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Flexibility—The Experience So Far

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2017

John A. Usher
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Extract

The choice of the word “flexibility” in the title of this paper rather than the term “closer co-operation” introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam is not accidental: since the general Amsterdam provisions on closer co-operation have not so far been used, a paper on the experience of those provisions since their entry into force would be very short—even if they have given rise to an extensive literature. It should nevertheless be remembered that under the terms of the Amsterdam Treaty itself there are situations where those provisions are deemed to have been used: under Article 1 of the Protocol Integrating the Schengen acquis into the Framework of the European Union, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Sweden, as signatories to the Schengen agreements, are “authorised to establish closer co-operation among themselves” within the scope of those agreements and related provisions; furthermore, under Article 5 of that Protocol, where either Ireland or the United Kingdom or both have not notified the President of the Council in writing within a reasonable period that they wish to take part,

“the authorisation referred to in Article 11 of the Treaty establishing the European Community or Article 40 of the Treaty on European Union shall be deemed to have been granted to the Member States referred to in Article 1 and to Ireland or the United Kingdom where either of them wishes to take part in the areas of co-operation in question”.

Type
Research Article
Information
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , Volume 3 , 2000 , pp. 479 - 498
Copyright
Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 2000

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References

1 To be replaced by the term “enhanced co-operation” by the Treaty of Nice

2 See e.g. Ehlermann, C. D. “Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Co-operation: The New Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty” (1998) European Law journal 246 Google Scholar; Usher, J. “Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation” in Heukels, T., et al (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam (The Hague, Kluwer, 1998), 253–271 Google Scholar, and EC Institutions and Legislation (Harlow, Longman, 1998) ch. 9; Monar, J. “Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam—Reform at the Price of Fragmentation” (1998) ELRev. 320 Google Scholar; De la Serre F. and Wallace H. “Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation in the European Union: Placebo rather than Panacea”, “Notre Europe” Research and Policy papers No. 2 (September 1997); Shaw, J. “The Treaty of Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy” (1998) European Law Journal 63 Google Scholar; Tuytschaever, F. Differentiation in European Union Law (Oxford, Hart 1999)Google Scholar; Weatherill, S. “Flexibility or fragmentation: trends in European integration” in Usher, J. (ed.), The State of the European Union (Harlow, Longman, 2000)Google Scholar; and the papers in De Burca, G. and Scott, J. (ed.), Constitutional change in the EU: from uniformity to flexibility? (Oxford, Hart, 2000)Google Scholar.

3 Art. 40 of the TEU sets the general framework for closer cooperation, and Art. 11 of the EC Treaty applies the concept in the context of the EC.

4 See Usher, J. “Economic and Monetary Union—A Model for Flexibility?” in 1 CYEL (1998), 39–75 Google Scholar.

5 Art. 122 EC.

6 Art. 43(g) TEU

7 OJ 2000 L131/43

8 OJ 2000 L160/1.

9 OJ 2000 L160/19.

10 OJ 2000 L160/37.

11 OJ 2001 L12/1.

12 Art. 4.

13 Para. 1.3.7.

14 Para. 1.3.12.

15 Council Decision 98/317 (OJ 1998 L139/30).

16 See Usher, J. The Law of Money and Financial Services in the EC 2nd edn. (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 173–178 Google Scholar.

17 European Council Resolution of 16 June 1997 (“Rapid” Information Service 18 June 1997).

18 European Council Resolution of 16 June 1997, para. 1.6.

19 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No. 7310, 28 and 29 September 1998.

20 Council Decision 2000/427 on the adoption by Greece of the single currency (OJ 2000 L167/19).

20a As has now happened with the adoption of Council Regulation 539/2001 (OJ 2001/L81/1).

21 OJ 2001 L12/1.

22 Arts. 61(c) and 67(1).

23 Para. 23.

24 OJ 2000 L160/1.

25 OJ 2000 L160/37.

26 See Stone, P. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe (Harlow, Longman, 1998), 10 Google Scholar.

27 Para. 32.

28 OJ 2000 L160/19.

29 OJ 2000 L160/37.

30 Para. 25 in the matrimonial Regulation, para 18 in the service Regulation.

31 OJ 2001 L43/1.

32 Para. 13 of the recitals.

33 Similar in legal nature to an EC Directive; see Louis, : “A legal and institutional approach for building a Monetary Union” 33 (1998) CMLRev. 548 Google Scholar.

34 ECB Third Progress Report on the TARGET project, November 1998, 18.

35 Annex I to the Conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council, 12 and 13 December 1997.

36 See Usher, J. EC Institutions and Legislation (Hartlow, Longman, 1998), 23–25 Google Scholar.

37 See Art. 106(6).

38 Decision 98/345 (OJ 1998 L154/33).

39 The normal current qualified majority represents just over 71% of the weighted votes, but under the Nice Protocol on the Enlargement of the EU, a qualified majority in an enlarged EU would represent 74.78% of the weighted votes.

40 OJ 1998 L318/4. An account of the legal debates is given in Vigneron and Mollica: “La différenciation dans l’Union économique et monétaire” (2000) Euredia (Revue européenne de droit bancaire et financier) 197, 219-227.

41 This is reflected also in the academic literature: the UK view is in effect supported by Louis, , “A legal and institutional approach for building a Monetary Union” above n 33 at 65 Google Scholar; but Vigneron and Mollica, ibid, argue on a teleological basis in favour of the majority view.

42 There is a similar provision in Art. 2 of the Danish Protocol.

43 Beginning with Usher, J. “Variable Geometry or Concentric Circles: Patterns for the European Union” (1997) ICLQ 243, 270–272 Google Scholar.

44 Under a revised text of Art. 230 of the EC Treaty.

45 [1993] ECR I-3605.

46 [1976] ECR I473.

47 See, to take a couple of random examples, Case 60/81 IBM v. Commission [1981] ECR 2639, or Case C-49/88 Al-Jubail Fertiliser v. Council [1991] ECR I-3187.

48 Cases C-294/88 & C-194/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763, and Case 231/89 Gmorzynska-Bscher [1990] ECR I-4003.

49 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR I355.

50 Case 804/79 Commission v. UK [1981] ECR 1045.

51 By virtue of Art. 4(1) of the EC Treaty there is a single monetary policy at the single currency stage, and under Art. 105(2) it is the task of the ESCB to define and implement this monetary policy.

52 Case 222/82 Apple and Pear Development Council [1983] ECR 4083.

53 Art. 70 EC.

54 See e.g. the recitals to Council Directive 85/374 on liability for defective products, OJ 1985 L210/29.

55 [2000] ECR I-8419.

56 EP and Council Directive 98/43, OJ 1998 L213/9.

57 Clause G in the draft text.