“The financing of government in the South presents an important field of study. The needs in relation to sources of revenue are greater in the South than in other parts of the nation. The South has relied heavily on the property tax to meet these needs, but it has also experimented widely with other forms of taxation. It has depended on federal grants to a great extent, though it has had difficulty in meeting certain conditions set up for some of these grants. The whole subject of government finance needs to be further studied and the experiences of the various states in the area need to be compared and contrasted. Materials will be found in state reports, in the reports of federal agencies which distribute grants-in-aid, and in the findings cf various groups which have studied the general problem, as, for example, the Advisory Committee on Education which reported to the President in 1939, and the Committee on Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations set up by the Department of the Treasury.”

Much of the foregoing comment by a group of Southern political scientists with special reference to the Southern region is equally applicable to states in other sections of the country. It has often been alleged that the American tax system, in so far as it may be called a system at all, is a survival of the horse-and-buggy age. The thousands of small local taxing jurisdictions existing throughout the country—some 165,000 of them—are striking evidence of our antiquated methods of levying and collecting taxes. In Pennsylvania alone—and many other states are in a worse condition—there are approximately 5,200 local units of government, half of them school districts, and all of them with the power to tax and to incur debt.

For many years there has been widespread discussion of the need for reorganizing the Department of State. Students, publicists, members of Congress, and members of the Department itself have repeatedly pointed out that the Department has not been geared up to performing the functions required of the foreign office of a great twentieth-century world power.

The chief criticisms of the Department have been four: (1) that there was lacking a basic pattern of sound administrative organization, (2) that the type of personnel found both at home and abroad was inadequate for the job required in foreign affairs today, (3) that the Department was too far removed from the public and from Congress, and (4) that it was not prepared to provide leadership for, and maintain the necessary relations with, other federal agencies.

The bitter controversy in Congress over anti-poll-tax legislation has revealed the need for a careful study of this subject. But rather little discriminating material has appeared. The case for poll-tax retention rests on folklore; the case for its abolition rests on propaganda, which is often more impassioned than exact. Belief in the poll tax is socially correct in the South. Logical argument is only a minor bulwark of the tax. Its main defense is the raised eyebrows that follow any questioning of the wisdom of this voting requirement. The opposition to the tax relies more on logic, but the statistics marshalled to support its case often will not stand up under close scrutiny. This article attempts to tell the story of the poll tax, with particular reference to Texas.

The difference between the poll tax as a voting requirement and merely as a revenue measure must be emphasized. Many states levy a poll tax which has nothing to do with suffrage. Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Indiana—to mention only four—have this tax. Although various means of enforcing payment are used, failure to pay does not disfranchise anyone. The poll tax as a prerequisite to voting is now found in only eight states, viz., Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee.

In a democracy, understanding is an essential ingredient of intelligent action. We the people cannot be expected to play our proper rôle in the drama unfolding before us today if we are not kept informed about the why and the how of the war. We ought to know our enemies, and their mad dream of world conquest. We ought to know our Allies and the sacrifices they are making to win a war which we could never have won without their help. We ought to know what we as individuals can do to bring our enemies to their knees more quickly. And finally, we ought to know something about the things we are fighting for. In the words of Mr. Elmer Davis, director of the Office of War Information, “This is a people's war, and to win it the people should know as much about it as they can.”

To help “facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding … of the status and progress of the war effort”—according to the executive order creating the OWI—the federal government has utilized five main media: motion pictures, the press, radio, graphics, and face-to-face discussion. While reaching a more limited audience, government pamphlets have served as an invaluable sixth medium. A review of a select list of the pamphlets about the war on the world front may be of particular interest to political scientists for two reasons: (1) the publication and distribution of such pamphlets is one important phase of the wartime activities of our government; and (2) they are an excellent source of information for teachers and other community leaders upon whose shoulders has fallen much of the responsibility for keeping our people informed about the war.

Before the war, Australia was a great food-producing country—in fact, she had, per capita, the greatest food supply in the world—yet there was no one department in the Commonwealth government in which the task of administering that food supply was centralized. No constitutional or statutory basis existed for control by the Commonwealth of food production, processing, and distribution. Agriculture was a function of the individual states, all of whom maintained separate departments of agriculture. Since the export of certain basic agricultural products such as wool and wheat was essential to the economy of Australia, a loosely-knit system of marketing boards affiliated with the Commonwealth Department of Commerce had developed to supervise the sale of these commodities. However, several of these boards, such as the Dairy Produce Board and the Dried Fruits Export Control Board, which had derived their powers originally from special legislation, experienced difficulties because of constitutional restrictions. In 1936, the Privy Council declared invalid a series of marketing laws relating to dried fruits, dairy products, and wheat. Section 92 of the Constitution, which requires free trade among the states, was interpreted by the Council as constraining the Commonwealth as well as the states. Under the wartime emergency powers granted to the Commonwealth by the National Security Regulations of 1939–40, these agencies and many additional similar ones received legal basis.

