We propose an analytic account of dispositional conservatism that attempts to uncover a foundation of what is often taken to be an anti-foundationalist position. We identify a bias in favour of the status quo as a key component of the conservative disposition and address the question of the justification of such a conservative disposition, and the circumstances in which the widespread adoption of such a disposition might be normatively desirable. Our analysis builds on a structural link between the economist's traditional emphasis on questions of feasibility and the conservative's attachment to the status quo.

A raft of new research on the causes and effects of political corruption has emerged in recent years, in tandem with a separate, growing focus on the effects of political institutions on important outcomes such as economic growth, social equality and political stability. Yet we know little about the possible role of different political institutional arrangements on political corruption. This article examines the impact of territorial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive (parliamentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption cross-nationally. We find that unitary and parliamentary forms of government help reduce levels of corruption. To explain this result, we explore a series of seven potential causal mechanisms that emerge out of the competing centralist and decentralist theoretical paradigms: (1) openness, transparency and information costs, (2) intergovernmental competition, (3) localism, (4) party competition, (5) decision rules, (6) collective action problems, and (7) public administration. Our empirical findings and our analysis of causal mechanisms suggest that centralized constitutions help foster lower levels of political corruption.

One of the chief explanations for the decline of social capital in the United States is the passing of the ‘civic generation’, those who came of age during the Depression and the Second World War. These Americans experienced greater government largesse than previous generations, yet we know little about how public programmes influenced their subsequent involvement in public life. This article draws on policy feedback theory to examine how the educational benefits of the GI Bill, through which 7.8 million Second World War veterans attended college or gained vocational training, affected recipients' political participation across three time periods, from 1950 to 1998. We find that initially, interpretive effects of programme implementation produced increased levels of participation among users generally. Later on, resource effects enhanced participation rates selectively, with the strongest effects among those who had attained the highest levels of education. Overall, the study illustrates distinct mechanisms, timing and sequencing through which public policy can shape the interests and capacities of programme recipients to engage in democratic participation.

Previous research has shown that institutional factors, particularly ‘direct democracy’, along with racial context, shape policy outcomes in the fifty American states. But less is understood about the impact of such factors on attitudes towards government of racial and ethnic minorities. The passage of ballot initiatives targeting minority interests might be expected to have a negative effect on these groups. This study considers the impact of institutional and social context on attitudes about government responsiveness (external efficacy), drawing on pooled NES survey data from 1988–98 merged with state level data. Consistent with previous research, which was based on a single year, there is strong evidence that citizens in states with frequent exposure to direct democracy are more likely to perceive that government is responsive to their needs. At the same time, direct democracy did not have the hypothesized detrimental impact on racial and ethnic group attitudes towards government in general. State racial context also did not have a measurable impact on individual-level attitudes. Regardless of state environmental contexts, however, racial and ethnic minorities (with the exception of Latinos) reported less confidence in government than whites. The findings have broader implications, particularly given the growing racial and ethnic diversity and the ongoing politics of democratic inclusion in America.

What determines the responsiveness and effectiveness of democratic governments in meeting their citizens’ needs? Based on his 1993 study of the twenty Italian regions, Robert Putnam argued that ‘civic community’, a self-reinforcing syndrome of social engagement and political participation, is the explanation. A re-examination of Putnam’s data reveals little evidence of such a syndrome, but confirms that where more citizens participate in politics outside of networks of clientelistic exchange, more effective democratic government results. To discern the causes of variation in this self-motivated political participation, I test Putnam’s measures of social engagement against aspects of Italian socio-economic structure. Economic development and the historical distribution of land, not social engagement, are found to be powerful predictors of self-motivated political participation and in turn democratic quality.

