It used to be said by a certain learned professor opposed to departure from old and familiar paths, “Gentlemen, all progress is change, but not all change is progress.”

In every department of human affairs, in every quarter of the civilized world, the contrast between conditions in the late eighties and the present time is amazing—not conditions only but the difference in attitudes, in beliefs, in human relations. We may well ask ourselves, Whither? Certainly it is incumbent upon us to consider the character of these changes—whether they are making for progress—and what steps we are taking or can take to meet them. I ask you to consider with me two aspects of this question, one affecting industrial and the other international relations. In each case the proposals heretofore offered to meet the situation appear to fall into one of two categories, the first mechanistic, the second educative; the first, an attempt to meet a new situation by introducing new devices of control; the second by a process of education to modify or change men's attitude and belief.

Under the provisions of a constitutional amendment adopted in November, 1920, the voters of Missouri, at a special election in August, 1921, approved the plan for a constitutional convention, to consist of two delegates from each of the 34 senatorial districts and 15 delegates elected at large. In order to secure representation from different political parties the amendment restricted each party to the nomination of one candidate for delegate in each senatorial district. The state committees of the two major political parties agreed also to the nomination by each of seven candidates for delegates-at-large, and jointly nominated a candidate for the fifteenth delegate-at-large, so that the convention was bipartisan in its membership. This arrangement prevented the consideration of questions involving party differences, except in one case where agreement was secured upon a compromise plan.

The convention met on May 16, 1922 and adjourned sine die on November 6, 1923, after having been in session 267 working days. On account of the session of the legislature a recess was taken from December 15, 1922 to April 16, 1923. The convention continued to meet until September 7, 1923, when another recess was taken to enable the committees on phraseology and arrangement, submission and address, and others to complete their reports. The convention reassembled on October 2, 1923 and completed its work on October 5. In order to provide for any contingency that might arise it was decided to reconvene on November 6, with the understanding that the president and secretary with such delegates as might be present could declare the convention finally adjourned.

Is there any fundamental distinction between so-called “public” and “private” agencies, officers, institutions, corporations, associations, persons—legal entities and quasi-entities of all sorts? It is the theory of the courts that such a distinction exists, but their attempts through a maze of decisions logically to establish a principle of distinction have been futile.

Several bases of distinction have been adopted by the courts, including, first, the purpose or interest involved. “An office … seems to comprehend every charge or employment in which the public is interested.” Thus “private corporations are those which are created for the immediate benefit and advantage of individuals…. Public corporations are those which are created for public purposes.”

However, it is held that the whole interest in the corporation must be public to make it a public corporation. “Public corporations are political corporations or such as are founded wholly for public purposes and the whole interest in which is in the public. The fact of the public having an interest in the works or property or the object of a corporation, does not make it a public corporation.”

The opening paragraph of Section 8 of Article 1 of the Constitution reads as follows: “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes‥‥ to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.” For what purposes may Congress, in light of this phraseology, spend money raised by national taxation? Hamilton answered, for any purposes which Congress itself found to be promotive of the general welfare. Madison, on the contrary, held the power thus granted to be only instrumental—Congress might spend money only as a means of carrying into effect its other granted powers. So far as the practice of Congress is concerned, Hamilton's view has long since prevailed, but the Supreme Court has never had occasion so far to develop its theory on the subject. Its failure, therefore, to seize the opportunity proferred it in the Maternity Act cases is somewhat disappointing.

By the Maternity Act of November 23, 1921 Congress extends financial aid, in the work of reducing maternal and infant mortality, and protecting the health of mothers and infants, to such states as shall accept and comply with the provisions of the act. The act was attacked on two grounds; first, that the appropriations voted were “for purposes not national, but local to the states,” and secondly, that the acceptance by a state of the terms of the act would constitute a surrender by it of its reserved powers.