In a recent issue of the Journal, one finds a largely theoretical discussion of a question that potentially implicates quite serious legal policies and consequences: “May the President violate customary international law?” Despite professorial conjecture, the answer to such a question, which can be documented in actual trends in legal decision, emphatically has been no (i.e., the President is bound by and may not lawfully violate international law).

Larry Johnson’s timely and important essay challenges both utopian and realist accounts of UN law and practice by reviving the debate over the nature and functions of the UN General Assembly, particularly the General Assembly’s power to deploy certain legal tactics not only to influence collective security deliberations in the UN Security Council, but also, more significantly, to provide some legal justification for multilateral military “collective measures” in the event of Security Council gridlock. One vehicle by which the General Assembly may assert its own right to intervene in defense of “international peace and security” is a “Uniting for Peace” (UFP) resolution, authorized by resolution 377(V) (1950). At its core, a “uniting for peace” resolution is an attempt to circumvent a Security Council deadlock by authorizing Member States to take collective action, including the use of force, in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. General Assembly resolution 377(V) does not require resolutions to take specific legal form—language that echoes the preambular “lack of unanimity of the permanent members [that results in the Security Council failing to] exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” is sufficient to render a given resolution a UFP, provided the General Assembly resolution calls for concrete “collective [forceful] measures.” For this reason, experts disagree on precisely how many times a UFP has indeed been invoked or implemented, although informed analysts suggest UFP has been invoked in slightly more than ten instances since 1950.

In this essay, I take up two concerns raised by Harold Koh and Todd Buchwald in their critique of the Kampala amendments on aggression: what they term “proxy prosecution” and the notion of aggression as a uniquely political question. I also take issue with the argument in Alain Pellet’s response on attacks by nonstate actors.

These areas of contention notwithstanding, there are important issues on which I think that Koh and Buchwald get it right. In forthcoming work, I argue that the object and purpose of the criminalization of aggression precludes an interpretation of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute that would include humanitarian interventions not authorized by the Security Council. Nonetheless, the failure to make this textually explicit at Kampala was a mistake that the authors are correct to lament. Similarly, they accurately identify the ambiguities in the provisions on the amendments’ entry into force as an entirely avoidable defect that creates unnecessary confusion. These important points notwithstanding, the article takes some misleading positions on the politics of the crime.

In recent debates about the interplay between international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL), two broad camps have emerged. On the one hand, defenders of what may be called the convergence thesis have emphasized the inclusion of basic rights protections in the so-called “Geneva instruments” of IHL, as well as the role of human rights bodies in interpreting and amplifying rights protections in IHL through juridical or quasi-juridical interpretation and pronouncements. In armed conflicts, it is said, human rights apply concurrently and in ways that strengthen the protective constraints of IHL. Critics of the convergence thesis, on the other hand, have protested that pressing human rights obligations on state forces misunderstands the nature of both IHL and IHRL, and generates misplaced and impossibly onerous demands on belligerents—ultimately and perversely, the effect of emphasizing convergence may be less, not more, human rights protection.

The limited use of dispute settlement mechanisms under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement explains the recent upsurge in requests for advisory opinions on issues specific to climate change to international courts, namely the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, it is still unclear how these courts will answer the questions posed, and in particular whether they will coordinate or compete with each other. As the requesting states and bodies are well aware of this uncertainty, requesting an advisory opinion from three courts simultaneously was an ingenious (not ingenuous) strategy to clarify states’ obligations to mitigate or adapt to climate change through the international judiciary. This essay assesses how the parallel jurisdiction of courts in these cases presents an opportunity to enhance states’ obligations concerning climate change through requesting concurrent views on the same rules and obligations. It considers the potential for contradictory views between courts on the same obligations. Finally, the essay analyzes the extent to which these courts may compete or cooperate in their approach to the resolution of these issues.