated contribution to a well-documented debate in antiquity that continues to hold great contemporary interest: what psychological characteristics (such as deliberation, purposiveness, practical intelligence, but also emotions, memory and self-awareness), if any, distinguish humans from non-human animals?