Recent decisions relating to commercial transactions have raised issues about the limits of the courts’ jurisdiction to interfere with contractual terms, even where the terms seem to yield unjust results on breach. The author argues for a reconceptualisation of the ancient equitable doctrine of relief against forfeiture, as one which ensures that rights taken by way of security should never allow a secured creditor to recover more than his secured debt. Building on roots in the law of mortgages, this requires the court to characterise the substance of the parties’ bargain. It can, in common with the law of penalties, be understood as implementing a mandatory policy which allows the parties full freedom in crafting their primary obligations, but denies them full freedom in deciding what shall be the consequences of a breach of a primary obligation. The author argues that the restatement fits the contours of the existing law, and the requirements of corrective justice.

The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms makes no mention of any right to procedural justice in the making of administrative decisions. Any protection for such rights must be found in Article 6(1) which provides that in the determination of their “civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”. But Article 6(1) was originally intended to apply to the determination of private law rights only and not to public law matters (see Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium (1981) 4 E.H.R.R. 1, 36 (Sir Vincent Evans, dissenting); Konig v. Germany (1978) 2 E.H.R.R. 170 (Matscher J., dissenting)). The article plainly envisages judicial proceedings, and there are obvious difficulties in applying it straightforwardly to administrative proceedings.

For five centuries most lawsuits claiming land hinged on the exercise of a right of entry whereby the claimant had become instantly seised. Historians have assumed that he had previously been disseised, the disseisor’s wrongful possession not having matured into a protected seisin. But the mechanism, not confined to reversing disseisins, was the alternative to a real action and therefore claimed title by inheritance. Inheritance did not start as the automatic devolution of a non-existent ownership. On each death the lord made a new grant to the heir and put him in seisin, which was not an abstraction like possession but by definition conferred by the lord. Changes beginning in the 12th century eroded the lord’s part in inheritance: instead of putting heirs in seisin lords athorised them to put themselves in; and finally one had the right of entry if a supposed lord could have given authority.

Claims of conscience are a substantial area of concern in relation to healthcare decisions but are often only considered in a limited context. Broadening our understanding of claims of conscience, however, might lead to claims that we are moving back towards a doctor-centred understanding of medical care. This article argues that we can allow claims of conscience without unduly penalising patients by focusing on the responsibilities that ought to attach to conscience claims. This article sets out three responsibilities – humility, universality and reciprocal respect – which ought to be part of any claim of conscience. The Charlie Gard case is then used as an example to explore the use of responsibilities. The article then moves to consider possible issues that arise from this view.

IN Hämäläinen v Finland (Application no. 37359/09), 16 July 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that Contracting States of the Council of Europe may require the dissolution of an existing marriage before extending the right to legal gender recognition.

This article discusses the case of Brock and Wyner (2001) (the “Wintercomfort Case”) and considers its implications for private citizens who traditionally have not incurred criminal liability merely for failing to prevent a third party from committing an offence unless they have some specific legal responsibility for the victim or for the business or motor-vehicle in connection with which it is committed. The wide and vague interpretation placed on section 8 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, which applies to everyone who occupies or manages premises, is contrasted sharply with the House of Lords’ views of its predecessor (section 8 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965) in Sweet v. Parsley. The author draws attention to the clearer and more circumscribed section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and argues for an equally specific provision to be substituted for a Section 8 of the 1971 Act.