To write of Philip Jessup means to survey the history of the teaching of international law in the United States throughout the last half century; to cover all important events concerning the birth of international organizations on the morrow of the Second World War; to visit the halls of the General Assembly and the Security Council; to attend meetings of the American Society of International Law and the Institute of International Law, where he so frequently took the floor to shed light on their debates; to attend sittings of the International Court of Justice in the years 1960-1969. I could hardly undertake this task; there are others much more qualified to do so. What I wish to do is to recall him as a great jurist I knew and a delightful human being; in short, a judge and a great friend whom I learned to admire.

No recent issue has so divided lawyers and writers in the field of international law as the question whether courts of one nation should sit in judgment on the acts of other nations with respect to foreign held property—sometimes, always, or never. The United States Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cubav. Sabbatinosaid the answer was never—or at least hardly ever—thus upholding and reaffirming the “act of state doctrine”. The Congress in the Hickenlooper (or Sabbatino) Amendmentmade an effort to reverse that ruling, an effort that has proved largely unsuccessful. Now the State Department has taken its turn, arguing in a formal communication to the Supreme Court that when it perceives no objection to adjudication on foreign policy grounds, the courts should judge the validity of the foreign nation's acts under international law standards—at least as to counterclaims.

The principal achievement of the Hague Conference of 1907 was the Convention for an International Prize Court. That convention provided for a real and permanent court composed of judges who were to be appointed by the contracting Powers for terms of six years, were required to be “judges of known proficiency in questions of international maritime law and of the highest moral reputation,” and were to be paid a stated compensation from a fund contributed by all the Powers.

Jurisdiction was conferred upon the court to review on appeal all judgments of national prize courts. By a subsequent agreement, for the purpose of avoiding difficulties presented by the constitutions of some of the signatory Powers, an alternative procedure was authorized under which the new court might pass upon the question involved in the case of prize de novo, and notwithstanding any judgment of the national prize court, instead of passing upon it by way of appeal from that judgment. Article 7 of the convention provides:

The right of an alien to inherit real estate or the proceeds of its sale in any of the States of the United States is specifically provided for in a number of treaties currently in force between the United States and other countries; but the right of an alien to inherit personal property from a deceased American citizen is left for the most part to the discretion of our States. That is the rather surprising conclusion to be drawn from a study of the existing treaties of the United States in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Clark v. Allen.

Mr. J. Holmes had told us that the object of the study of law is to make the prophecies of precedent more precise, to generalize them into a thoroughly connected system; that that object is “the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentalities of courts.” The framers of our constitutional jurisprudence were clearly concerned with the incidence of just principles upon governmental powers. Kent declares that when the United States ceased to be a part of the British Empire, and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became subject to that system of rules, which reason, morality and custom had established among the civilized nations of Europe, as their public law. It was recognized that the law of nations prescribed “what one nation may do without giving just cause for war, and what of consequence, another may or ought to permit without being considered as having sacrificed its honor, its dignity, or its independence.” Story avers that the general law of nations is “equally obligatory upon all sovereigns and all states." It is "the umpire and security of their rights and peace,” declared Jefferson. It is a law which “binds all nations,” declared the Supreme Court of the United States in 1794.