In recent years, the availability of pecuniary compensation for failure to complete a contract for the sale of land has provoked considerable discussion, both in the courts and elsewhere. Where such a failure has occurred, a number of possible claims are open to the other party. His most obvious source of pecuniary compensation is undoubtedly an action for damages for breach of contract. Alternatively, he may seek to obtain damages in lieu of a decree for specific performance. Further, he may be able, in appropriate circumstances, to seek damages for misrepresentation either under the law of tort or under the provisions of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Finally, if he is the purchaser, he may be able to base a claim for pecuniary compensation on the fact that the vendor is a constructive trustee of the subject matter of the contract pending completion. The interrelation of these different remedies (which have often been held to give very different measures of recovery) both with one another and with the remedies of specific performance and rescission has given rise to a number of difficulties, several of which had to be considered by the House of Lords in the recent case of Johnson v. Agnew. The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast these different remedies in the light of the recent authorities.

The Bucks. Constabulary Widows' and Orphans' Fund Friendly Society was set up primarily to provide for the relief of the widows and orphans of deceased members of the Bucks. Constabulary. It was financed by voluntary contributions from the members. There was nothing in the rules about the destination of the society's property on its dissolution. In April 1968 the Thames Valley Constabulary came into being, an amalgamation of the Bucks. Constabulary and other forces. An effective instrument of dissolution of the society was signed on 14 October 1969; and Walton J. found himself facing in Re Bucks. Constabulary (No. 2) the question of “the destination of the assets of the friendly society …” Walton J. took the view that most past decisions “in relation to the destination of the funds of unincorporated associations” had “lost sight of” the “quite elementary … question of the property of unincorporated associations in the round.” He therefore proceeded to outline the general law on the holding of property by unincorporated associations as a necessary prelude to his decision on the destination of the funds. This was unquestionably the correct course to follow. It is suggested, however, that Walton J.'s view “in the round” on the holding of property by unincorporated associations is too simple, and that circumstances will arise in which a more complex problem on the destination of funds might arise, and which will surely call for a more complex answer. It must also be noted that Walton J. did not have to deal with the question of funds accruing to a society from outside sources, i.e., other than from the members themselves.

Where injury or damage is caused by a public authority in the exercise of its functions it would be broadly true to say that the tendency of the modern law is to equate the authority with a private person or trading company causing the same loss. Qualifications exist, of course, the most important being those relating to the Crown, to statutory authority for works which would otherwise be a nuisance and the principle that the courts should not interfere with intra vires “policy” decisions, but there are now comparatively few substantive or adjectival rules putting a public authority in a protected position. Indeed, there is now some demand that we should place public authorities in an inferior position by exposing them to a regime of strict liability for the risks they create in pursuit of a supposed benefit for us all. In view of this attitude it is perhaps not surprising that we tend to consider the public authority only as defendant, but a recent Court of Appeal decision reminds us that there are still instances of legislative solicitude for the authority as plaintiff. The background involves a long and still unsettled wrangle over statutory interpretation beginning with the famous case of River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson.

In its judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne v. Sabena, the Court of Justice of the European Communities gave an interpretation to the provisions of Article 119 of the E.E.C. Treaty, on equal pay of male and female workers, which caused some stir. The Court held that the equal pay rule had direct effect, in the sense that any female worker could appeal to it in proceedings against her employer before courts or tribunals of any of the Member States. This ruling embodied a novel interpretation of Article 119: not only because the Court itself had not yet applied its doctrine of direct effect to this article, but also because most of the authors on the subject had come to a different conclusion. The Court seems to have been aware of the practical problems which might result from such a situation; it added some considerations on what it called the “temporal effect” of its judgment. Its decision “might,” it said, result in the introduction of claims by female workers dating back to the time when the direct effect of Article 119 came about (1963 for the “old” Member States!); therefore, it developed a certain number of reasons for deciding that “important considerations of legal certainty affecting all the interests involved” made it impossible to reopen the question as regards the past. Only workers who had already brought legal proceedings at the date of the judgment could benefit from the direct effect.

The 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was the creation of the ninth session of the League of Nations. Containing important provisions on judicial settlement, as well as on conciliation and arbitration, the Act provided the Permanent Court of International Justice with an indisputable basis of jurisdiction. Whether the Act survived the demise of the League and is equally effective today is, however, a matter of some disagreement.

In his book, Taking Rights Seriously, Professor Ronald Dworkin has argued that the institution of rights against the state is justified “because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected.” But he also stressed the difficulty of ensuring that these rights are respected:

The institution of rights against the Government is not a gift of God, or an ancient ritual, or a national sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the Government's job of securing the general benefit more difficult and more expensive, and it would be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served some point.

Now Dworkin's book is concerned with the problems presented in a democratic system of law and government by a serious commitment to fundamental political rights, such as freedom of speech and the disputed right of civil disobedience; and Dworkin does not directly consider the interest which the individual may have in the maintenance of good government in matters that affect him. One object of this article is to consider whether it is worthwhile seeking to relate the debate about citizen's rights to an assessment of the Ombudsman system. Another aim, since no-one would claim that the Ombudsman should be the sole protector of citizen's rights, is to examine the relationship between the Ombudsman and other agencies for the protection of the citizen in his dealings with the administration. The material to be discussed is drawn from the experience in the U.K. of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration, the Parliamentary Ombudsman: but aspects of the discussion may be relevant to the experience of ombudsmen in other countries.

What sort of relation, according to the Pure Theory of Law, does a higher-order norm bear to a lower-order norm? Does the higher-order norm in effect subsume the lower-order norm? And if so, is subsumption sufficient for authorisation, such that subsumption of a norm under an appropriate higher-order norm authorises, say, a legal official's “choice” of that norm? This interpretation of authorisation in the Pure Theory of Law, fine as far as it goes, would be misleading if offered as a full statement. For Hans Kelsen in fact works with two types of authorisation, what I term material authorisation, wherein authorisation of a lower-order norm stems from the applicable higher-order norm, and formal authorisation, wherein authorisation of a lower-order norm flows from the power of the legal organ that creates, applies, or validates that norm.