The greatest need in the field of labor legislation is the establishment of scientific standards. The chaotic condition of such legislation in this country is everywhere recognized. This lack of uniformity is due partly to the fact that, where England, for instance, has one body enacting legislation, we have fifty bodies politic, each with different industrial conditions and with different ideas as to what is constitutional. It is significant that this lack of uniformity has led to the organization of a special national association to promote scientific study of labor legislation. Forty-two states held legislative sessions during 1909. A flood of labor bills were introduced and nearly four hundred were enacted into law.

Our organization is known as the Political Science Association, and yet the subject to which it is devoted lacks the first essential of a modern science—a nomenclature incomprehensible to educated men. Other sciences employ terms of art which are exact because barbarous, that is remote from common usage, and therefore devoid of the connotations which give to language its richness and at the same time an absence of precision. But the want of an exact terminology is not the only defect of our subject. It suffers also from imperfect development of the means of self-expansion. The natural sciences grow by segmentation, each division, like the severed fragments of an earthworm, having a vitality of its own. Thus in zoölogy and botany we hear of cytology, histology, morphology and physiology, expressions which correspond, perhaps, with aspects of our own ancient, yet infantile, branch of learning.

The first of the divisions already mentioned, cytology, deals with the cell as the unit of structure, and bears thus an analogy to the study of man as an individual, a social being by nature, no doubt, but considered from this point of view as a separate personality; to some extent at least as an end in himself. It corresponds rather to psychology than politics. Histology, if I am correctly informed, is concerned with the tissues made by the organic connection of many cells, the substances of which the body is formed, and by means of which its manifold operations are conducted. We may fancy that it has its counterpart in sociology, that science of which the late Gabriel Tarde remarked that it was named before its birth, although the time had come when it ought to be born.

Perhaps the two most important constitutional events during recent years are the establishment of the South African Union and the struggle in Great Britain over the budget and with reference to the powers of the House of Lords. Both of these events are excluded from treatment here—the South African Union is discussed somewhat fully in another part of this Review; the British constitutional struggle is still in progress, and cannot be satisfactorily treated at the present time.

However, with reference to the South African Union it may be well to call attention to the movement away from loosely-constructed federal states. In the United States the state governments have steadily tended to become of less importance as compared with the national government, but this change has necessarily been produced not so much by textual changes in the constitution as by judicial interpretation. By the German imperial constitution of 1871 a fairly centralized federal organization was established, and since 1873 when the federal legislative power was extended over the whole field of civil law there have been no important extensions of federal power by textual changes in the constitution; but here as in the United States the federal power has increased at the expense of the states in a manner not shown by changes in the written instrument of government. “The most important and most weighty interests of the nation are common to all and must be cared for in a uniform manner, and all branches of public law and political life stand in a close and indissoluble relation the one to the other, so that by the logic of facts particularism must give place to unity, the common will must to an ever increasing extent displace the separate wills of the individual states.”

It is indeed a substantial grist that the Supreme Court of the United States at the last term of court has ground for students of political science. The first opinion was delivered on November 1, 1909, and the last on May 31, 1910, and the court decided no less than sixty-five constitutional cases. Notice that with caution it is merely said that the court decided no less than that number; for it is often somewhat a matter of opinion whether a case should be classed as constitutional, and it may well be that there are readers who will find that the court exceeded sixty-five. And how were those sixty-five divided? Many turned on more constitutional points than one, and thus an enumeration of the cases bearing on the several clauses of the Constitution will reveal a total exceeding sixty-five. The enumeration, subject to amendment in accordance with each student's views, gives the following results: The Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-four cases; the Commerce Clause, twenty-one; the Obligation of Contracts Clause, eight; whether cases arise “under the laws of the United States,” eight; Full Faith and Credit Clause, five; and sixteen other clauses, from one to four cases each, aggregating twenty-seven.

Through these dull figures some important facts shine distinctly. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause clearly took a vast part of the court's energy, and each of these provisions has to do with the curtailment of functions which prima facie belong to the several states. In other words, the chief feature of this term, as of every recent term, has been a more or less successful attempt of litigants to overthrow state statutes as denials of due process and equal protection or as interferences with interstate commerce.

