Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Notes on Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Welfare to Work, Social Justice and Domination: an introduction to an Interdisciplinary Normative Perspective on Welfare Policies
- PART I Legal Perspectives
- PART II Sociological Perspectives
- PART III Philosophical Perspectives
- Index
14 - Freedom, Exit and Basic Income
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 March 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Notes on Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Welfare to Work, Social Justice and Domination: an introduction to an Interdisciplinary Normative Perspective on Welfare Policies
- PART I Legal Perspectives
- PART II Sociological Perspectives
- PART III Philosophical Perspectives
- Index
Summary
Introduction
The idea of basic income – an income grant paid to all individual citizens or residents with no test of means or willingness to work – has started to move from academic discussion into mainstream policy debate. One major normative argument for basic income that has also achieved considerable salience is the so-called ‘republican’ argument. This takes as its starting point the idea that social policy should aim to respect and protect the individual's interest in freedom as nondomination: freedom as the status of not being subject to the arbitrary power of interference by another. Republican basic income enthusiasts argue that payment of a basic income helps to prevent domination in the economic context, such as in the relationship between workers and employers. A related line of argument contends that conditionality in ‘welfare’ systems – making benefits conditional on work-related activity – generates greater vulnerability to domination and should be avoided for this reason. In the past few years, however, critics have questioned the likely impact or adequacy of basic income in preventing domination, focusing especially on domination in the employment relationship. This chapter reassesses the ‘republican’ case for basic income, and against conditionality, in light of this criticism. It is argued that the criticisms provide a valuable corrective to simplistic and exaggerated claims about basic income and domination, but that there is nevertheless a defensible core to the republican argument. Much of the discussion focuses on the employment relationship, but an important part of the response to the critics is to repeat that risks of domination arise in a number of contexts, not only employment. For example, as Eleveld reminds us in her contribution to this volume (Chapter 12), there is a high risk of domination in the relationship between the recipient of conditional welfare payments and the state. Basic income's contribution to freedom as non-domination includes its contribution in these contexts as well as that of employment.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, the core republican case for basic income is reprised, explaining how basic income is connected by some theorists to the power of exit from relationships, a power that is, in turn, linked to the status of freedom as non-domination.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Welfare to Work in Contemporary European Welfare StatesLegal, Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives on Justice and Domination, pp. 307 - 330Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2020