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The self-organizing consciousness entails additional intervening subsystems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2003

Takashi Yamauchi
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843 [email protected]

Abstract

The self-organizing consciousness (SOC) is not sufficient to account for young children's ability to acquire complex rules and word-object mappings. First, the attention-association cycles suggested by the SOC are unlikely to happen because recurrence of particular stimulus properties usually disengages the attention of an observer. Second, “primitive processors” preinstalled in the system make the SOC unnecessarily complex.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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