This article explores the role of organized interests in congressional elections by examining the influence of the National Rifle Association (NRA) in contested House races in 1994 and 1996. Most research on the electoral impact of organized interests reports that groups have a negligible impact on the outcome. Yet anecdotal evidence regarding NRA influence abounds, particularly in 1994. We construct an aggregate model of congressional vote share that allows us to systematically analyse the electoral impact of the NRA in 1994 and 1996 House races. Unlike previous research of this sort, we provide evidence that the NRA can have a statistically discernible effect on election outcomes, but not in all elections and for all candidates. The NRA endorsement was particularly helpful to Republican challengers in 1994 (and to some extent Republican incumbents), but much less helpful to Democrats. These effects are much reduced in 1996 for all candidates. Likewise, having lots of NRA members in the district helped Republican challengers the most (in 1994) and Democrats not at all. Finally, reasons as to why the NRA was able to amplify but not mitigate the party trend, as well as individual-level mechanisms that might produce an endorsement effect, are discussed.

Low levels of voter turnout in the first election to the National Assembly for Wales in May 1999 brought into question both the ability of devolution to revitalize representative democracy and the legitimacy of the Assembly itself. But drawing wider implications from turnout requires that we understand why electoral abstention was so widespread. We examine three hypotheses about voter turnout in 1999: that non-participation simply reflected a general apathy towards politics; that it was based on a specific apathy towards the new Assembly; or that low voter turnout reflected antipathy towards an unwanted political institution. We find support for the first two hypotheses, but little evidence for the third. Devolution has failed to engage the interest and support of many in Wales, but low turnout has not been prompted by fundamental antagonism to the devolved institution among the Welsh electorate.

This article examines the recent pattern and progress of health care reform in affluent democracies, focusing in particular on Britain, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. Its main contention is that efforts to reform health care in advanced industrial states have been marked by a paradoxical pattern of ‘reform without change and change without reform’, in which large-scale structural reforms have had surprisingly modest effects yet major ground-level shifts have, nonetheless, frequently occurred as a result of decentralized adjustments to cost control. The main task of the article is to investigate the reasons for and effects of this puzzling pattern by plumbing the largely unexplored theoretical territory between comparative health policy analysis and cross-national research on the welfare state. Along the way, the article develops a simple model of the politics of reform that helps explain cross-national variation in legislative and policy outcomes – particularly outcomes that occur through decentralized processes of internal policy ‘conversion’ and policy ‘drift’, rather than through formal legislative reform. It also takes up a number of other intriguing issues raised by recent trends: why, for example, market reforms are clustered in centralized political and medical frameworks; why these reforms have generally enhanced state authority rather than market autonomy; why, despite fragmentation, decentralized political and medical systems shifted towards an expanded government role; and why significant retrenchment of the public-private structure of health benefits occurred in the United States.

This Note presents a study of the impact of issue positions of political parties on electoral choice. Together with economic performance and the popularity of leaders and candidates, issue-specific considerations are the main ‘short-term’ forces influencing the voting choices of individual voters. Issue voting has been shown to matter in a large number of studies. Most recently, Alvarez et al. have demonstrated the power of issues in British general elections, which have long been known as an important case of class voting. They argue that one should no longer debate whether issues (and the economy) matter in British elections: ‘Instead, the focus should shift from whether to how much and to how their influence in particular elections compares to their influence on other British elections, and to elections in other nations.’

In an article published in this Journal, Nadeau, Martin and Blais argue that perceptions of the costs and benefits of alternative outcomes and general orientations to risk interact to affect voters' decisions in referendums on fundamental political questions such as Quebec sovereignty. We use Nadeau et al.'s data to demonstrate that their interaction-effects model is overly complex and suffers from serious multicollinearity difficulties. A simpler main-effects model has virtually identical explanatory power and removes anomalous findings. We also argue that their model is too simple because it omits variables such as party identification, feelings about party leaders and government performance evaluations that voters use as heuristic devices to help them make decisions when stakes are high and information about the costs and benefits of referendum outcomes is low. We analyse a dataset that includes these variables and demonstrate that they have strong effects in a model of referendum voting that controls for perceived costs and benefits of alternative referendum outcomes and several other variables. Additionally, differences in the magnitudes of the perceived costs and perceived benefits of alternative referendum outcomes are not statistically significant. This latter finding contradicts widely cited experimental results in behavioural economics and related ‘asymmetry’ hypotheses concerning the presumed status quo bias in major referendums.

