No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between “is” and “ought”
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 October 2011
Abstract
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between “is” and “ought.” Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011
References
Hume, D. (1739–1740)
A treatise of human nature. Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects. Available at:
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1903)
Principia Ethica. Available at:
http://fair-use.org/g-e-moore/principia-ethica
Google Scholar
Target article
Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between “is” and “ought”
Related commentaries (1)
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking