Book contents
- What is a Person?
- What is a Person?
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Constructing the ‘Mainline Tradition’
- Part II No God, no Soul: What Person?
- Part III Toward Disabling the Person
- Part IV Persons Restored or Final Solution?
- 21 Parfit and Heidegger
- 22 Strawson and Nagel
- 23 Personalism, Phenomenology, Edith Stein
- 24 God Made Adam and Eve
- Epilogue or Epitaph?
- Appendix The World of Rights Transformed Again
- Bibliography
- Index
23 - Personalism, Phenomenology, Edith Stein
from Part IV - Persons Restored or Final Solution?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2019
- What is a Person?
- What is a Person?
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Constructing the ‘Mainline Tradition’
- Part II No God, no Soul: What Person?
- Part III Toward Disabling the Person
- Part IV Persons Restored or Final Solution?
- 21 Parfit and Heidegger
- 22 Strawson and Nagel
- 23 Personalism, Phenomenology, Edith Stein
- 24 God Made Adam and Eve
- Epilogue or Epitaph?
- Appendix The World of Rights Transformed Again
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Thus the serial selves in the mould of Hume and Parfit, as well as Cartesian Egos, do not live up to the claims of their proponents, while social and other assimilative accounts of the supposed person point to various forms of totalitarianism, whether ‘liberal’ or non-liberal. We can therefore return to where we left off at the end of the first part of this study: the line of development from Plato to Aquinas – that Mainline Tradition which made substantial advances towards an intelligible account of persons but which remains somewhat leaky and certainly incomplete.
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- What is a Person?Realities, Constructs, Illusions, pp. 216 - 235Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019