Cultural identity has become prominent in studies of world politics in the post-Cold War era. First, a growing literature in world politics has emerged that focuses on the impact of social culture, broadly conceived as the shared religious, racial or ethnolinguistic characteristics of a society. The significance of this aspect of culture is epitomized in studies focusing on ‘ethnic conflicts’, ‘ethnic security dilemmas’, and most prominently in Huntington's ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis, which suggests, among other things, that shared civilization membership is the fulcrum upon which post-Cold War era world politics rests. Secondly, the impact of political culture, broadly conceived as the shared norms and institutions guiding political behaviour in a society, has become increasingly salient, as evidenced by the bourgeoning literature on the democratic peace thesis, which posits that the extent to which a state (or pair of states) is democratic is a major determinant of its war-proneness. Adherents of this view argue either that although democracies are just as war-prone as non-democracies they rarely fight other democracies, or that democracies are more peaceful than non-democracies, in general.

This Research Note examines the role democracy plays in explaining the disparity in educational attainment between men and women in a cross-national context. Policies designed to improve education figure prominently in recent attempts by governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to stimulate economic development. The recent emphasis on education is grounded in a well-established literature in economics on the rate of return on investment in education and in a fairly new stream of research in economics – endogenous growth theory – that suggests knowledge is the generative force of economic growth. Although a majority of the work in both literatures focuses on aggregate levels of educational attainment (usually enrolment ratios or literacy rates), a growing body of evidence identifies women’s educational attainment relative to men’s as a crucial variable in explaining the wide variation in economic development throughout the world. In addition to its direct impact on economic growth, women’s education may indirectly affect economic performance in a number of important ways: through its impact on health, fertility and infant mortality. Previous empirical work shows that women’s education has a strong negative effect on fertility and infant mortality. Moreover, family health practices improve in direct proportion to female education. According to the World Bank, countries that achieved universal primary education for boys in 1965 but lagged far behind in educating girls had about twice the infant mortality and fertility rates in 1985 of countries with smaller gender gaps.

In a recent paper, Dryzek and List attempt a reconciliation of Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy. Such an attempt is certainly long overdue and their original article is an important first step. In some ways it succeeds. In particular, they show that much of the imagined tension between the two theoretical frameworks is illusory and due to the mistaken assumption that many of the claims of rational choice theory form part of social choice theory (SCT) too. But in the nature of a Comment, I shall concentrate on aspects of their discussion which in my view warrant more critical scrutiny.

The objective of this study is to assess and compare the relative impact of issues and the economy on the vote in democratic elections. There is a rich and vast literature dealing with issue voting and an equally impressive literature concerning economic voting. For the most part, however, these amount to two separate streams of research. Relatively little attention has been paid to where these literatures overlap and less still to the simple but basic question: which matters most, the issues or the economy?

The main debate in the issue voting literature recently has been between the directional and proximity models. That debate, engaging both technical and conceptual issues, has focused entirely on how issues play in an election, whether voters prefer the party that is closest to their own position or the party that is the strongest defender of their side on an issue. The question of how much issues affect the vote, however, has been neglected. Indeed, both the proximity and directional schools implicitly agree that issues matter, and so challenge the Michigan school's strong scepticism on the import of issues. Given that the difference between the two models is often quite small, a more fruitful line of investigation might be to return to the equally fundamental ‘how much’ question.

What are the political consequences of economic reform in new democracies? Is the effect of economic reform on democratization the same across regions? Some scholars of transitology argue that economic reform has negative consequences on democratization largely because the resistance of established groups can undermine democratization processes. Others, mainly scholars of the post-socialist region, argue that in the post-socialist region economic reform has positive consequences on political democratization due in large part to the region's distinctive historical and structural legacies. The heated debate between Philippe Schmitter with Terry Karl and Valerie Bunce provides ample opportunity to (re)think about democratization in a more contextual and cross-regional perspective. However, there has been little systematic empirical analysis across regions. This analysis attempts to fill the gap by examining whether the dominant research paradigm of democratization is empirically valid across regions in transition.

