Based on that pragmatic approach, I have selected twelve domains, twelve labours of Hercules as illustrated on the metopes of the Temple of Zeus at Olympia. Both Hercules and Europa are part of the Greek mythology, from the cradle of European civilization, and are even interconnected. We know that Zeus disguised himself as a white bull to seduce Europa. That same Zeus used the same technique, disguising himself, this time as Amphitryon, the spouse of Alcmene, and conceiving with her a child, Hercules. The mother was considered the tallest, most beautiful woman, and wise with it. The child inherited from his natural father the combination of enormous strength and a certain leanness and was thus very powerful. By analogy, the power of Europe is based on the synergy and power of the constituent Member States and pragmatism should hence allow each of the Member States to be better off together.

The reader should see these twelve priorities as an illustration of how a pragmatic approach can work in practice. Other domains can be added and domains can be omitted, but always based on the premise that actions on the European level should make a difference and that citizens should be able to feel this in everyday life. And just as no metopes stands alone, these twelve policy areas must also become holistic, rather than a menu to select from.

My aim is to briefly summarize each of the labours and still – it is becoming more difficult now – avoid Eurocrat jargon. I will discuss for each labour the potential impact on European citizens and what it is all about. Let us not forget Jean Monnet’s earlier thought that Europe is not for the Member States, but for the citizens. The twelve labours, or priorities, are:

• 1. Erasmus4All or the happy few?

• 2. Environmental and climate policy: a sense of urgency

• 3. Europe: a home for industry?

The question is: how should we proceed now? Can Europe just muddle on now that the momentum has ebbed? Or should we just stop, as has happened with a lot of past integration efforts throughout the world? Or should we breathe new life into Europe and if so, how? Let us take a closer look at four possible scenarios.

1. EURO-MADNESS

Europe is the future. Member States are the past. This is how we could summarize this scenario. All tasks should be transferred to the supranational level as much as possible. European taxes, direct European elections, a European army – these are just a few of the many possibilities.

Guy Verhofstadt, former leader of the ALDE (liberals) group in the European Parliament, is an adoptee of this philosophy. He advocates a United States of Europe with a European diplomatic corps, a European army and a genuine European government. Valéry Giscardd’ Estaing and Helmut Schmidt also have far-reaching proposals that make Europe a fully integrated monetary, budgetary and fiscal zone. This philosophy is based on the idea that what is done at European level is done better.

The gap with the citizens makes such an approach unfeasible; that is not realpolitik. Citizens already believe that everything is decided in Brussels. Entrusting yet more powers to the Schuman bubble would only exacerbate those problems and lead to further mistrust in the European construction.

The Euro-madness approach is not only unfeasible, but also undesirable. After all, from the earlier points it may be concluded that Europe is not a nirvana. It does not make sense to want to do everything on a supranational level.

Besides, the European construction is a gradual process, not one that aims to bring everything up to the European level, gradually eroding the powers at national and regional level. It only makes sense to bring a certain domain wholly or partly to the European level if there is real added value in doing so. Nor was it ever the intention of the fathers of Europe to create a kind of Moscow in Brussels.

Incidentally, the concept of ‘the United States of’ does not seem attractive to me as a model for Europe.

In the international law of the sea, human activities in the ocean are regulated according to multiple jurisdictional zones. Thus, the spatial distribution of jurisdiction of States is the foundation of the law of the sea. Where the jurisdiction of two or more coastal States overlaps, delimitation of the overlapping marine spaces is at issue. This chapter will deal with rules of international law with regard to maritime delimitation, focusing mainly on the following issues: (1) the cardinal principle applicable to maritime delimitations, (2) the three-stage approach and its limitations, (3) relevant circumstances in the law of maritime delimitation, (4) the delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and (5) the role of international courts and tribunals in the development of the law of maritime delimitations.

