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10 - Violence, Human Rights, and Piety: Cosmopolitanism versus Virtuous Exclusion in Response to Atrocity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 September 2009

Thomas Brudholm
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen
Thomas Cushman
Affiliation:
Wellesley College, Massachusetts
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Summary

Introduction: Fellow Feeling and Its Limitations

There is a well-established argument in moral philosophy and to some extent in political economy that human beings qua human beings have a strong sentiment of sympathy for others. In 1759 Adam Smith who was then the professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow published his The Theory of Moral Sentiments in which he had much to say about “fellow feeling.” It is worth quoting Smith at some length on this issue, since his views have to some extent remained definitive on the topic:

Humanity consists merely in the exquisite fellow-feeling which the spectator entertains with the sentiments of the persons principally concerned, so as to grieve for their sufferings, to resent their injuries, and to rejoice at their good fortune.

(Smith, 1984, pp. 190–191).

David Hume took a similar view in writing the three volumes of the Treatise on Human Nature (1958) in the 1730s. For Hume

A good natur'd man finds himself in an instant of the same humour with his company. … A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity into my mind

(Hume, 1958, p. 317).

But Hume noted that when I feel sympathy for a child who has injured him self, I do not actually feel pain and hence he reasoned that sympathy or the ability to sympathize with the mood of a fellow human being is in fact the basis of morality as such.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
, pp. 242 - 264
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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