“Illustration” or “map” are among the most frequently used words for translating the Chinese character tu, a graphic representation of any phenomenon that can be pictured in life and society, whether in traditional China or elsewhere. Investigations of the early role of tu in Chinese culture first set out to answer questions about who produced tu, the background of its originator, and the originator's purpose. How were pictures conceptualized? Interpreted? In examining tu, Chinese scholars stressed the relational aspect of tu and shu (writing) to answer both these questions, as well as to the importance of not robbing an image of its overall beauty and life with too much graphic detail. In the West, specific concepts of technical or scientific illustrations did not exist before the Renaissance. With the coming of that age, technical illustration became a specific branch of knowledge and activity, with its own specific goals and ends.

A neurologist with abdominal pain goes to see a gastroenterologist for treatment. The gastroenterologist asks the neurologist where it hurts. The neurologist replies, “In my head, of course.” Indeed, while we can feel pain throughout much of our bodies, pain signals undergo most of their processing in the brain. Using neuroimaging techniques like functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) and positron emission tomography (“PET”), researchers have more precisely identified brain regions that enable us to experience physical pain. Certain regions of the brain's cortex, for example, increase in activation when subjects are exposed to painful stimuli. Furthermore, the amount of activation increases with the intensity of the painful stimulus. These findings suggest that we may be able to gain insight into the amount of pain a particular person is experiencing by non-invasively imaging his brain.

Such insight could be particularly valuable in the courtroom where we often have no definitive medical evidence to prove or disprove claims about the existence and extent of pain symptoms.

The centrality of freedom as a philosophical construct is often neglected in contemporary academic circles and popular media outlets when it comes to discussions of crime, criminals, and the criminal law. This is surprising, especially since freedom—its absence or its presence—is an important ethical dimension underpinning all transgressive acts, including delinquency and crime. More specifically, the notion of freedom problematizes wayward conduct because transgression can (and does) emerge from freedom's limits rather than its excesses. What this suggests, then, is that criminality is not necessarily an artifact of one's autonomy gone awry or of making “bad” choices; rather, criminality may be a moment of self-discovery, transformation, and transcendence in which a “critical freedom” is borne. This is a period marked by living life on the edge; of contesting thresholds and boundaries in which “a plethora of original ideas, thoughts, inventions, new forms of resistance, and so forth” emerge.

H.L.A. Hart has stated that certain mental conditions have an “excusing” effect on punishment, whereby “[t]he individual is not liable to punishment if at the time of his doing what would otherwise be a punishable act he is … the victim of certain types of mental disease.” The Supreme Court, however, upheld a state statute allowing for increased “punishment,” in the form of civil commitment, for sexually violent predators who suffer from a “mental abnormality.” Thus, American jurisprudence is faced with a paradoxical role of mental conditions: serving to both aggravate and mitigate sentences. This dual purpose of mental conditions becomes a pressing legal issue as mental conditions associated with brain structure or function become more detectable with the emergence of neuroimaging.

In federal capital sentencing, judges are obligated to consider aggravating and mitigating factors before imposing a death sentence. There are aggravating and mitigating factors that could be implicated by mental conditions, including future dangerousness, and impaired capacity, respectively.