International peace and security on the oceans are currently faced with a variety of threats. For instance, piracy and armed robbery against ships are serious problems endangering the welfare of seafarers and the security of sea communication. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through marine transport is a matter of pressing concern. Furthermore, military uses of the oceans raise international tension between interests of the coastal State and interests of the naval State. Thus, this chapter will address the legal issues of maintenance of international peace and security at sea. Principal focus will be on the following issues: (1) the rules applicable to the suppression of piracy and its limitations, (2) the prevention and suppression of maritime terrorism and other unlawful offences at sea, (3) military exercises in the EEZ of a foreign State permissible in the law of the sea, and (4) the significance of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Ocean governance must be based on a sound scientific understanding of the marine environment. Thus, it may be argued that the freedom of marine scientific research is a prerequisite of ocean governance. However, marine scientific research or other survey activities in the offshore areas may affect economic and security interests of coastal States. In particular, military survey activities in the EEZ of another State have raised highly sensitive issues between surveying and coastal States. Hence, there is a need to achieve a balance between the freedom of marine scientific research and the protection of interests of coastal States. Against that background, this chapter will address particularly the following issues: (1) definition of marine scientific research, (2) reconciliation between the freedom of marine scientific research with the protection of interests of coastal States, (3) hydrographic and military survey activities in the EEZ another State, (4) international cooperation in marine scientific research, and (5) the transfer of technology.

This chapter follows the Lena Goldfields Arbitration of 1930 and examines the legal practices deployed by the parties and the tribunal in their relation to the internationalisation of concession agreements. The tribunal was constituted after a dispute arose between a British company and the Soviet state over the fate of a concession agreement granted in 1925 concerning goldmines in Siberia, and it is the only international arbitration the Soviet Union ever participated in. The chapter takes as a starting point that the socialist revolution in the Soviet Union led to a fundamental change in the structure of the legal order, especially with regard to property rights. Instead of private individual ownership, Soviet law prescribed collectivised state ownership. The chapter argues that the tribunal elevated the jurisdiction over the Lena Goldfields concession agreement to the international level in order to override the application of socialist Soviet law. This elevation was achieved by relying on legal techniques concerning the competence of the arbitral tribunal and the applicable law to the concession agreement. While the Soviet Union maintained that the dispute was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, the company and the tribunal claimed the jurisdiction of an international legal order.

By reason of their geography, landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States cannot fully use the oceans and it is thus not surprising that these States have sought to safeguard their special interests. As a consequence, the LOSC provides specific rules with regard to the rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States. As these States are also members of the international community, it is important to secure their right to engage in marine activities. Thus this chapter will address particularly the following issues: (1) the definition of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, (2) the right of access to and from the sea and navigational rights, and (3) participation in the exploitation of natural resources and marine scientific research in the EEZ of another State.

Internal waters, the territorial sea, international straits and archipelagic waters are marine spaces under the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State. However, the use of the marine environment for sea communication necessitates the freedom of navigation through those spaces. Consequently, marine spaces under territorial sovereignty are part of the territory of the coastal State and the highway for sea communication at the same time. The dual nature of marine spaces gives rise to the fundamental question of how it is possible to reconcile the territorial sovereignty of the coastal State and the freedom of navigation. With that question as a backdrop, this chapter will examine the following issues in particular: (1) the coastal States jurisdiction over foreign vessels in internal waters, (2) refuge for ships in distress, (3) the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, (4) the legal regime of international straits, (5) the legal regime of archipelagic waters, and (6) the differences between the right of innocent passage, the right of transit passage and the right of archipelagic sea lane passage.

This chapter expands on the concept of reciprocity, looking at how it can be defined, its key characteristics, and the three key functions it plays: in norm creation, as a condition, and in execution of the law. It examines the defining elements of reciprocity: proportionality, relativity, equality, and interdependence. The chapter goes on to examine the nature of reciprocity, and its relationship to custom and general principles, two sources of international law. It illustrates how it is reciprocity’s relationship with the structural characteristic of sovereign equality in international law that explains many of its roles and defining characteristics.

This chapter aims to show the role of oil concessions and arbitrations conducted on disputes arising from them for the internationalisation of contracts. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Arbitration between the British oil company Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast Ltd) and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi of 1951 was one of the first of a number of arbitrations against oil-producing countries in the Middle East in the period after the Second World War and serves as a point of entry for this analysis. The argument this chapter advances is twofold. First, it aims to suggest that the construction of the international legal order over concession agreements shielded the economic sphere from sovereign assertions over production and resources and thereby maintained imperial patterns of domination in favour of Western states and their companies. Second, it argues that the driving force behind the making of this international legal order was the theory and practice of British international lawyers relying on notions of natural law, on creative argumentation and on repetition to establish the authority of the international legal order.