Any attempt to evaluate the adequacy or inadequacy of tort law in general is bound to fail unless the scope of inquiry is severely limited. All attempts to find some unifying principle have failed. In light of the diverse interests involved which may be political, domestic or economic, and the purposes to be achieved, which may range from the quasi-criminal to determination of title to property, it would be a miracle of intellectual abstraction if it were otherwise.

To confine inquiry to “accidental” injuries, i.e., those arising as a by-product of some lawful activity carried on for reasons other than the invasion of a plaintiff's interest, is helpful but not satis-factory. For example, “accidental” injury to a person's privacy, honour or reputation could fall in this category. While issues of “strict liability” or liability for “fault” permeate this field and have, in England and Canada, been developed by the courts in favour of the former, public interest in freedom to disseminate news and the encouragement of freedom of speech is an important factor here which makes it impossible to compare other branches of the law where there is no counterpart. Here too legislation is playing an important role. By statute in England attempts have been made to mitigate some of the harsher features of strict liability by eliminating damages and substituting an “offer of amends” for accidental and non-negligent defamation. While legislation in Canada has been widespread, particularly with regard to the total or partial abolition of the distinction between libel and slander, such legislation has nowhere changed the strict liability of the common law.

Hart and Honoré's book is a thorough and scholarly study of the concept of causation in Anglo-American law. Closely reasoned, with full reference to the literature and a considerable treatment of Continental theories, it represents a serious attempt to restate the law in tort, contract and crime in an intelligible way. In future, any serious student of the subject will have to take note of it. Unfortunately for the authors they have backed a loser in supporting Re Polemis and criticising the foreseeability test; and since much of their argument depends upon their opinion on this question, their book must now be accounted largely out of date, if the decision of the Judicial Committee in The Wagon Mound receives the acceptance that seems probable. In respect of the general theory of causation, however, the discussion retains its intellectual interest; and the chapters on contract and crime, though relatively short, are largely unaffected by The Wagon Mound.

It was only six years ago that C. J. Slade wrote his memorable article “The Myth of Mistake in the English Law of Contract” in which he placed the whole subject of mistake in a new and agreeable perspective. “Mistake as such,” he declared, “has no operative effect whatever at law.”

This was good news for the student; but problems of error in persona still had to be solved, and for these Mr. Slade proposed a simple application of the basic principles of offer and acceptance. The test was whether A's offer was addressed to B and B's acceptance addressed to A, their intention being construed objectively unless that of the one was known to the other, in which case the actual intention of the former determined the matter. The authorities, for the most part, ranged themselves in substantial support, and rationality, it seemed, had been injected at last into this confused branch of the law.

This reassurance has now been disturbed by the case of Ingram v. Little, which reminds us that the offer and acceptance test is no magic formula acting as a ready panacea for all the ills caused by error in persona.

The facts which gave rise to Ingram v. Little are by now well known. Three ladies who wished to sell their car were offered an acceptable price by a stranger, but they made it plain they would not accept payment by cheque. He then pretended to them that he was a certain P. G. M. Hutchinson and quoted an address which the ladies found to be the one shown beside that person's name in the telephone directory.