Summary

Philosophical, historical and political perspectives inform this chapter’s exploration of the meaning and value of privacy in professional relationships. Rights of privacy allow for individual choice in deciding whether to share personal information with others. This provides individuals some control over the flow of information about themselves and confers on privacy a particular authority in protecting individual identity and sense of self. Grounding privacy and professional relationships within an ethical and moral framework clarifies how they contribute to social welfare and the social good. Virtue ethics can inform an understanding of privacy as a personal right and a public interest and allows us to see how professional relationships without privacy protections may exacerbate inequalities and oppression while rendering impossible the job of the professional. Relational theory and the ethics of caring are presented as some of the current instructive approaches to understanding professional relationships. Finally, the chapter emphasises the importance of confidentiality as a foundational component of professional relationships and discusses the responsibilities of professionals with respect to informed consent and autonomy.

Virtue ethics

Philosophy, in its engagement with meanings, offers deep insight into the components of a good life. We therefore turn to philosophers for guidance in elucidating the meanings of the main concepts in this chapter. Virtue ethics, initiated by Plato and furthered by his student Aristotle, encompasses ancient Greek beliefs about what constitutes a good life. Lodge (1950) points to the two levels of Plato's dialogues – individual and social. The former is materialist, valuing possessions, property and wealth. In contrast, concern in the social is for excellence and preservation of the community, power, law and order. Aristotle’s description of political associations focuses on the ways in which societies create capacities for ethical practices and modes of existence.

Appiah (2003) is among a group of contemporary philosophers (Doris, 2002; Hursthouse, 2002; Sunstein, 2004) engaged in a re-examination of virtue ethics. Feminist philosophers (Brennan, 2002; Koggel, 2002; Sherwin, 2002) also contribute to the current dialogue by analysing the impact of different kinds of relationships on equality and oppression. This sense of the importance of virtue ethics is seen, as well, in the work of some of our best contemporary social scientists (Koocher and Keith-Spiegel, 1998; Dworkin, 2000; Banks, 2004; Hugman, 2005).