I find three major shortcomings in Mele's account. First, verbal ambiguities suggest that the analysis is irrelevant to self-deception and/or that the traditional conception is subtly reinstated. Second, the data offer no means of establishing the superiority of the present account. Finally, as political rhetoric, Mele's proposal not only operates to disqualify others, but establishes science as their judge.

Plamondon's kinematic theory is very powerful from a descriptive point of view. Unfortunately, the fact that it neglects some fundamental features of the motor system, such as nonlinear inertial torque interactions or joint redundancies, limits its explanatory power and biological validity. As a consequence, the data presented by Plamondon & Alimi should be analyzed and interpreted with caution. There appears to be a gap between the observations reported by the authors and some of the conclusions they draw.

In field computing a topologic organization of CFs is necessary to support sensorimotor planning. A simple model of cortical dynamics can exploit such topologic organization.

A major worry in self-deception research has been the implication that people can hold a belief that something is true and false at the same time: a logical as well as a psychological impossibility. However, if beliefs are held with imperfect confidence, voluntary self-deception in the sense of seeking evidence to reject an unpleasant belief becomes entirely plausible and demonstrably real.

We argue that the separation between CF (contextual field) and RF (receptive field) in relation to the NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) system is empirically questionable and that it is functionally unnecessary. In addition, the proposed suppression of unexpected information will in many cases be counterproductive.

A form of self-deception exists that is both intentional and common. In it, people act as if they are undergoing a certain state of mind as a tactic for experiencing the state. This kind of self- deception can be illustrated by what happens to players of simulation games. Someone playing a pilot in a flight simulator game, for example, comes to experience aspects of the world of a pilot. Research on hypnotic responding is used to illustrate the nature and effectiveness of such a strategy of self-deception.

Plamondon & Alimi's model will gain substantially in credibility when it is able to come up with predictions for new (rather than old) experimental results that discriminate between various models. Moreover, the present model is nothing more than a descriptive “black box,” not an explanation for motor performance. A link to the contribution of various neuronal mechanisms involved in motor control and of muscle properties to the performance of the model is crucial.

Well-posed questions about information processing may require physiologically based, quantitative models of large scale neocortical dynamic function. “Synchronization” of this dynamics can be viewed in different contexts of the binding problem.

Mele's modified definition of self-deception is consistent with evolutionary theory. Self-deception is most likely whenever ignorance confers (reproductive) advantage, namely, in impression management, deception, conformity, social norms, reproductive knowledge, and existential conflicts. Second-order self-deception (unawareness of unawareness) perpetuates self-deception and may be the reason for our misguided definitions.

Plamondon & Alimi (P&A) have unified much data on speed/accuracy trade-offs during reaching movements using a delta-lognormal form factor that describes “the asymptotic behavior of a large number of dependent linear systems,” notably neuromuscular systems. Their approach raises questions about whether a large number of systems is needed, whether they are linear, and whether the results disclose the neural design principles that control reaching behaviors. The authors admit that “it is difficult . . . to provide a direct biological interpretation for the system parameters” (sect. 6, para. 4).

Mele's jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception preclude definitive ascriptions of self-deception in practice. Consequently, actual ascriptions of self-deception require large inferences and may frequently be in error. It is recommended that attention be directed toward actual practices of ascription to understand how children learn and adults dispense what is ultimately a moral judgment.

We briefly review the long-standing ideas about the use of synchronicity in the brain, which rely on Donald Hebb's views on cell assemblies and synaptic plasticity. More recently the distinction among several timescales in the description of neural activity has become a focus of theoretical discussion. Phillips & Singer's target article is criticized mainly because it does not distinguish these timescales properly and hence does not really address the questions so intensely debated today.

In Schmidt's experiments, only properties of actually produced movements systems are measured; in Fitts' experiments, external task parameters are measured too (target size and distance). Thus, the laws contain variables of different natures and cannot be reduced to each other even formally. These difference especially reveals itself in modeling: a model of variability can be simpler if it deals with the performance variables only. On the other hand, modeling Fitts' law, one should take into account not only the human effector system but features of the experimental apparatus as well. These differences have not been sufficiently reflected in Plamondon & Alimi's target article.

Phillips & Singer's compelling presentation is weakest in its demonstration of commonalities between sensory plasticity and higher forms of learning and behavior. We propose that available data on schizophrenia can provide such evidence, because of the presence of impairments in a number of functions central to their model, and strong relationships between these dysfunctions and behavior.

Even though Plamondon's kinematic model fits the data well, we do not share the view that it explains movements other than ballistic ones. The model does not account for closed-loop control, which is the more common type of movement in everyday life, nor does it account for recent data indicating interference with ongoing processing.

As understood by neodissociation and sociocognitive theorists, hypnotic responses are instances of self-deception. Neodissociation theory matches the strict definition of Sackeim and Gur (1978) and sociocognitive theory matches Mele's looser definition. Recent data indicate that many hypnotized individuals deceive themselves into holding conflicting beliefs without dissociating, but others convince themselves that the suggested state of affairs is true without simultaneously holding a contrary belief.

This commentary cites several findings of neuromuscular research that are consistent with aspects of Plamondon's kinematic theory. In addition, we point out certain biomechanical properties of the limb that influence the requirements for the production of accurate movement, and might thus compromise the global applicability of any law governing speed/accuracy trade-offs.

This commentary describes some extensions of the Phillips & Singer model of contextual interactions to cater for the contrast- and extent-dependency of surround facilitation and suppression. I also comment briefly on some semantic problems with what exactly the role of synchronization might be: input preprocessing or output postprocessing?

Those who invoke the word self-deception to represent one phenomenon often argue that those who use it to represent another are misusing the construct. Better to recognize that self-deception is a fuzzy concept that may be used to represent a variety of mental processes and states, and to direct our energy toward distinguishing empirically among its forms and functions.

Movement time and accuracy, as defined by Plamondon & Alimi, do not conform to empirical definitions. When definitions are used that conform better to empirical ones, the original predictions of the kinematic theory are no longer valid – as is demonstrated by simulations. Thus the theoretically derived quadratic law and the successful empirical quadratic law seem to be independent of each other.