It has been suggested that type I adenylyl cyclase may play a unique role in long-term potentiation, due to both unique regulatory properties as well as a specialized distribution within the mammalian brain. This would allow an integration of the signals wrought by increased intracellular calcium with those conveyed into the cellular milieu via increased cAMP. These results are discussed in the context of changes in cellular structure, because of changing interactions between G proteins and cytoskeletal components, which might be expected to accompany chronic synaptic activation.

Further understanding at neuroscientific and personality levels should considerably advance our ability to deal with individuals that have strong sociopathic tendencies. An analysis of neurodynamic responses to emotional stimuli will eventually be able to detect sociopathic tendencies of the brain. Such information could be used to enhance the options available to individuals at risk without limiting their personal freedoms.

Probably Homo habilis is two species not one; similarly for Pan troglodytes. Although amenable to training, in nature Pan paniscus may be a “specialized insular dwarf.” Language is uniquely human, but symbolic behavior and intelligence are widespread among animals with little respect for phylogenetic closeness to Homo sapiens.

This commentary questions the target articles inferences from a limited set of empirical data to support this model and conceptual scheme. Especially questionable is the attribution of internal representation properties to an assembly of cells in a discrete cortical module firing at a discrete attractor frequency. Alternative inferences are drawn from cortical cooling and cell-firing data that point to the internal representation as a broad and specific cortical network defined by cortico-cortical connectivity. Active memory, it is proposed, consists in the sustained activation of the component neuron populations of the network.

Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.