With the submission to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the dispute over the sovereignty of East Greenland, a controversy of long standing between Denmark and Norway approaches a solution. The question first became acute in 1919, but an understanding of the conflicting claims upon which the parties rest their cases can be gained only by an examination of the more remote historical factors involved. Without attempting definitive opinions in a case concerning which complete information is not available, the writer wishes to examine the various claims which have been advanced, and to evaluate their relative importance in the settlement of the dispute.

A resolution of the present citizenship status of women as nationals of the United States presents certain difficulties, which arise mainly from three differing phases of our national policy: (1) the operation of the common law as decisive of this question until March 2, 1907; (2) the enactment of March 2, 1907, in part declaratory, and in part in derogation, of the pre-existing law as it applied to the citizenship of women; (3) the Cable Act of September 22, 1922, inaugurating a distinct policy unknown to the common law, and the amendments made thereto by Acts of Congress of July 3, 1930, and March 3, 1931.

The student or practitioner whose interest is primarily in the interpretation and application of the law of nations is often prone to dismiss fundamental concepts as a matter of mere theoretical importance. This is a serious mistake. No one is capable of understanding the interpretations and applications of the law of nations which have been made in judicial decisions, national and international, in arbitrations, and in international incidents, unless he has some knowledge of the fundamental concepts of the science and of the conditions under which those concepts have developed. Concepts, in truth, are as much a part of the fabric of international jurisprudence as the intricate and confused records of international conduct. If they are no longer its warp and woof, they provide at least the necessary patterns.

There are times when, as I look at the regulations of the countries of the world affecting immigrants, I see in my mind’s eye the building up of walled-in countries, much like the wall-encircled towns of the medieval period. I see the doors that lead to them closing more and more against the stranger. The development of international interests in our economic world seems to have sagged. In a sense, we are reverting to that stage in our history when our concern centered solely around each of ourselves, nor took into account the needs of others.

The events in Manchuria during the fall of 1931 have again focussed considerable attention upon the problems of treaty enforcement, a matter which has attracted great interest since Bethmann-Hollweg’s famous statement about “a scrap of paper” in 1914. The discussion and study of sanctions, of implementation and putting “teeth” into pacts and treaties, have been widespread since 1919, and two or three schools of thought have arisen in regard to this question, which is one of important current political and legal concern.

The recent governmental policy of withholding recognition from foreign governments long and firmly established, because they are disapproved, has caused confusion in the conduct of international affairs and in the administration of justice in the courts. In late years this has been particularly exemplified in the relations of the United States with the Soviet Government of Russia, but it has had illustrations on earlier occasions in connection with Mexico and other countries, when a desire to express disapproval of certain foreign governments or their policies has induced, through the purported privilege of withholding recognition, the concomitant policy of intervention, reprisals, and non-intercourse.

There was concluded in Washington on December 15,1931, an arbitration between the Central Powers and the United States of claims arising out of the seizure by the United States of enemy-owned ships, patents and radio stations during the World War. The arbitration was unique in that, instead of being brought about as the result of a treaty or a convention between the Powers in question, it was instituted as the result of an Act of Congress by which a special tribunal was established for the hearing of such claims against the United States. Thus we are confronted with the unusual spectacle of a Power against whom the claims were asserted, recognizing such claims by a legislative act on its own part, without any bilateral agreement, and establishing of its own accord a special tribunal for the determination of the claims. It was consequently an arbitration international in its scope, but conducted before a domestic tribunal.

It is not necessary to make a profound study of the work of the League of Nations in the sphere of minorities protection to realize the importance of the I Minorities Section of the Secretariat, of the minorities petition and of the Minorities Committees (usually called “the Committees of Three”). Indeed it is difficult to imagine how the guarantee of the League could have been given substantial reality without these three institutions. At first sight it would appear remarkable that the treaty articles upon which the present procedure is based should make not the slightest mention of any provision concerning these institutions. This is nevertheless the fact. All the rules (with only one exception) concerning the functions of the Minorities Section and of the Minorities Committees and the nature of the minorities petition have been established unilaterally by resolution of the Council.

Under a special agreement signed December 17, 1930, the United States agreed to arbitrate (pursuant to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907) with the Government of Sweden the questions:

First, Whether the Government of the United States of America detained the Swedish motorship Kronprins Gustaf Adolf between June 23, 1917, and July 12, 1918, and the Swedish motorship Pacific between July 1, 1917, and July 19, 1918, in contravention of the Swedish-American treaties of April 3, 1783 and July 4, 1827.

The problem of the withdrawal of the mandates system from a territory subject to a League of Nations mandate under Article 22 of the Covenant has aroused considerable academic controversy for a decade. Not until quite recently, however, did the problem receive a comprehensive investigation and solution by official organs of the League of Nations. The present article has the purpose of setting forth the pertinent facts of this investigation, and the general principles adopted as a result thereof, governing termination of mandates.

Every student of international law knows that the federal courts in the United States apply rules derived from international law. At least five theories have been offered to explain the basis of the authority of such rules before the courts. This study is limited strictly to an analysis, comparison, and appraisal of these various theories in the light of federal judicial opinion.

A brief description of Belgium’s geography and history is essential to make clear how the present tangled legal situation arose respecting Belgium’s neutrality since its violation in 1914. Belgium is one of those nations, like Palestine and Luxemburg, which, unfortunately for their tranquillity, lie across the easiest route between two powerful states. Her history is largely the story of the passage of armies up and down the Meuse, between France and Germany. The names of Rocroi, Sedan, Namur and Liege tell the story of the importance of this highway.