Psychiatrists called on to assess the reliability of witness testimony in the courts enter an arena fraught with uncertainties. This commentary discusses Commane & Kopelman's exploration of both the ‘normal’ fallibility of memory and disordered memory and considers the unavoidable limitations of their guidance on memory assessment and medico-legal work.

Clinicians assessing children with autism are sometimes faced with a dilemma, especially if there is a definite or suspected history of abuse or neglect: is this autism or attachment disorder? This is important because the attachment disorders (reactive attachment disorder and disinhibited social engagement disorder) are thought to be caused by abuse or neglect, whereas autism is not. We discuss the Coventry Grid, a clinical tool aiming to aid differentiation between autism and attachment disorders. We examine the small body of empirical studies focusing on this differential diagnosis and find that the Coventry Grid can be regarded as an evidence-based tool. We also discuss preliminary findings regarding a relatively unstructured observational method involving two assessors who engage the child in jokes and playful social dilemmas, which might help clinicians elicit the information required to complete the Coventry Grid.

The rise in domestic violence and abuse has been dubbed a ‘pandemic within a pandemic’. Individuals known to mental health services are particularly vulnerable. Yet despite challenges to mitigating domestic violence and abuse in this group, the COVID-19 pandemic has provided opportunities to develop new interventions to support those affected.

Intra-hospital transmission of COVID-19 is a major concern. To mitigate this risk, ‘COVID-triage’ psychiatric wards were implemented by some in-patient service providers in the UK. Although the effectiveness of this model has not been investigated, there are questions about the benefits and detriments of this model of care for patients and staff. This reflection draws from the experiences of clinicians who were redeployed from their planned clinical posts (and training rotations, in the case of trainees) to staff a newly established COVID-triage ward at a large urban mental healthcare provider, between August 2020 and March 2021.

The expert witness practice of psychiatrists is under constant scrutiny by the courts and, in the UK, the General Medical Council, as well as within appraisal and revalidation as part of a doctor's overall practice. Regulation and appraisal of expert witness practice must address not only technical competence, including demonstration of a real understanding of the interface between medicine and law, but also ethical probity, including in respect of bias, which is the most challenging appraisal focus. In psychiatry, there is much room for ‘values expression’, and therefore bias, in the offering of expert opinion. This article first describes various legal and psychological definitions of bias; then addresses the sources and routes to expression of bias within expert witness practice, viewed legally, psychologically and neuroscientifically. Finally, it proposes ways in which inevitable bias can be minimised by the individual practitioner.

In this article three main issues are addressed using anecdotal and anonymised illustrations of situations in which the author has been engaged, during 35 years of medico-legal practice, to assist in the process of obtaining and analysing the evidence of children to facilitate decision-making by various authorities and tribunals. Those issues are: the competence of a child to be a witness in the Crown Court; the process by which a child's evidence has been elicited; and the use of an analytical approach to the content (verbal, behavioural and emotional) of a child's evidence as an aid to jurists who have the task of reaching a decision as to the child's reliability, as distinct from their competence.

Debates on dualism continue to plague psychiatry. I suggest that these debates are based on false dichotomies. According to metaphysical physicalism, reality is ultimately physical. Although this view excludes the idea of entities distinct from physical reality, it does not compel us to favour neural over psychological interventions. According to methodological dualism, both physical and mental interventions on the world can be deemed effective, and both perspectives can therefore be thought to be equally ‘real’.

Differentiating between autism spectrum disorder and attachment disorders such as reactive attachment disorder (RAD) and disinhibited social engagement disorder (DSED) can be difficult. We comment on Davidson et al's article on this problem, note the dearth of validated assessment tools for RAD and DSED, and point to the utility of the Early Trauma-Related Disorders Questionnaire.

Criticism of the biomedical model of psychiatry that regards mental illness as brain disease has been labelled ‘anti-psychiatry’. Critical psychiatry arises out of so-called anti-psychiatry, but has additional roots in transcultural psychiatry, its alliance with psychiatric user/survivor groups, and the methodological critique of the neuroscientific basis of mental health problems and psychiatric treatment effectiveness. It is not opposed to psychiatry as such and argues for a person-centred shift for practice and research. This article discusses how a more truly biopsychosocial model, which critiques the biomedical model to produce a more relational practice, is needed not only for psychiatry but also for medicine in general.

Pica is a condition associated with a number of physical and mental health diagnoses. The potentially fatal consequences of pica and the links with significant physical health problems are not always recognised. Pica is like other forms of behaviour that can challenge: clinicians must seek the underlying cause and treat this first, before primarily pursuing a behavioural form of treatment. In this article, we discuss the associations, consequences, assessment and management options available for pica to guide professionals. Pica often presents in a way individual to the particular patient, so tailoring of assessment and treatment is important.

