[What follows below is the substance of a document Miss Silva prepared, which was filed on June 6, 1961, with the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, as an Appendix to the petitioners' complaint in the case of W.M.C.A., Inc. et al. v. Caroline K. Simon, Secretary of the State of New York, et al. (61 Civil No. 1559, 1961). The suit seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and alleges that the apportionment and districting provisions of the New York Constitution deny the petitioners and others similarly situated both due process and the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution. Miss Silva had been employed in 1959–60 as special consultant on legislative apportionment by the State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, which reproduced in two volumes as Staff Report No. 33 (April, 1960) the study she made for it.

Litigation in the federal courts concerning legislative apportionments, from Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) to Baker v. Carr, the Tennessee case pending in the Supreme Court at this writing, has been largely preoccupied with questions of federal jurisdiction. The document below does not touch this issue, but rather is confined to the practical effects of the apportionment and districting provisions of the New York Constitution. Man. Ed.]

One of the major obstacles to the progress of political theory lies in the fact that people speak of rights without paying attention to the feasibility of their exercise. I propose to raise here some elementary problems relating to the right of speech. It is one of the basic tenets of our democratic political philosophy that all people (over a given age) have an equal right of speech. Making this right operational however gives rise to difficulties which have not been faced.

I shall start out with a very simple problem, which moreover has the advantage of evoking familiar pictures: this is the chairman's problem. I find myself chairman of an assembly, and regard all participants as formally equal, which commits me to treating them equally. Feeling bound by this principle, I decide as follows: the duration of the meeting is m, the number of participants n: I shall give the floor to each participant for a time m/n; thus the equal right of speech will receive practical application. Assume that the meeting is to be crowned by a vote (the time of actual voting not figuring in m): before the participants cast their equal votes, they will have had equal opportunities to influence the voting, i.e., they shall have had, insofar as depends upon me, equal voices.

Now if m the duration of the meeting (in speaking time) is three hours, and if n the number of participants is 12, my procedure is susceptible of being applied: it grants the floor to each participant for a quarter of an hour. This is not a long time but still it may be enough.