One crucial difference between migration and other areas is that the web of individual rights woven by human rights law has remained thin for a long time. Migration has long looked like the last bastion of sovereignty while other fields of law became subject to a rights revolution imposing meaningful constraints on public authorities. This essay confronts the legacy of immigration exceptionalism with developments in the European legal space since the 1990s. Catalyzed by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), human rights eventually have taken center stage in legal and political struggles challenging the power to exclude. The expansion of human rights discourse in contemporary Europe is seen as part of a larger trend. Mutually reinforcing processes of “humanrightization” in law, politics, and everyday practice have given rise to successful claims raised by migrants and other social actors seeking to limit the governmental power of migration control. Humanrightization of migration discourse makes it possible to formulate far-reaching demands for the inclusion of migrants within the framework of the recognized rules of legal argumentation—a “positivist human rights maximalism.”

Embedded in mutually reinforcing processes of “humanrightization” in law, politics, and everyday practice,1 the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR, or Strasbourg Court) has become a central actor and forum for conflicts around the inclusion and exclusion of migrants in Europe. The Strasbourg Court has derived specific protections for migrants from the originally “migration-blind” norms of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), such as the prohibition of torture, and respect for family and private life, for example.2 This extension of the ECHR to migrants means that migration control is no longer purely within the discretion of states.

Scholars of international law have been increasingly troubled by states’ vast powers and practices of migrant exclusion. There is no doubt that much of this uneasiness is catalyzed by a keen sense of the demands of a basic liberalism at the international legal order's core. Indeed, the increased construction of border walls,1 the continuously widespread use of deportation as a migration control tool,2 and new digital bordering technologies3 have all come under scrutiny precisely because of the challenges they pose to the notion of supposedly universal entitlements, both substantive and procedural, that often appear disabled or overridden when it comes to the treatment of different sorts of migrants. My goal in this contribution is not to add to such legal critiques, but rather to provide the contours of a broader normative argument to rebuke—or at least complicate—what is often called the state's “right to exclude” all or most would-be immigrants. This right is not just standardly assumed in legal and political practice—indeed, standardly viewed as the linchpin of sovereignty—but has also enjoyed sophisticated defense by liberal political theorists.4 The main goal of my argument is to suggest that anyone with basic liberal inclinations—including political theorists, lawyers, and practitioners of politics—should be able to agree that, under current circumstances, granting states a potent “right to exclude” entails deep tensions with basic moral standards of legitimate authority. This is because the deeply entrenched characteristics and historical background conditions of immigration control today tend structurally to push states to violate the appropriate moral conditions of their legitimate authority to enforce immigration restrictions.5 While moving above and beyond legal argumentation, my hope is that the argument may underscore and give further analytical expression to some of the animating concerns of contemporary legal contestations of states’ exclusive powers and practices.

Embedded in any policy proposal is a set of assumptions about the problem that the policy is intended to solve.1 As policy processes play out, some of these assumptions are contested by the actors involved, while others remain latent. Policy discussion about institutionalizing investment dispute prevention reflects a set of assumptions concerning the problem of investment disputes. In this contribution, I examine assumptions embedded in the development of, and the response to, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Secretariat's 2023 Draft Legislative Guide on Investment Dispute Prevention and Mitigation. The Draft Legislative Guide represents the high-water mark of efforts to develop a model of investment dispute prevention that could be rolled out at the domestic level. I make three main arguments. First, both the Draft Legislative Guide itself and wider policy discussion assume that investment disputes develop independently of the cognitive and institutional environment in which they occur. As a result, policy discussion overlooks the extent to which dispute prevention initiatives can, counter-intuitively, produce investment disputes. Second, policy discussion of investment dispute prevention assumes that investment disputes have their roots in coordination failures across government, rather than democratic processes, distributive conflicts, or tensions between the interests of investors and wider public interests. This premise, and its implications, deserve much closer critical scrutiny. Third, institutionalized models of investment dispute prevention of the sort envisaged by Draft Legislative Guide are almost exclusively found in developing states. The dispute prevention agenda needs to grapple openly with the fact that advice is being given to developing states to establish dispute prevention institutions that have no equivalents in the domestic systems of developed states.

This contribution examines the role of dispute prevention mechanisms (DPMs) in domesticating and broadening foreign investor privileges. Although conceived as a means of responding to the backlash against investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), dispute prevention mechanisms are likely to produce legal enclaves whereby a privileged group of actors are afforded special treatment, and their interests are elevated into policy priorities. As currently conceived, DPMs are expected to operate as a regime embedded in domestic law, but replicating and amplifying investment law's emphasis on the exclusivity of foreign investor rights. Thus, the effect of DPMs is to anchor and extend foreign investor rights to a pre-dispute stage. By analyzing the premises and core features of the emerging DPMs, this contribution argues that, rather than addressing the systemic issues underpinning international investment law, the dispute prevention agenda will further expand and entrench foreign investor privileges.

This contribution highlights the importance of institutional dispute prevention not just to prevent the proliferation of formal legal disputes between states and foreign investors, but also to preserve the relationship between investors and states and enable investment retention and expansion. Drawing from empirical studies and survey findings, as well as the World Bank's country experience of working on investment policy and promotion frameworks, this contribution provides an overview of the World Bank's experience in implementing such mechanisms globally.1

For Peru, the introduction of dispute prevention mechanisms was a consequence of the country's increased openness to foreign investment. Following a severe economic crisis, the government launched several pro-investment reforms in the 1990s. These included signing bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreements with investment protection provisions, as well as investment contracts with foreign investors. The resulting flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country, in turn, increased the likelihood of the state facing investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases. As Peru began to face investment claims in the early 2000s, the Coordination and Response System for International Investment Disputes, also known as “SICRECI” for its acronym in Spanish, was established to manage the practical challenges of coordinating the state's defense. In practice, however, SICRECI's mandate has expanded progressively beyond coordinating ISDS defense, as the institution has undertaken several actions to prevent disputes and otherwise adapted to the specifics of Peru's pro-investment policy. SICRECI became one of the first models of dispute prevention mechanisms, with international organizations showcasing it as an example of how states, in particular developing countries, could address and mitigate a growing number of concerns over the impact of investment arbitration.1

China's 2019 Foreign Investment Law establishes a formal mechanism to handle complaints by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs)—i.e., Chinese enterprises that are wholly or partly foreign-owned. Its “complaint agencies” are empowered to prevent disputes by facilitating settlements; they do not have adjudicatory authority. Beyond the immediate objective of dispute prevention, this essay argues that the FIE complaint mechanism was intended to strengthen central oversight and control over subnational governments. However, the mechanism may be hindering its intended objectives in practice. In particular, the flexibility and informality of its processes encourage ad hoc settlements between FIEs and errant subnational governments in ways that may undermine the exercise of central administrative powers.

The steady rise of international investment arbitration in recent years suggests that many states still struggle to prevent investor grievances from becoming international investment disputes and ultimately arbitration claims. The United States is not exempt from such difficulties, but it has some institutional advantages contributing to its successful approach to mitigating and managing international investment disputes. Key advantages include its practice of: (1) “internationalizing” domestic law in U.S. international investment agreements (IIAs); (2) encouraging foreign investors to pursue domestic remedies in U.S. courts; and (3) domesticating the international investment regime within the U.S. government. The U.S. experience offers some valuable lessons for the ongoing reform of the international investment regime.