The year 1909 was not characterized by great dramatic occurrences like the Boxer outbreak of 1900 or the war of 1904. Although its history abounded in most interesting situations, it was a period rather of peaceful development and readjustment than of marked advance along any particular lines. The general, desire to maintain peaceful relations and to settle such differences as might still be outstanding between nations was evidenced by the large number of ceremonial visits from country to country—visits of monarchs and prime ministers, of commercial and literary deputations, and of distinguished private individuals. All the important European nations took part in this exchange of courtesies which gave occasion in each case to eloquent declarations of mutual friendship. In general, no special political importance could be attributed to such visits beyond the common desire of keeping relations in their normal, friendly condition. In certain cases, indeed, the attempt was made to attribute a special importance; as in the case of the visit of the Russian czar to Italy, which was interpreted in some quarters as an attempt to break up the Triple Alliance. Other meetings again were characterized by very unusual cordiality, such as that of the German emperor, and later of the German prime minister, with the emperor of Austria.

The war between Russia and Sweden culminating in the treaty of Fredrikshamn in 1809 decided the fate of Finland; according to the terms of the treaty Sweden ceded to Russia her Finnish provinces. Article VI of the treaty states, however, that Russia guaranteed Finland her laws and privileges. It is this latter clause, which at the present day is the bone of contention in the Finnish question.

The campaign of the Russian army corps in Finland was very far from being a decisive one; the progress was slow, the resistance of the enemy strong; finally, the Finns started a guerilla war against the Russians, causing the latter very great annoyance.

At the same time the Russian government had many other troubles on hand. The figure of Napoleon loomed high on the horizon of Europe and his shadow began to fall on Russia too, causing the Tsar Alexander I much anxiety.

All this was a strong inducement for Alexander to settle the Finnish question as soon and as peacefully as he could.

All through the year 1808 the Russians pursued a wavering policy; first they would threaten the Finns, then make them certain promises or concessions and so on; thus for example, two important manifestos were issued on March 28 and 31, 1808.

An inexhaustible topic for political discussion in the Island of Porto Rico is that of citizenship. Every Porto Rican who occupies himself in the slightest degree with public affairs declares it as one of his chief grievances against our government, that it has failed to make the Porto Ricans citizens of the United States. Many features of the Spanish rule he recalls without regrets but he never fails to impress it upon you, especially if you are an American, that before 1898 he was a citizen of Spain, and that his representatives sat in the Spanish cortes. Republican United States he declares has been less generous to him than monarchical Spain. It seems to him a plain matter of justice that he should be made a citizen and he cannot understand the apathy of the United States towards the entire question, and least of all the active antagonism to his aspirations which appears when the matter is galvanized into life by executive recommendation or congressional proposal.

On May 31, 1910, the Union of South Africa became an accomplished fact. The four provinces of Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State (which bears again its old time name) and the Transvaal are henceforth joined, one might almost say amalgamated, under a single government. They will bear to the central government of the British empire the same relation as the other self-governing colonies—Canada, Newfoundland, Australia and New Zealand. The Empire will thus assume the appearance of a central nucleus with four outlying parts corresponding to geographical and racial divisions, and forming in all a ground plan that seems to invite a renewal of the efforts of the Imperial Federationist. To the scientific student of government the Union of South Africa is chiefly of interest for the sharp contrast it offers to the federal structure of the American, Canadian and other systems of similar historical ground. It represents a reversion from the idea of State rights, and balanced indestructible powers and an attempt at organic union by which the constituent parts are to be more and more merged in the consolidated political unit which they combine to form.

The evolution of parliamentary government in Germany proceeds apace. The virtual admission of Chancellor Bülow, on the occasion of the publication of the Kaiser's interview with the retired English diplomat in October, 1908, that the government's defeat by the reichstag would necessarily involve his resignation will be at once recalled. This promise has been now actually fulfilled, and that suave and genial statesman's retirement, upon the defeat of his budget, advances Germany one step farther toward a modern system of ministerial responsibility to the people's representatives. The appointment of a successor who promises a continuation of Bülow's policy indicates that there are other important steps yet to be taken, but does not obscure the significance of this change of ministers. Within no distant period it is altogether likely we shall see a full-fledged system of political ministerial responsibility to the legislature, with its corollary of effective votes of lack of confidence,—a system in which the reichstag will control the appointment of the incoming ministers as well as force the resignation of those with whom it is no longer in accord. It may therefore not be without a timely interest to review the German doctrine of the budget as a means of control over the executive.

The most serious criticism which we can lay at the door of the Spanish American to-day is his lack of political cohesion. The border provinces are everlastingly rebelling against the decrees of the central government. One hundred years ago, when the Spanish colonies began to secure their independence, they either did not combine or else combining soon fell apart. We naturally wonder why, when they copied our Constitution they did not follow our example and recognize the strength that comes from union. The answer to this and to many other criticisms that may be made is to be found in the history of the Hispanic race and in the geographical conditions that exist in the southern continent.