Critical trends in psychiatry are abundant today. Their impact on how psychiatry is currently practised is considerable. Yet what deserves close examination is the extent to which these modes of critique (anti-psychiatry, liberation movements, activism, existential, narrative or hermeneutic approaches, theories of values, psychoanalysis) inherently belong to or have become part of the very system that they criticise. Despite their political, social or scientific influence, which is undeniable, their critical power is often limited by their inability to radically challenge the deeper anthropological and philosophical presuppositions on which mainstream psychiatry rests. It can be argued that Foucault offers such a challenge. Implementing his historico-philosophical method, Foucault is sceptical of the anti-psychiatric quest for non-oppressive modes of psychiatric power and the humanist and postmodern efforts to moralise or relativise psychiatric truth. All these modes of critique rest on preconceived notions of nature, power and truth and have been integrated by the pluralism of the psychiatric universe. Yet Foucault's critique seeks precisely the opposite: to explore a new anthropological conception of insanity that has the power to challenge the legal, moral or reductionist constraints under which medical truth currently operates.

Forensic psychiatry services have grown and become more complex in structures, processes and pathways. Legacy customs, practices and changing policy are now organised into formal models of care. These are written accounts of how a health service is delivered, outlining best practice and services for patients progressing through the stages of their condition and the care and treatment available. This article explores the four key elements of a model of care: goals; pathways and processes; treatment programmes; and systematic evaluation. It describes the most common model of care in forensic services, which builds on structures of stratified therapeutic security. It also considers variations on this basic or standard model matched to needs arising from the complex interrelationship with other parts of the mental health service for the population served and with criminal justice, primary care and physical health, housing and welfare agencies.

Mental health services are recognised to have an important role in responding to domestic abuse, but approach across the UK's National Health Service (NHS) is inconsistent. We describe an example of taking a whole- organisation approach to responding to domestic abuse in one NHS mental health foundation trust.

Mind–body dualism is often considered to be incompatible with modern psychiatry for two reasons. First, it is claimed that dualism is falsified by recent advances in neuroscience. Second, dualism is thought to lead to an unhelpful attitude towards patients and their illnesses. I reflect on and challenge both lines of thought and argue that there is no inherent conflict between dualism and psychiatry.

There has been a series of judgments in recent years emanating from the Court of Protection in England and Wales involving sexual relations. One such judgment is unique in that it is the first time the court has assessed capacity in the sexual practice of autoerotic asphyxiation in a person with a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. This article reviews the judgment and specifically the key section of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, section 27, which applies to capacity decisions in the context of family relationships, including sexual relationships. The practice of autoerotic asphyxia can be a complex and emotive subject and dangerous to individuals undertaking it. The judgment provides guidance and a framework for applying the Act to assess the capacity of someone practising autoerotic asphyxia that can be used in clinical practice for people with any mental disorder.

Up to a fifth of people with intellectual disabilities display challenging behaviour that has a significant impact on their health and quality of life. Psychotropic medication does not appear to confer any clinical benefits beyond risk reduction in acute situations. However, very few non-pharmacological treatments have clear evidence of clinical and cost-effectiveness and there is therefore often a dearth of advice as to which components or interventions would be helpful. To our knowledge no single model has been developed to provide a clear path from understanding the behaviour to the implementation of a therapeutic approach for such a complex clinical problem. In this article we describe a stepped-care model that needs to be further operationalised in the assessment and management of behaviours that challenge in adults with intellectual disabilities.

This article gives a general overview of the current situation in relation to a range of widely recognised and also newly identified types of child maltreatment. The academic and clinical evidence relating to the impact of child maltreatment on the mental and physical health of child victims is substantial and steadily increasing in volume. New types of abuse are being identified, and changing environmental circumstances, which exacerbate the possibility of widely recognised types of child maltreatment occurring, are also being described. These include multi-type maltreatment, female genital mutilation and online child maltreatment. Serious questions may arise regarding neglect of the moral and social development of children and young people who become addicted to online gaming and pornography. Multiple national and local definitions of each of these existing and new forms of maltreatment have been created, some of which are covered here. The impact of these abuses on the physical and mental health and development of child victims in families or settings where abuse or neglect has occurred is discussed.

It has been common clinical practice for staff members to make an application to a mental health tribunal (the First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) in England or the Mental Health Review Tribunal in Wales) on behalf of a patient detained in hospital for psychiatric treatment who may lack capacity to make that application, for example in dementia in-patient settings. Following a series of cases in the Upper Tribunal, such practice may not be appropriate and there is now a risk that the application will be struck out. It is important that clinicians are aware of developments in case law and therefore we provide guidance on how clinicians should approach applications to the tribunal and the assessments of capacity that may be required.

After many years of mental healthcare reform there is still a lot of unease among patients about healthcare workers’ lack of attention to their daily needs and to the tensions and ambiguities that accompany their attempts to integrate their condition into their lives. Person-centred care is often presented as a solution, but the term refers to many differing approaches and needs further specification depending on the problem it aims to resolve. This article presents and discusses a clinical and philosophically informed approach that flexibly focuses on the person- and context-bound aspects of the patient's condition and on the co-regulatory role of the clinician in the patient's attempt to regulate their condition. This approach is a way of thinking, rather than yet another model. It will be shown how this approach can be integrated in the core curriculum of specialty (residency) training in psychiatry.