Whatever the Farmer-Labor party in Minnesota may or may not have achieved during the period of its ascendancy from 1931 to 1939, it is obvious that its effectiveness was drastically impaired by its failure to control the state legislature. With the exception of 1933 and 1937, when the so-called Liberal caucus elected the speaker of the house of representatives and organized that body, the Farmer-Labor party did not have a majority in either house of the legislature. In other words, the party controlled neither the house nor the senate in the sessions of 1931 and 1935 and controlled only the house in 1933 and 1937.

Why was the party unable to control the legislature at a time when the state, by positive pluralities and majorities, was electing and re-electing Farmer-Laborites to state administrative offices? This question relates to a basic problem in representative democracy, for certainly here was a clear instance of the will of the “majority” submitting over a period of eight years to that of a “minority” among the state's voters. In 1943, the Farmer-Labor party, torn by inner strife and discredited in many quarters, had reached what appeared to be the bottom of a decline that began with an overwhelming defeat by the Republicans in the 1938 general election.

The wars which are now drawing to a close can be compared to the Thirty Years War (1618–48), the War of the Spanish Succession, which really began in 1688 and lasted until 1713, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1789–1815). Each of these wars lasted thirty years or slightly less, and if we begin the present war in 1914, it already has become a fourth thirty-years war.

All of these wars left problems which had aspects in common. In all, there was the problem of returning to the ways of peace, of settling boundaries and governments, of reconstruction, and of maintaining a stable international order. But in each successive war the area involved was larger, the number of participants in the peace was greater, their economic relationships were more pervasive, and a more intensive international political organization was attempted.

At Westphalia in 1648, the effort was rather to establish the independence of states than to organize their interdependence. The ancient structure of the Holy Roman Empire and the universal spiritual authority of the Papacy were crumbling. The national independence of Switzerland and of the Netherlands and the virtual independence of the states of Germany were recognized. The notion of the sovereign territorial state, so different from the conception of a feudal hierarchy which had dominated medieval thinking, took root in men's minds and was promoted by the administration of efficient governments beginning to realize the possibilities of building power upon national sentiment.

Looking at the post-war period, it seems obvious that the government of the United States will give more attention to foreign affairs than it has in any comparable period of American history. How can the machinery for conducting foreign relations best be organized to meet these increasing responsibilities?

The conduct of foreign relations in the modern world is no simple matter. Technical experts, intelligence systems, ability to negotiate, national political stability, a large and loyal staff of public servants—these are but some of the national requisites for effective participation in world affairs. The mobilization and organization of the best staff resources in the country, the negotiation of national policies, and then of international agreements, constitute a formidable task under any system of government.

The conduct of foreign relations is, of course, easiest in a completely authoritarian state. It is made immeasurably more difficult by any division of authority. In most non-authoritarian governments, some division of authority has been found desirable, even at the expense of occasional awkwardness of procedure, because thereby the dangers of usurpation of power are minimized. The United States has gone farther than any democratic country in dividing responsibility in foreign affairs. Not only is there the usual distinction between legislative and executive authority, but the independence of the two branches has been so far underlined that the achievement of over-all government policies (as distinct from legislative and executive policies) is extremely difficult unless the party relationships are just right between the two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

In his budget message for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, which really should be labelled the State of the Union Message, President Roosevelt presented in outline his legislative program, which occupied Congress for the session. The message was devoted primarily to war expenditures, farm and food program, stabilization program, civilian control, non-war expenditures, the debt limit, and a pay-as-you-go tax system.

Organization. The political complexion of the Seventy-eighth Congress differs considerably from that of the Seventy-seventh, particularly in the House. The Republicans gained 47 Representatives and ten Senators, while the Democrats lost 45 Representatives and nine Senators. The third parties retained the same number of Representatives, but lost one Senator. The change in personnel was even greater, with thirteen changes in the Senate's membership and 106 in that of the House. The chairmanship of three standing committees of the Senate and fifteen of the House were changed at the beginning of or during the session.

The United States must assume leadership among the nations of the world if peace is to be maintained. If, after the present holocaust, we do not create a better world, in which justice and neighborliness shall supplant tyranny and war, the sacrifices being made by our fighting men will have been in vain.

Are we prepared to assume this necessary leadership? Can we chart the course for a better world when we do not agree on our own international postwar program? Congress and the Executive must work together in our international relations if we are to have a long-range foreign policy. Some method must be found to enable the Executive and Congress to have a better understanding of the facts and closer unity on international problems. Moreover, on the home front, there is a desperate need for more direct liaison and for a clearer understanding between the executive and legislative branches of our government.

Any discussion of postwar problems in our relations with Latin America must begin with a consideration of the great changes which have taken place in hemisphere relations during the war period. Since 1939, the American Republics have achieved a degree of coöperation in international matters which would hardly have seemed possible a few years earlier, and today all but one of the nations of the Continent are helping the United States either as belligerents or as non-belligerents in the prosecution of the war.

On the military side, our neighbors have given us bases for our Naval and Air Forces and have strengthened their own armed forces, in most cases with the aid of missions from our Army and Navy. Some of them have taken an active part in anti-submarine operations, and Brazil is preparing to send forces abroad. On the political side, they have set up machinery for coöperation in dealing with fifth column and other hostile activities. The importance of their coöperation in these matters is inestimable. Of still more significance, perhaps, has been their economic aid.

