Gilead et al. present a rich account of abstraction. Though the account describes several elements which influence mental representation, it is worth also delineating how feelings, such as fluency and emotion, influence mental simulation. Additionally, though past experience can sometimes make simulations more accurate and worthwhile (as Gilead et al. suggest), many systematic prediction errors persist despite substantial experience.

We agree with Cushman that rationalizations are the product of biological adaptations, but we disagree about their function. The data available do not show that rationalizations allow us to reason better and make better decisions. The data suggest instead that rationalizations serve reputation management goals, and that they affect our behaviors because we are held accountable by our peers.

Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) subjects can present temporary behaviors of acute agitation and aggressiveness, named problem behaviors. They have been shown to be consistent with the self-organized criticality (SOC), a model wherein occasionally occurring “catastrophic events” are necessary in order to maintain a self-organized “critical equilibrium.” The SOC can represent the psychopathology network structures and additionally suggests that they can be considered as self-organized systems.

We argue that Whitehouse's group-based model neglects two key contextual variables: environmental threats and ideology. Environmental threats lead to extremism outside of group settings and predispose individuals toward joining ideologically zealous groups. Ideologies and environmental threats can also explain why certain groups adopt norms that encourage violent self-sacrifice.

Kalisch et al.'s PASTOR model synthesizes current knowledge of resilience, focusing on mechanisms as a common pathway to outcomes and highlighting neuroscience as a method for exploring this. We propose the model broaden its definition of resiliency to include positive indices of recovery, include positive affect as a mechanism, and approach motivation as distinct from overcoming aversive motivation.

Classification schemes are useful when they elucidate common underlying mechanisms, bring together diverse examples, or illustrate gaps in knowledge for empirical investigation. Kline's scheme merges different approaches, but is orthogonal to existing schemes and overemphasizes evolved specializations, potentially at the detriment of clarifying teaching processes. Focus on underlying mechanisms, what is learned, and consequences for information transfer may provide additional utility.

Uchiyama et al. present a dual inheritance framework for conceptualizing how behavioural genetics and cultural evolution interact and affect heritability. We posit that to achieve a holistic and nuanced representation of the cultural environment and evolution against which genetic effects should be evaluated, it is imperative to consider the multiple geographic cultural layers impacting individuals and genetic heritability.

Phillips et al. conclude that current evidence supports knowledge-, but not belief-reasoning as being automatic. We suggest four reasons why this is an oversimplified answer to a question that might not have a clear-cut answer: (1) knowledge and beliefs can be incompletely equated to perceptual states, (2) sensitivity to mental states does not necessitate representation, (3) automaticity is not a single categorical feature, and (4) how we represent others' minds is dependent on social context.

We feel exhausted after working mentally hard even while just sitting on a chair, suggesting the concept of cognitive vigor. Do movement vigor and cognitive vigor share control mechanisms? Functions of the basal ganglia-cortical circuits, which are regulated by the midbrain dopaminergic system, appear to underlie both movement vigor and cognitive vigor.

The claims that learning systems must build causal models and provide explanations of their inferences are not new, and advocate a cognitive functionalism for artificial intelligence. This view conflates the relationships between implicit and explicit knowledge representation. We present recent evidence that neural networks do engage in model building, which is implicit, and cannot be dissociated from the learning process.

First, I argue that there is no agreement within non-classical cognitive science as to whether one should eliminate representations, hence, it is not clear that Brette's appeal to it is going to solve the problems with coding. Second, I argue that Brette's criticism of predictive coding as being intellectualistic is not justified, as predictive coding is compatible with embodied cognition.

Cushman argues that the function of rationalization is to attribute mental representations to ourselves, thereby making these representations available for future planning. I argue that such attribution is often not necessary and sometimes maladaptive. I suggest a different explanation of rationalization: making representations available to other agents, to facilitate cooperation, transmission, and the ratchet effect that underlies cumulative cultural evolution.

Recent findings in evolutionary psychology explain how moral disciplining is connected to the need for collective action. Morals are strict in societies affected by war or perceived collective danger, but loose where peace and security prevail. This theory supplements the moral disciplining theory by providing an evolutionary explanation for the postulated link between puritanism and the need for cooperation.

We argue that: (1) disappointment in the effectiveness of i-frame interventions depends on realistic expectations about how they could work; (2) opportunities for system reform are rare, and i-frame interventions can lay important groundwork; (3) Chater & Loewenstein's evidence that i-frame interventions detract from s-frame approaches is limited; and (4) nonetheless, behavioural scientists should consider what more they can contribute to systemic reforms.

With respect to De Dreu and Gross's article, we comment on the psychological functions for attack and defense, focusing on associations between individual differences in psychopathic personality traits and the behavioral patterns observed in attack-defense conflicts. We highlight the dimensional nature of psychopathy and formulate hypothetical associations between distinct traits, their different behavioral outcomes, and associated brain mechanisms.

We agree with the author's working model, but we suggest that (a) the classical distinction between fast and slow processes as separable processes can be softened, and (b) human performance might result from an interplay between fast and slow processing and these processes may be mediated by systems that evolve to satisfy the need for operation in a complex environment.

Although compelling and insightful, the proposal by Uchiyama et al. largely neglects within-person change over time, arguably the central topic of interest within their framework. Longitudinal behavioural genetics modelling suggests that the heritability of trajectories is low, in contrast to high and increasing cross-sectional heritability across development. Better understanding of the mechanisms of trajectories remains a crucial outstanding challenge.

We suggest that the accounts offered by the target articles could be strengthened by acknowledging the role of group selection and cultural niche construction in shaping the evolutionary trajectory of human music. We argue that group level traits and highly variable cultural niches can explain the diversity of human song, but the target articles' accounts are insufficient to explain such diversity.

Clarke and Beck propose that the approximate number system (ANS) represents rational numbers. The evidence cited supports only the view that it represents ratios (and positive integers). Rational numbers are extensive magnitudes (i.e., sizes), whereas ratios are intensities. It is also argued that WHAT a system represents and HOW it does so are not as independent of one another as the authors assume.

Norenzayan et al. suggest that Big Gods can be replaced by Big Governments. We examine forms of social and self-monitoring and ritual practice that emerged in Classical China, heterarchical societies like those that emerged in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica, and the contemporary Zapatista movement of Chiapas, and we recommend widening the hypothesis space to include these alternative forms of social organization.