In criticising South American habits of mind and political tendencies, one must remember that the moral and intellectual characteristics that form the soul of a people are developed in its past and represent a legitimate inheritance from its ancestors. For the motives of its conduct, one must look to its history.

Historically, the Hispanic race was led to develop individualistic rather than coöperative action. In the Middle Ages the forces at work in the peninsula were centrifugal rather than centripetal.

When the report of Chinese opposition against foreign loans reaches the western world, a certain class of people at once call such opposition the outcome of the historical anti-foreign feeling, oriental exclusiveness, self-conceit, and Boxerism. They assume that the Chinese have no grievance at all, and that these orientals “kick” simply because they are self-conceited heathens who do not know what is good for them. The more representative class, however, do not unreservedly subscribe to this opinion. They interpret the opposition as a manifestation of “Chinese nationalization.” Thus the New York Tribune in an editorial calls the recent opposition to the Hankow-Szechuan loan as “a strikingly characteristic manifestation of the rampant spirit of ‘China for the Chinese’ which prevails in large parts of the country.”

There is much truth in this interpretation. But it points to only one of the many phases of the case. It is, therefore, inadequate to explain the whole situation and is misleading when taken as the premise for the solution of the problem. In order to understand fully and estimate aright these oppositions which are likely to exist in the future, we should examine closely the underlying causes from all points of view.

There are two obvious reasons for welcoming a new and revised edition of Sir William Anson's “Law and Custom of the Constitution.” The first edition was issued twenty-four years ago. The preface is dated March, 1886; so that the book must have been passed for the press within a few months after the first general election that followed the extension of the franchise and the redistribution of seats due to the legislation of 1884 and 1885. In the intervening years—1885–1909—there have been great changes in the general political conditions of England—changes which mainly affect the constituencies. There have also been large additions to the permanent work of many of the state departments—notably the home office, the local government board, the board of trade, the department of education, and the department of agriculture. Moreover resulting from these additions to the permanent work of the state departments and the increasing complexity of political conditions in the constituencies, there have been sweeping changes in the procedure of the house of commons—changes which by 1909 had made the cabinet practically dominant in that chamber.

Early in 1910 it was rumored in Manila that an extraordinary session of the Philippine legislature was to be called, in order that the necessary appropriations might be made for the fiscal year 1910–1911. These rumors received no direct confirmation until the proclamation issued by the Governor-General on February 28, calling an extraordinary session to convene on March 28.

Our laws affecting immigration represent the accretions of ninety years, but the great mass of this legislation falls within the last third of this period. Since 1882 Congress has passed a score of immigration acts and amendments, besides the numerous immigration features embodied in laws relating primarily to other subjects.

From the standpoint of purpose and aim, the provisions of this legislation may be grouped under four main heads: 1. Restrictive; 2. Protective; 3. Distributive, and 4. Administrative.

For the first group a more accurately descriptive phrase would be “Restrictive and Selective,” for it is impossible to dissociate, in most provisions, the purpose of restricting the volume of immigration, lest the number of comers prove too great for our receiving population, and the purpose of controlling the quality of our immigrants, lest our citizenship suffer through undesirable additions.

What are the restrictive and selective provisions of our laws? In the first place, certain classes of aliens are excluded from admission to the United States. Since our first federal measure of restriction in 1862, this list of the unwelcome has gradually lengthened, until to-day twenty-three classes may not lawfully enter.

The new railroad bill considerably widens the domain of federal control over interstate railroad transportation, and should serve to elevate the Interstate Commerce Commission to a position of correspondingly enhanced influence. New matters have been subjected to the jurisdiction of that body, and its powers in those matters already confided to it are substantially augmented in important particulars. But interesting as are these portions of the new law in themselves, they represent in the main nothing more than extensions and elaborations of principles already firmly established in former Acts regulating interstate commerce. To the student of constitutional law they present no problem that has not been thoroughly discussed in the debates over previous bills or settled by the courts. His attention, however, is at once arrested by the court feature of the new bill, although this occupied a position of secondary importance in the debates in Congress. This newly created Court of Commerce represents a notable innovation in the judicial system of the United States. It is a tribunal unlike any other known to American law, and its establishment warns us that even the judiciary may not wholly escape the effect of the universal tendency toward specialization which is such a prominent feature of modern life.