Contra Wilkins & Wakefield, we argue that an evolutionarily inspired approach to language must consider different facets of language (i.e., more than syntax and semantics), and must explore the possibility of nonhuman precursors. Several examples are discussed, illustrating the power of the comparative approach in illuminating our understanding of language evolution.

Toward a neurobiologically grounded approach to explaining self-control we discuss the case of a patient with a bilateral lesion in frontal ventromedial cortex. Patients with such lesions display a marked deficit in social decision making. Compared with an account that examines the causal antecedents of self-control, Rachlin's behaviorist approach seems lacking in explanatory strength.

It is the contention of Latash & Anson (L&A) that in atypical populations, such as those with cognitive, central neurological, or peripheral disorders, the central nervous system (CNS) is capable of producing more effective, though often less “normal,” movement patterns ifleft to its own devices. It is the aim of this commentary to extend their argument to other populations by pointing out the many parallels with development of movement patterns in sport.

We agree with Latash & Anson that therapeutic approaches should be directed toward solving the underlying problem, not toward adapting the abnormal to normal behaviour. The fundamental obstacle, however, is that doing so requires a solution of the “equivalence problem” in movement control.

Adaptations occurring in the central nervous system (CNS) in the presence of pathology are not uniformly “good” for the organism when viewed in a functional context. A functional reordering of CNS priorities can be produced by allowing restructuring of the external context or through modification of neuromuscular physiology or anatomy designed to reduce the inherent restriction of functional movement in upper motor neuron syndrome. In fact, volitional control can often be “unmasked” through such interventions. Therapeutic interventions should not be directed toward “normalization” of motor patterns but should permit a functional reordering of CNS priorities that would otherwise not be possible.

Wilkins and Wakefield's hypothesis that language is fundamentally a cognitive rather than cominunicational adaptation is reasonable, but there are flaws in their anatomical and fossil evidence. Their analysis of reorganization also needs clarification. Finally, the origin of language ability must have occurred with australopithecine rather than habiline adaptations on entry into the novel hominid adaptive zone.