Absorbed for three years in the grim business of global war, the American people only dimly understand what is involved in their apparent willingness to participate in the equally exacting business of organizing the world for enduring peace. If this participation is to be sustained and effective instead of short-lived or sporadic, the scope and forms of the future foreign policy of the United States cannot help being profoundly affected. Its context will be radically different from that of prewar times.

This observation does not imply any sharp departure from the fundamental postulates of policy enunciated year in and year out by Secretary Hull since 1933. The foreign policy of every great power is always more or less a continuum, compounded of old and new elements. Between wars we at least paid lip service to the ideal of a world organized for peace and security, though we persistently declined to assume the obligations of full membership in the League of Nations. We have for decades sponsored the development of a loose collaborative system designed to further Pan-American solidarity. At the world level, moreover, we have been an active participant in international agencies concerned with technical, scientific, social, and humanitarian matters, including, since 1934, the International Labor Organization. And in 1928 we joined with sixty-two other signatories of the Pact of Paris in renouncing “war as an instrument of national policy.”

Background of Conference Action. Forty-one countries were represented at the twenty-sixth session of the International Labor Conference, held in Philadelphia April 20–May 12, to consider the future rôle of the International Labor Organization and the economic and social policies to be recommended to the governments of member states. This was the first regular session of the Conference to be held since 1938, the New York-Washington session in 1941 having been a special one. As in 1941, there were no delegations from Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Spain, and the U.S.S.R. Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Switzerland, and Turkey, which were not represented at the 1941 sesseion, were represented by government delegates and advisers, as well as Sweden, which sent a full delegation. The occupied countries of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia were represented by complete delegations; also Luxemburg by two government delegates and an adviser.

As compared with the 1941 sesssion, the twenty-sixth was held at a time more propitious to the cause of the United Nations, was better attended both as to countries represented and the number of delegates and advisers present, and was more deeply occupied with specific proposals concerning the future status of the I.L.O. and post-war economic and social problems. The reasons for this were to be found in the events of the two and a half years separating the two sessions.

An institution is an action pattern, a social complex of interrelated habits. Members of an institution occupy habitual positions in relation to other members. The conduct of each individual moves in repetitious patterns governed, by that individual's positional relationships in the institution and by the total action pattern of the institution. These positions are defined in the organizational structure of the institution; they evolve, grow, reach an established routine as the institution becomes a stabilized pattern of social action.

An institution may have a formally integrated structure and may be in continuous activity—like a given church; or it may be a contingent pattern of action invoked only on the occurrence of specific events—as marriage or portions of the law. Administration involves both types of institution, but the most frequently observed and commonly studied is the formal structural organization.

The administration as a whole (of the Federal Government, for example), or of any well defined unit of it (as a department or independent agency), may be looked upon as an institution. In general, the form is hierarchical, necessitated by the division of labor involved, the requirements of supervision and coördination, the necessity for authority and direction. As a going concern, the administrative unit has daily, monthly, yearly patterns of action. The effectiveness with which the unit achieves its objectives depends upon the appropriateness of its organization to the functions required of it, the perfection with which its various elements are integrated into a smooth-running going concern.

For the purposes of my discussion, I am defining “educational function' broadly. I take it to comprehend not merely instruction of the youth who regularly resort to academic lecture halls and libraries, but also the impact of such special knowledge as we accumulate upon the adult population generally, and especially upon the officials in government, industry, commerce, agriculture, and labor with responsibility for policy, decision, and operation of our major political and economic institutions.

The entire burden of my remarks is a plea that in the years ahead we move together as a family of related intellectual workers to define more precisely the profession of social scientist. Especially, I urge that we consider together the broadening of the domain of our profession so that, although it remains based in academic life, it will penetrate, as a recognizable, self-disciplined group of investigators and staff advisers, the major extra-academic institutions of our national life.

Postwar American security planning will be realistic and adequate only to the extent that it is based upon a careful evaluation of the present and prospective relationship of the power position of the United States to that of the remainder of the world. In the past, it has been fashionable in this country to condemn power politics as something immoral, associated with the sinister contrivings of European diplomatists and not with the honest and above-board conduct of foreign relations by a democratic and peace-loving people. The term “power politics” has come to mean the cynical and ruthless use of power to advance national interests at the expense of others. But even though such a use—or abuse—of power is to be condemned, it does not follow that the power factor in international relations can be disregarded or even minimized. In practice, it will always be uppermost in the minds of statesmen, however much they say about the legal equality of all states, and the peoples of democratic countries need to be as fully aware of the constructive uses to which power may be put as to the misuse of which it is so freely susceptible.

While condemnation of power as a basis of policy has by no means disappeared from American thinking, there is a growing realization that we were able with impunity to minimize its importance in the past because of the existence of a particular set of circumstances which combined to provide us with adequate national security and which required little positive effort on our part. In other words, there is a new awareness of the fact that our favorable position with respect to security, which existed during the latter part of the nineteenth century and up to 1914, arose, not from moral superiority on our part or from the inherent excellence of our governmental system, but from other factors which had little or no relationship to these political or moral qualities.