Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I What is acquired – theory-theory versus simulation-theory
- 2 ‘Radical’ simulationism
- 3 Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory
- 4 Varieties of off-line simulation
- 5 Simulation, theory, and content
- 6 Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: arguments for a simulation-theory mix
- 7 Folk psychology and theoretical status
- 8 The mental simulation debate: a progress report
- Part II Modes of acquisition – theorising, learning, and modularity
- Part III Failures of acquisition – explaining autism
- Part IV Wider perspectives – evolution and theory of mind
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
4 - Varieties of off-line simulation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- Part I What is acquired – theory-theory versus simulation-theory
- 2 ‘Radical’ simulationism
- 3 Simulation and self-knowledge: a defence of theory-theory
- 4 Varieties of off-line simulation
- 5 Simulation, theory, and content
- 6 Simulation as explicitation of predication-implicit knowledge about the mind: arguments for a simulation-theory mix
- 7 Folk psychology and theoretical status
- 8 The mental simulation debate: a progress report
- Part II Modes of acquisition – theorising, learning, and modularity
- Part III Failures of acquisition – explaining autism
- Part IV Wider perspectives – evolution and theory of mind
- References
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
Simulation and information
In the last few years, off-line simulation has become an increasingly important alternative to standard explanations in cognitive science. The contemporary debate began with Gordon (1986) and Goldman's (1989) off-line simulation account of our capacity to predict behaviour. On their view, in predicting people's behaviour we take our own decision-making system ‘off line’ and supply it with the ‘pretend’ beliefs and desires of the person whose behaviour we are trying to predict; we then let the decision maker reach a decision on the basis of these pretend inputs. Figure 4.1 offers a ‘boxological’ version of the off-line simulation theory of behaviour prediction.
The off-line simulation theory of behaviour prediction is a radical departure from the typical explanations of cognitive capacities. In explaining a capacity in some domain (e.g., our ability to solve mathematical problems), the usual strategy in cognitive science is to suppose that the subject has a body of information about that domain (see, e.g., Fodor, 1968a). For example, our ability to predict the motion of projectiles is thought to depend on a body of information about mechanics – a folk physics. Of course, much if not all of these information bases or theories may be tacit or ‘sub-doxastic’ (Stich, 1978). Further, different theorists have different ideas about how the information is encoded.
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- Theories of Theories of Mind , pp. 39 - 74Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996
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