The proposition needs no arguing that it would be desirable from everybody's point of view if some way could be found of bringing the 600 million people of mainland China back into effective, approximately normal relations with all the rest of the world. It is often argued that the early realisation of what the present Communist régime on the mainland claims as its legal and moral right—to represent China in the United Nations—would go very far towards accomplishing the purpose. I must confess to a considerable scepticism concerning the predictions often made about the changes in attitude and behaviour the Chinese Communists would display if they were admitted to the United Nations. Communist China's external relations depend on a number of factors besides her standing in the United Nations. There has been nothing in China's actions or declarations over the years to indicate that U.N. membership is so highly valued by the Chinese that they would of their own accord significantly modify any of their other major goals in order to achieve this one. The record indicates rather that the contrary is true.

Until 1949, Communist rule was still restricted to states where wheat forms the basis of agricultural production. But when Mao Tse-tung extended his control to territories south of the Yangtse river, thereby enabling Ho Chi Minn to establish later a twin régime hi North Vietnam, the problem of collectivisation first appeared in tropical areas where rice is the main agricultural crop. From then on, an unforeseen problem of major importance has confronted the two Asian Communist leaders. Unlike their other colleagues in the Socialist camp, these two have had to adapt the rigorous norms of the collective system to the production of rice, an extremely delicate aquatic plant. Their relentless efforts to accomplish this are unprecedented and, now that the practical experiment has been in progress for several years, it is possible to make a preliminary appraisal of the results.

In the area under the rule of the Canton Government, the young Kuomintang members were full of revolutionary spirit and in favour of social change. In addition to this, the graduates of the Peasant Movement Training Institute, who were disciplined in the revolutionary atmosphere of the Institute, went out to the rural areas to organise the peasants. It is easy, then, to understand why the peasant unions developed rapidly in this area. Of course, even under the Canton Government, there were some countermovements among landlords, traditional local officials and their supporters.

The cultural level of North Vietnam is undoubtedly one of the lowest imaginable. Eighty per cent, of the population is illiterate, ignorant to an incredible degree and subject to the most extraordinary superstitions. Apart from the masses there remains the élite—and the hopes that one should be able to place in the youth. But here, also, we find the same deep division that was created in the population as a whole by the war—on the one hand the members of the Resistance and on the other those who remained outside it.

Any treatment of such a basic topic as the role of law in China, old or new, becomes meaningful only if it is related to a discussion of the philosophy of law in our own tradition. In order to make an evaluation that brings the Chinese situation into relief, one has to compare, contrast, or relate the role of law at the different stages of China's development with its role in the Western tradition. Since the basic philosophical assumptions, on which all definition and discussion of law are based, are themselves controversial in our own tradition, this is a very hazardous undertaking; but it is crucial to any understanding of China, past and present.

Sovietologists and Sinologists have found it extremely difficult to assess the position which the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV) occupies within the Communist bloc. Some have concluded that it is simply a satellite of Peking, basing their judgment upon its geographical position and the fact that the Vietnamese leaders closely followed the policies of the Chinese Communists, at least during the early years of the state's existence. Others have stated that the DRV is more closely bound to the Soviet Union than to China, and they quote extracts from the speeches of Vietnamese leaders to confirm this opinion. Still others maintain that the DRV enjoys a substantial measure of independence of both Russia and China and may, like Tito's Yugoslavia, break with the Communist bloc at some future date. They point out that the Vietnamese, like the Yugoslavs, won their own independence without the backing of the Russian or Chinese army. All of these conclusions are too facile and prove, if they prove anything at all, that their authors have not taken into account all the factors which have a bearing upon the events in the DRV. As in all Communist states, the formulation of policy is the responsibility of a few leaders, but these men, whatever their personal political inclinations, are restricted in their choice of policy by the circumstances in which they find themselves.

A belief widely current in the Western world is that Vietnamese in general dislike the Chinese, towards whom they experience a feeling of inferiority springing from the domination of Vietnam for over a thousand years by her powerful northern neighbour.

It would amount to a serious error of judgment to treat North Vietnam's economic development as a mere pocket edition of the Chinese or Soviet experiment. It is, of course, true that many features of economic policy adopted by the bearded ruler of Hanoi show clear signs of their Pekingese or Muscovite parentage. As far back as 1954 Ton Duc Thanh, chairman of the Vietnamese Popular Front, Lien Viet, had pointed to the current Soviet scene as his country's target for the future.

Until the Chinese “volunteers” crossed the Yalu in November 1950, the Chinese involvement in North Korean politics seems to have been minimal. And yet, when the North Korean régime's very life and the Chinese border were threatened by the massive assault of the United Nations forces, the Chinese quickly came to the aid of the North Koreans. What is Chinese policy toward Korea? What are the prospects for Sino-Korean relations? Such questions will concern us for a long time. This article details part of the historical background to them.

For many years, many thousands of Vietnamese patriots have sacrificed themselves for a double objective—the unity and independence of Vietnam—and it was in pursuit of these aims immediately after the Second World War that, first the Viet-Minh, then the anti-Communist nationalists, brought into operation all the means at their disposal, both military and diplomatic. The Geneva Agreements of July 1954 confirmed the independence of Vietnam at international level. Yet, at the same time the country's unity, which for several years had no longer constituted a problem, was destroyed.