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Mindreading underlies metacognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Peter Carruthers
Peter Carruthers
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742. [email protected]/Faculty/pcarruthers/
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Abstract

This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.

Type
Author' Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 164 - 182
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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