Using survey data collected in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuanian in 1990–92, we reexamine findings reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992). Our analysis indicates a significant link between political and economic reform orientations. Individuals who prefer political reforms of a democratic nature also favor a decreased role of the state in guaranteeing social well-being. In addition, our finding that better-educated Soviet and post-Soviet citizens are more likely than the less-well-educated to prefer individual responsibility for well-being is in direct contradiction to the findings reported by Finifter and Mickiewicz. The differences in the two sets of conclusions give rise to very different substantive conclusions regarding the economic and political changes now occurring in these societies.

Hannah Arendt never wrote systematically on the subject of democracy. In her book of greatest relevance to the subject, On Revolution, she criticized liberal democracy, and defended a conception of virtuous political “elites,” leading most commentators to view her as an opponent of democracy. I argue that Arendt defended a distinctive conception of grass-roots democracy, and that her conception of elites is distinctively democratic rather than anti-democratic. I bolster this argument by examining her historical context, and conclude by assessing the relevance of Arendt's conception of democracy.

Predominant views of political deliberation represent it as a matter either of “contemplation without interest” or of interest without contemplation. Whether we claim that political thinking can transcend power or that it is simply a vehicle for it, we abet a nihilistic political culture and authorize the thoughtless exercise of power. What each view denies—or insufficiently explores—is thinking's capacity to transfigure “interest” and power without pretending to transcend them. By contrast, political perspectivism incorporates multiple perspectives in an effort thoughtfully to respond to the will-to-power that attends our location in the world. We need political spaces if we are to become responsive agents of power, because we often can neither recognize the effects of our activities without the benefit of others' perspectives nor alter those effects by our efforts alone.

When Kant first used the term “culture,” he referred to the human capacity to will universal moral laws. Multiculturalists object to the denial of “difference” implicit in Kantian as well as all other Enlightenment forms of universalism. Their objection stems from their more particularistic understanding of culture, which for the most part everyone shares today. Plato is frequently said to be the fount of (universal) natural law theory; yet a medieval Muslim philosopher, Alfarabi, presents a Plato who denies moral universalism but acknowledges the possibility of some form of universalism, at least in the realm of knowledge. Alfarabi's Plato thereby provides a corrective for both extreme contemporary particularism and extreme Kantian universalism.

We shall address questions concerning the impact of candidate spending in congressional elections in a new way. We develop a multiequation model of congressional vote choice that takes the endogeneity of expenditures into account. We then estimate both this model and the more traditional single-equation model using individual level survey data. The substantial differences we find between the two models indicates that the simultaneity bias present in the single-equation model is not trivial. The challenger and incumbent expenditure terms are each significant (whereas only challenger expenditures are in the single-equation setup) and of much greater magnitude in the multiequation case. In addition, we evaluate hypotheses grounded in persuasive communications theory concerning the type of individuals most affected by the messages emanating from the campaigns. We find that individuals with higher education, those with greater interest in campaigns, and those with strongly held convictions are unaffected by candidate spending, whereas individuals lacking each of these attributes are greatly influenced by campaign expenditures.

Regression analysis in comparative research suffers from two distinct problems of statistical inference. First, because the data constitute all the available observations from a population, conventional inference based on the long-run behavior of a repeatable data mechanism is not appropriate. Second, the small and collinear data sets of comparative research yield imprecise estimates of the effects of explanatory variables. We describe a Bayesian approach to statistical inference that provides a unified solution to these two problems. This approach is illustrated in a comparative analysis of unionization.

In their 1993 article in this Review, William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan reported evidence of both direct and indirect impacts of public opinion on Supreme Court decisions. Helmut Norpoth and Jeffrey Segal offer a methodological critique and in their own reanalysis of the data find, contrary to Mishler and Sheehan, no evidence for a direct path of influence from public opinion to Court decisions. Instead, they find an abrupt-permanent shift of judicial behavior consistent with an indirect model of influence whereby popularly elected presidents, through new appointments, affect the ideological complexion of the Court. In response, Mishler and Sheehan defend the direct public opinion linkage originally noted, at both individual and aggregate level; respond to the methodological critique; and offer further statistical analysis to support the aggregate linkages.

Theories of the public sphere, as standardly formulated, aim to specify the minimal, necessary conditions for a discursive realm free of coercion or manipulation. In his article in this Review in September 1992, Dana Villa urged us to reconsider this standard account. He argued that when read in light of postmodernist theory, Hannah Arendt provides the basis for a revised conception of the public sphere that privileges plurality and difference over consensus. Jim Johnson suggests that Villa's analysis is a thinly veiled polemic against critical theory. Johnson argues that, as critique, Villa's argument is neither decisive nor encompassing, and that as polemic it blinds Villa to potentially fruitful disagreements with critical theorists. Villa replies that Johnson misses the synthetic thrust of the original article because he identified public realm theory too narrowly with Habermas. Thus, he misconstrues the dialogue Villa sought to facilitate between Arendt and postmodernism.

Citizens of a representative democracy are twice removed from legislation. First, they do not deliberate and vote directly on legislation. Rather they elect assemblies that enact such legislation in their stead. Second, and less commonly remarked, citizens do not vote directly for assemblies. Rather they vote for individual candidates, with the candidates receiving the most votes elected. We examine the efficiency properties of these voting systems.

In this note we elaborate on the conditions under which on-line and memory-based strategies of political candidate evaluation can be implemented. We suggest that the structure of information may be an important contextual variable affecting the voter's choice of these strategies. In addition, we propose that citizens with less political sophistication are particularly sensitive to structural differences in the political information environment. We use an experimental design that manipulates the information-processing context to test these ideas. Our results suggest that the context in which information is presented plays a critical role in moderating the influence of individual differences in political sophistication.