There has been substantial debate on the measurement of tactical voting in this Journal, much of which has actually been concerned with the definition of a tactical vote. For this reason it is necessary to go ‘back to basics’ to examine the notion of a tactical vote within rational choice theory and follow its implications for the measurement of tactical voting. This Note has four aims: to elucidate the formal theoretical concepts behind the notion of tactical voting; to provide a practical definition of tactical voting based on those concepts; to examine and use the implications of the theory and definition to evaluate existing measures of tactical voting; and to further appraise measures of tactical voting from general methodological considerations. This Note focuses on tactical voting in single-member simple-plurality electoral systems. The following section argues that the range of situations where it may be optimal to vote tactically is both broader and less well defined than previous authors have generally realized. This implies that both the definition, and therefore the measurement, of tactical voting rest mainly on the criteria of voting for a party other than the first choice and doing so in order to best influence who wins. The empirical section examines various approaches to the measurement of tactical voting and argues that the Heath et al. measure is a priori the most attractive available. Furthermore, detailed analysis using British Election Study (BES) data from English voters in 1987, 1992 and 1997, shows that whilst the Heath et al. measure is relatively robust, it can be usefully revised to improve consistency with the strength-of-feeling scores. A corresponding method for identifying a voter's preferred party is also presented.

In a recent issue of this Journal Professor Yap asks whether and how governments in what she calls ‘less-democratic’ countries, that is those where elections are uncompetitive due to a lack of democratic safeguards or opposition parties, are held accountable for the effects of their policies on economic performance. She argues that governments in these countries have an interest in avoiding strife and inducing private actors to provide resources necessary for economic prosperity. Because of this, ‘when their economies are performing less than optimally, these governments tend to offer credible apologies in the same year to attenuate the potential labour disquiet and loss in production investment.’ Yap develops the concept of a credible apology as the joint occurrence of punishment of responsible actors or reparations to injured parties, and an increase in monitoring activity by non-government actors. She then presents evidence for South Korea for 1964–87 and Singapore and Malaysia for 1966–94 showing that, ceteris paribus, the tendency of production investment to decrease and strike activity to increase in years with high unemployment is offset if the government makes a credible apology.

Yap is quite clear that she assumes a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies. Indeed, such a causal relationship is necessary for the concept of accountability; the events that Yap classifies as credible apologies must be made in response to unsatisfactory economic performance in order for us to say that these governments are being held (or are holding themselves) accountable for the consequences of their policies.

Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy. His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow's conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. We are less impressed by the way Aldred characterizes the overall terms of the reconciliation we propose. We believe that his argument on this matter should be resisted because it provides deliberative democrats with a bad excuse to dismiss social choice theory altogether, which is surely not what he intends.

Debates between advocates of the two major alternative forms of electoral system often proceed at cross-purposes. In parliamentary systems, governments not only wield executive power, they strongly influence the agenda of the legislature and in some cases dominate it. The core literature on electoral systems focuses almost entirely on the relations between vote shares and legislative seat shares, leaving government formation aside. Yet the main debate about democratic accountability focuses on representative government, of which a representative legislature is at most only one part.

I appreciate the work that Professor Lowry has put into the evaluation of the credible apologies argument presented in my article, ‘Non-Electoral Responsiveness Mechanisms’. Lowry states that I assume ‘a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies’. I am obliged to point out that this is inaccurate – I make no such assumption. What does cause the government's credible apologies? It is the need for the economic resources of labour quiescence and production investment from the respective resource-owners. Theory and empirical studies suggest that the withdrawal of such resources follows less-than-optimal economic performance; it follows, then, that governments in the less-democratic countries who need these resources are forced to pay attention to economic performance and offer credible apologies following sub-optimal economic performance.