Cumulatively, the twentieth century's second half was a very bad era for Arab peoples and polities. Each year added to a seemingly endless list of problems and failures. Few if any of their basic foreign policy goals were achieved, and the gap between theory and reality opened up further during the post–Cold War era. At home, Arab countries lagged behind many others in the pace of their economic development and social progress; the Middle East remained less democratic and more repressive than any region on earth after the fall of communism.

Under normal circumstances, this situation should ultimately have led to a serious reevaluation – which indeed did happen during the 1990s – and change. Yet despite the demonstrated deficiencies of the radical expectations that almost always dominated Arab rhetoric and so often determined political behavior, these old ways were not rejected. Instead, they were merely revived, preserved, or just repackaged with new slogans and justifications. The region's dramatic daily events, colorful personalities, and frequent crises dazzle the eye and appear to involve continual transformation. Yet in the end, what is truly remarkable is how little Arab ideology and politics have changed despite the glaring inadequacies they have constantly showed.

But why has such an awesome gap opened up between ideology and goals, on the one hand, and events on the other? And why has the Arab world found it so hard to challenge and revise its own disproven assumptions and failed policies? The key to this apparent mystery is hidden in the issue of who is to be blamed for this unhappy history and pessimistic outlook.