Human suicide presents a fundamental problem for the scientific analysis of behavior. This problem has been neither appreciated nor confronted by research and theory. Almost all other behavior exhibited by humans and nonhumans can be viewed as supporting the behaving organism's biological fitness and advancing the welfare of its genes. Yet suicide acts against these ends, and does so more directly and unequivocally than any other form of maladaptive behavior. Four heuristic models are presented here to account for suicide in an evolutionary and sociobiological framework. The first model attributes suicide to the extraordinary development of learning and cultural evolution in the human species. Learning may make human behavior so independent of biological constraints that it can occasionally assume a form entirely contrary to the principles of biological evolution. The second model attributes suicide to a breakdown of adaptive mechanisms in extremely stressful novel environments. The third model involves kin and group selection, arguing that in limited circumstances suicide may occur because of beneficial effects it has on other, surviving individuals who share the suicidal individual's genes. The last model suggests that suicide should be tolerated by evolution when it has no effect on the gene pool. This model holds particular promise in accounting for aspects of suicide not attributable to culture. The evidence indicates that suicide is most common in individuals who are unlikely to reproduce and unable to engage in productive activity; such individuals are least capable of promoting their genes. A complete explanation of suicide may derive only from an analysis of its biological significance.

A model of fear and pain is presented in which the two are assumed to activate totally different classes of behavior. Fear, produced by stimuli that are associated with painful events, results in defensive behavior and the inhibition of pain and pain-related behaviors. On the other hand, pain, produced by injurious stimulation, motivates recuperative behaviors that promote healing. In this model injurious stimulation, on the one hand, and the expectation of injurious stimulation, on the other hand, activate entirely different motivational systems which serve entirely different functions. The fear motivation system activates defensive behavior, such as freezing and flight from a frightening situation, and its function is to defend the animal against natural dangers, such as predation. A further effect of fear motivation is to organize the perception of environmental events so as to facilitate the perception of danger and safety. The pain motivation system activates recuperative behaviors, including resting and body-care responses, and its function is to promote the animal's recovery from injury. Pain motivation also selectively facilitates the perception of nociceptive stimulation. Since the two kinds of motivation serve different and competitive functions, it might be expected that they would interact through some kind of mutual inhibition. Recent research is described which indicates that this is the case. The most important connection is the inhibition of pain by fear; fear has the top priority. This inhibition appears to be mediated by an endogenous analgesic mechanism involving the endorphins. The model assumes that fear triggers the endorphin mechanism, thereby inhibiting pain motivation and recuperative behaviors that might compete with effective defensive behavior.