Recent media reports have revealed a substantial number of highly-paid senior civil servants and BBC presenters have been using “off payroll” arrangements and personal services companies to reduce the tax paid on their earnings. This article examines the tax and National Insurance contribution (NIC) savings that can be had by carrying on economic activity through a company rather than as an unincorporated business or an employee. These savings derive from a combination of favourable tax and NIC rates on companies, and can be further increased through family income-splitting arrangements, as witnessed in the case of Jones v Garnett. Several possible reforms to address the distortions and inequity in the present tax and NIC regimes in favour of companies are considered, including amendments to the IR35 “disguised employment” regime and the anti-income-splitting rules known as the settlement provisions. Applying the new statutory general anti-abuse rule, which the Government plans to introduce in Finance Act 2013, is another possible approach. The preferred option, however, is to deal with the root problem and pursue closer alignment of the tax and NIC treatment of activity carried on in different legal forms.

This article considers the contentious invocations of history that have become prominent in debates about English public law. It presents them as uses of history not simply to understand English public law but to reform it, through the reconstruction of historic authorities or reappraisal of historical sources. This article addresses the criticism they have attracted by distinguishing different kinds of orthodox and unorthodox reformist history. It advocates their transparent use and thoroughly deliberative history for reformist purposes in public law. It does so in three distinctive ways: first, by suggesting implications of Coke's dictum on causal understanding for whig historical approaches in the common law; secondly, by reassessing Maitland's dichotomy between the lawyer's logic of authority and the historian's logic of evidence; and, thirdly, by arguing that much can be learnt from the methodological caution, deliberation and rigour promoted by comparativists in their developed literature on legal transplants and law reform.

As students of the Law of Contract learn to their bemusement, in Fisher v Bell,1 although caught by a member of the constabulary in the most compromising circumstances, the owner of Bell's Music Shop, situate in the handsome Victorian shopping Arcade in the bustling Broadmead area of Bristol, was unsuccessfully prosecuted for offering for sale a flick knife contrary to s.1(1) of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The statute penalised “any person who manufactures, sells or hires or offers for sale or hire, or lends or gives to any other person” a flick knife. Mr Bell had done all in his power to make a sale. The switchblade had been displayed in his shop window with a label that read, “Ejector knife—4s”. The police officer, who spotted the display and then took the knife away to show to his superintendent, was told by the shopkeeper that he had had other policemen in the shop inquiring about the knives. When the officer returned to tell Mr Bell that he would be prosecuted, the latter simply retorted “Fair enough.”

This article reflects on a group of constitutional devices: mechanisms that empower one state institution to defend itself against another. The institution is given a shield to protect against the attentions of another body, or is given a sword it can use to repel an attack. Self-defence mechanisms are interesting for many reasons, but particularly for the light they cast on the separation of powers. These measures seem contrary to the normal prescriptions of that principle, allocating a capacity to a body that it appears ill suited to possess. Understanding why the separation of powers requires these surprising allocations helps explain its operation in ordinary contexts.

This paper identifies the source, content and limits of the controls that might be imposed by a court on the way a party exercises discretionary powers conferred under the terms of a contract. It is argued that such controls boil down to a requirement of “good faith”, in the sense that the party exercising the discretion must do so honestly, and that this can be tested by asking whether the decision is one that no reasonable person acting reasonably could have reached in the circumstances. It is suggested that a similar requirement should apply when a contracting party exercises a right to terminate for breach, whether at common law or under a termination clause.

Anti-discrimination complaints by religious employees have constructed seemingly intractable conflicts. The United Kingdom courts have resolved these disputes by diluting individual religious liberty, particularly when determining questions of disadvantage and proportionality under indirect discrimination. This article explores an alternative UK anti-discrimination claim route for religious employees, namely an employer duty of reasonable accommodation. A comparative analysis outlines the corresponding Canadian duty. This model is applied to UK employment cases featuring indirect religious discrimination, specifically those claims which formed the recent applications in Eweida and Others v UK. It is suggested that adoption of the Canadian model be considered: its nuanced approach to proportionality is particularly instructive. Whilst such a UK duty could prove controversial, it would cohere with both normative theory in law and religion and conceptual understanding of anti-discrimination law. Moreover, reasonable accommodation's individualised focus should be acclaimed; it need not compromise collective notions of religious liberty.