Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Table of Contents
- Note on Transliteration
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad
- Part One Background and Lost Voices
- 1 From Admirer to Critic: Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States
- 2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience
- 3 Disillusioned Diplomacy: US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945
- Part Two Did America Lose China?
- 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible: A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947
- 5 Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953
- 6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises
- Part Three Rapprochement and Opportunities
- 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation
- 8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991
- 9 Jiang Zemin and the United States: Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge
- Part Four Did China Lose America?
- 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy: Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America
- 11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations
- Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II?
- Index
5 - Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Table of Contents
- Note on Transliteration
- Abbreviations
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction: US-China Relations at a Historic Crossroad
- Part One Background and Lost Voices
- 1 From Admirer to Critic: Li Dazhao’s Changing Attitudes toward the United States
- 2 Legacy of the Exclusion Act and Chinese Americans’ Experience
- 3 Disillusioned Diplomacy: US Policy towards Wang Jingwei’s Reorganized National Government, 1938–1945
- Part Two Did America Lose China?
- 4 Lost Opportunity or Mission Impossible: A Historiographical Essay on the Marshall Mission to China, December 1945–January 1947
- 5 Negotiating from Strength: US-China Diplomatic Challenges at the Korean War Armistice Conference, 1951–1953
- 6 Mao Zedong and the Taiwan Strait Crises
- Part Three Rapprochement and Opportunities
- 7 Media and US-China Reconciliation
- 8 Sino-American Relations in the Wake of Tiananmen, 1989–1991
- 9 Jiang Zemin and the United States: Hiding Hatred and Biding Time for Revenge
- Part Four Did China Lose America?
- 10 China’s Belt-Road Strategy: Xinjiang’s Role in a System without America
- 11 The East and South China Seas in Sino-US Relations
- Conclusion: The Coming Cold War II?
- Index
Summary
Abstract
This chapter is about the Korean War Armistice talks (July 1951-July 1953) between the United Nations Command and the Communist side (North Korea and the Chinese military forces in Korea) from the perspective of negotiating from strength. It explores how the interplay of military strength on the battlefields and diplomatic schemes at the truce tent shaped the negotiation strategies from Washington and Beijing.
Keywords: The Korean War, The United Nations Command (UNC), United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Chinese People’s Volunteer army (CPVA), POWs, demarcation line
George Marshall’s failed mission to mediate a coalition agreement between the ruling Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was followed by the Civil War that ended with the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the Sino-Soviet alliance a few months later. In less than a year, the new Communist regime was faced with a graver challenge with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. This time, the responses of the United States and Communist China put the two already unfriendly countries on a collision course when the Chinese military and the American-led United Nations Command forces met face to face on the Korean battlefield. One year after fierce fighting, the Americans and the Chinese Communists agreed to meet at the negotiation table to talk about an armistice, however reluctantly, as the war stalled on the battlefields. With battle and negotiation, the Chinese Communists began to build a resume showing both persistence and bargaining capacity, while the Americans learned to consider cultural factors in future diplomatic and military operations in dealing with the Communists. In the long run, Sino-US relations were built mostly through negotiations and reconciliations.
The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, when the North Koreans attacked South Korean positions along the 38th Parallel, and ended with an armistice three years later. The United States’ instantaneous involvement in the war to lead the United Nations Command (UNC) on the side of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) and Communist China’s entry into the war four months later to aid the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) transformed the war from a civil war to an international conflict.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Sino-American RelationsA New Cold War, pp. 135 - 184Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2022