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One story that can be told about the development of legal protections for certain forced migrants in international law is, in terms of the scope of protection, a progressive one. From expanded definitions of who is entitled to refugee-law protection, to the development of complementary protection in human rights law, the ambit of that which the law purports to cover has moved wider. This might be seen as part of the broader trend in the expanding coverage of international human rights law generally. Yet, a counternarrative can also be told: a diminished commitment on the part of many states, particularly economically advantaged ones, to inward migration, including of forced migrants, as evidenced in the expanded scope of non-entrée, “closed borders” measures, from visa restrictions to carrier sanctions, push-back operations, and an unwillingness to engage in numerically significant refugee resettlements to their countries. This backlash trend can also be identified in human rights policy generally. Just as the scope of human rights legal protection in general, and the legal protection accorded to certain migrants in particular, has expanded, so too states have become less willing to provide such protection.
[N]ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual … is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.
Scholars of migration and citizenship will recognize the famous passage from the judgment of the ICJ in Nottebohm and perhaps be able to recite it from memory. But Nottebohm is nearing sixty-five, and so the inevitable question arises: is it time to retire the case? One impetus for the project of global migration law is the recognition of “current structures as historically contingent artifacts of a sovereignty-based global system in need of reform.” No artifact does more work in sustaining the current configuration than the use of citizenship (or nationality) as the technology for regulating transnational movement. Sooner or later, a conversation about the emergence of global migration law must grapple with international law's position on nationality, which brings us back to Nottebohm.
Recent years have witnessed the expansion of human rights standards relating to migrant domestic workers. This includes, in particular, the adoption of the 2011 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention on Decent Work for Domestic Workers (no. 189), General Comments from UN human rights treaty bodies, and an expanding body of case law in domestic and regional courts. Migrant domestic workers have played central roles in these cases, engaging in the public sphere to advocate for law reform, and, in doing so, gradually expanding the field of global migration law. This essay describes the emerging recognition evident in the approaches of UN human rights treaty bodies that axes of discrimination intersect and, in particular, that migration status and gender can be significant to the enjoyment of rights. This integrated approach is evident in the case law of international human rights bodies adjudicating the rights claims advanced by migrant domestic workers. The case law on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) shows the potential for such integrated approaches to move beyond the usual fragmentation of human rights, labor, and migration laws, but that potential remains limited.
This symposium has marshaled numerous insights regarding the emergence of a general field of inquiry within international law on the movement of people. To move into this conceptual terrain has required a certain amount of defiance of the conventional wisdom that questions of migration are within the purview of the sovereign state, and a matter of sovereign territorial prerogative. Yet this conventional wisdom manifestly no longer describes the times. There are now a host of limitations under positive international law on the prerogative of states to control rights of noncitizens to entry, residence, and work within their territories; and limitations on states’ rights to exclude or expel noncitizens therefrom.
If global migration law “includes all levels of the law,” then the European Union represents the most developed instance of the interplay of national, regional, and international law. Migration law in the European Union involves the interaction of EU Member States’ national laws, EU regional law, and international law. This complex interchange of different migratory legal regimes is the consequence of diverse, and sometimes conflicting, objectives and interests of the Union and its Member States, and the nature of EU law itself. This essay explores the impact of these three levels of the law on the four migratory regulatory categories—EU citizens, “desirable” third-country nationals, asylum seekers, and all other third-country nationals—and the three objectives associated with these categories. The predominance of one legal regime over another varies depending on the regulatory category of migrants and the objectives associated therewith. While describing the existing legal systems, the essay outlines their attributes and shortcomings, the most prominent being: a clear rift between the rights granted to EU citizens and to third-country nationals; EU Member States’ determination to reserve to their respective national territories a high level of national control over labor migration; and significant deficiencies of the EU asylum law which were brought to the surface by the recent refugee influx into the EU.
We live now in the midst of a massive global crisis of mobility. An ever-growing population finds itself refugees displaced from the legitimate jurisdiction of any territorial state. In the face of this pressing emergency, influential voices argue that international human rights law should be placed “at the center” of international efforts to meet this challenge. But today's calamity is set against the backdrop of a universal human rights regime that is not only thin but, more importantly, incomplete. When it comes to cross-border mobility, human rights law ensures that states allow individuals to leave their state, but alas does not require that any other state let them enter and remain. Such entry and residence rights are required only for a country's own nationals (however nationality is defined). And so, many refugees who have exercised their human right to exit come up against a functional block to mobility: they have no place to stop moving. Some of them may nonetheless find a state willing to take them in. In that case, they may enjoy meaningful protection, but this protection exists only by virtue of a state's domestic policies and has little to do with international human rights.