A complete explanation of the social world must at some level articulate the relationship between self and society. In many ways this is the fundamental theoretical task of sociological social psychology. Consequently, sociologists have developed a diverse set of conceptual systems and theoretical perspectives that seek to explain the nature of social action as it relates to our larger societal structures. Many of these theories rely (whether explicitly or implicitly) on various cognitive processes in their explanations of society. In fact, there is a long tradition of concern for cognitive issues within the discipline. Durkheim's analysis of collective representations, Marx's discussions of ideology and class consciousness, and Weber's “idealist” orientation and verstehen method all clearly place cognition in a central role. Yet, despite this tradition of general appreciation, there has been little explicit theoretical articulation of cognition from a sociological perspective. Indeed there has been conspicuously little in the way of contemporary developments even of the work of Mead, where the basis of a truly sociological approach to the mind is found. As Collins (1985: 225) has recently noted,