Chapter 9 examines the relationship between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL). Both bodies of law are concerned with protection of the human person, but there are some stark differences between the two. First, many IHRL instruments permit parties to derogate from their IHRL obligations in times of public emergency such as armed conflict, while IHL applies precisely at such times and permits of no derogation. Second is the difference in scope. IHL applies to all territory where an armed conflict is taking place, whereas IHRL has only limited extraterritorial application. This can lead to a direct conflict for a State, such as in a situation of occupation: the local law might violate IHRL obligations, yet under IHL the Occupying Power is required to respect that local law. Third, where IHL applies to both States and non-State actors, IHLR is primarily addressed to the State. In cases of overlap, harmony is preferred – both bodies of law apply. Where that is not possible because the conflict is direct, there are different views on how such conflicts should be reconciled. One view is that IHL, as the lex specialis, should prevail; the other is that the lex specialis doctrine will not always be appropriate. The conclusion is that although IHL and IHRL are slowly converging over time, there will still be situations where the differences are irreconcilable.

Chapter 7 looks at the law of targeting, which, in addition to imposing conditions on all targeting decisions, provides additional rules on the protection of civilians from the deleterious effects of armed conflict. The philosophical underpinnings of the law are explained, along with the core requirements of what constitute military objects and military objectives. Additional qualifications on permissible targeting are outlined – the requirements of proportionality and the precautions to be taken in attack, and the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks. The chapter explains the specific rules on targeting certain objects such as cultural property, the environment, medical facilities, works containing dangerous forces, objects necessary fo the survival or the civilian population and non-defended localities. The problem of dual-use (military/civilian) objects is examined, as is the law of targeting applicable in non-international armed conflict.

The Conclusions reflect on the law outlined in Chapters 1−10. They recall that IHL is essentially an attempt to balance two fundamentally contradictory drivers – the need to wage war effectively, and the need to protect people and property from the excessive effects of warfare. It concludes that IHL largely succeeds in this endeavour, and that without IHL life for those caught up in armed conflict would be immeasurably worse. It notes, however, that while the fundamental principles of IHL are enduring, States can and should do more to develop new or more comprehensive laws where there is a need, such as the under-developed law of non-international armed conflict and the lack of regulation of certain weapons.

Chapter 3 explains the types of armed conflict currently regulated under IHL, and the tests that have developed to determine whether an armed conflict exists. It explains that in the absence of a treaty definition of armed conflict, there are different views on what constitutes an armed conflict and when, therefore, the rules of IHL will apply. The application of IHL to other situations such as occupation and wars of national liberation is also covered. The chapter then turns to non-international armed conflicts; it describes the historical background from no regulation at all to their current regulation in Additional Protocol II, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and customary law. The tests for determining whether a non-international armed conflict exists are explained, and particular attention is given to the geographical scope of such conflicts. Finally, the chapter explains the various ways in which a non-international armed conflict can become internationalised, or transnationalised, and vice versa.

This is a general introduction to the book, explaining that the purpose of the book is to provide a concise but detailed explanation of the core rules of international humanitarian law. The contents of each chapter are summarised. It explains that the book looks at the major areas of IHL, putting them in historical context, so as to better understand how the law has evolved. This book also examines the current challenges for and pressures on the existing law, as IHL rules adopted in the time of cavalry and bayonets must adapt to deal with issues like drones, cyber warfare and autonomous weaponry. It notes that the third edition has been updated to reflect new developments in the law of armed conflict up to May 2023.

Chapter 4 looks at the concept of combatants and non-combatants, and its connected status, that of prisoner of war (POW). It examines who is entitled under IHL to combatant status, and examines those persons who have been denied combatant and POW status under IHL. Particular attention is paid to the status of resistance fighters, national liberation and guerrilla fighters, those participating in a levée en masse, and participants in non-international armed conflicts. The chapter outlines those categories of participant not entitled to combatant status such as spies, mercenaries, so-called unlawful combatants, and private military and security contractors. Chapter 4 also explores the current legal thinking regarding a contentious area of the law – that of civilians taking direct part in hostilities. The rules regarding POW status and the treatment of POWs are described. The chapter concludes by examining another developing area of the law: the power of detention in non-international armed conflicts.

Chapter 2 outlines the contemporary legal framework of IHL, examining the treaty and customary laws that govern conduct in armed conflict, and exploring the fundamental principles of the law. The distinction between the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum is explained, as well as some of the different terms used in IHL (Hague Law, Geneva Law, war vs armed conflict, etc). The main sources of IHL are explained – treaties and customary international humanitarian law. The chapter then explains the main principles governing IHL – distinction, discrimination, military necessity, proportionality, prohibition on unnecessary suffering, neutrality and humanity.

Chapter 5 looks at the detailed rules regarding the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces, and those who care for them – medical and religious personnel. It also looks at the law regarding what is perhaps the most recognisable emblem in the world – the Red Cross – and its affiliated emblems, the Red Crescent and Red Crystal.

Chapter 2 explores the right to make use of medically assisted procreation to conceive a child, upheld by the Strasbourg Court as an expression of private and family life. It discusses limitations based on ‘the rights of others’ (e.g. the other gamete provider in disputes over embryos) and ‘morals’ (e.g. public policy objections to heterologous fertilisation, surrogacy and the posthumous use of cryopreserved gametes/embryos). The chapter argues that the refusal to treat couples with donated gametes imposes a choice between genetic parenthood and the continuance of marriage to an infertile spouse, affecting both prospective and existing family life. It further maintains that reproductive autonomy should extend to posthumous reproduction where the deceased left advance directions and there are no overriding child welfare concerns. The chapter notes the recognition of legal ties between children and genetic parents in foreign surrogacy cases, albeit exclusively through the lens of children’s privacy (identity) rights.

Chapter 4 argues that there is a (limited) human right to a healthy child, to the extent that medical technologies are available to detect and prevent disease in the future offspring at the conception or gestation stage. It considers two claims arising in Strasbourg litigation: access to timely, accurate prenatal testing and to the termination of pregnancy on grounds of foetal abnormality, and the selection of healthy embryos through pre-implantation genetic diagnosis by aspiring parents afflicted by serious hereditary illnesses. While many judgments are country-specific and regard the failure to correctly implement existing laws or the adequacy of remedies in case of errors, the chapter also questions the legitimacy of total bans on embryo/foetal selection against disability; it maintains that, notwithstanding possible objections based on, inter alia, the message sent by permissive laws to existing disabled people and the human dignity rhetoric, they fail to satisfy the principle of proportionality.