Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables, Figures, and Appendices
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: The Puzzle of Japan's Welfare Capitalism
- 1 Rashomon: The Japanese Welfare State in a Comparative Perspective
- 2 Structural Logic of Welfare Politics
- 3 Historical Patterns of Structural Logic in Postwar Japan
- 4 The Rise of the Japanese Social Protection System in the 1950s
- 5 Economic Growth and Japan's Selective Welfare Expansion
- 6 Institutional Complementarities and Japanese Welfare Capitalism
- 7 The Emergence of Trouble in the 1970s
- 8 Policy Shifts in the 1990s: The Emergence of European-Style Welfare Politics
- 9 The End of Japan's Social Protection as We Know It: Becoming Like Britain?
- Conclusion: Two Future Scenarios
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
9 - The End of Japan's Social Protection as We Know It: Becoming Like Britain?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 August 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Tables, Figures, and Appendices
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: The Puzzle of Japan's Welfare Capitalism
- 1 Rashomon: The Japanese Welfare State in a Comparative Perspective
- 2 Structural Logic of Welfare Politics
- 3 Historical Patterns of Structural Logic in Postwar Japan
- 4 The Rise of the Japanese Social Protection System in the 1950s
- 5 Economic Growth and Japan's Selective Welfare Expansion
- 6 Institutional Complementarities and Japanese Welfare Capitalism
- 7 The Emergence of Trouble in the 1970s
- 8 Policy Shifts in the 1990s: The Emergence of European-Style Welfare Politics
- 9 The End of Japan's Social Protection as We Know It: Becoming Like Britain?
- Conclusion: Two Future Scenarios
- Bibliography
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics
Summary
The structural logic approach put forth in this book predicts the most likely policy outcomes on the basis of the government type, party strength, and district magnitude. This chapter applies the logic to explain why Japan's social protection system began to change fundamentally in the post-1996 period. At first sight, there appears to be little difference between the pre-1996 and the post-1996 periods: the government type remained the same – that is, coalition governments. This apparent continuity, however, masked a tidal shift in Japanese politics that occurred after the electoral and legislative rules were changed in the latter half of the 1990s. In October 1996 the Lower House adopted a SMD-dominant mixed electoral system, requiring the typical Lower House politician to compete for a single seat in her district. This chapter covers the period from the 1996 Lower House elections through to 2006.
Of critical importance here is the centralization of decision making within the LDP as a consequence of the new electoral rules. The LDP leadership had always found it very difficult to impose its will on the party, due to the weakening of the party that occurred under the MMD/SNTV system. Japan's MMD/SNTV system had empowered intraparty veto players, such as habatsu leaders and subcommittees of the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), which were allied with different ministries. Under the new electoral rules, the elimination of intraparty competition eroded the basis of the old LDP politics by making it possible for the party leader to centralize the party.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Welfare and Capitalism in Postwar JapanParty, Bureaucracy, and Business, pp. 254 - 286Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008